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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Daeyup Lee, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
This thesis deals with macroeconomic dynamics. In chapter 1, I study a one-sector growth
model with endogenous discount rate of the sort proposed by Meng [2006]. I extend the
model into a heterogeneous agents model with respect to initial wealth, and investigate
whether the wealth distribution may converge to a degenerate distribution. I find that
if an agent’s decision only depends on his or her reference group and if consumption is
more important in discounting than income around the steady state, then convergence to a
degenerate distribution is a unique solution. Furthermore, if an agent’s decision depends on
average variables of overall society, I find that there exists a continuum of steady states.
In chapter 2, I introduce three mechanisms into otherwise standard Aiyagari [1994] model
to generate a realistic wealth distribution. The three mechanisms include: i) a wealth-
dependent shock: labor income shock is wealth-dependent; ii) misspecification: people do
not take into account the dependence of the labor income process on wealth when they make
consumption decisions; iii) status-seeking from some threshold: there is a direct utility gain
from being wealthy. The main findings are as follows: i) Wealth-dependent labor income
shock with misspecification helps to explain wealth concentration but cannot fully explain
the share of the top 1% in wealth distribution. ii) In the full model with status-seeking, the
share of top 1% becomes closer to the data.
In chapter 3, I build a simple model (two-dimensional discrete dynamical system) to
study the interactive dynamics of short-term nominal interest rates of the U.S. and interna-
tional risk appetite. Main implications from the research are the followings: First, strong
iii
interaction between short-term nominal interest rates of the U.S. and international risk ap-
petite can induce bifurcations of the dynamical system: stable fixed point to limit cycle and
then to chaos. Second, a numerical experiment suggests two possible explanations for rising
variance ratios: the reduction of random shock and the bifurcation of a dynamical system.
This finding hints the potential of complexity measures (such as Lyapunov exponent and
permutation entropy) as early warning signals.
iv
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1.0 A CLOSER LOOK AT WEALTH DYNAMICS OF A ONE-SECTOR
GROWTH MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS DISCOUNT RATE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Generally speaking, in simple macroeconomic models, an agent’s utility depends only on
his or her own consumption. Recently, social factors which have influence on consumption
decisions have been extensively investigated. For example, people might be interested in the
average consumption in the economy (“Keeping up with Jones”). Or, people might take
into account the wealth level of the reference group (“status seeking”). In this paper, I
investigate the consequence of these two motives in a model. Particularly, I am interested
in the dynamics which emerges from these motives while focusing on the issue of wealth
convergence. I think that the issue is particulary important in economic integration.1
Concretely speaking, in this paper, I study long-run wealth dynamics of a one-sector
growth model with endogenous discounting suggested by Meng [2006]. Meng [2006] in-
vestigates the indeterminacy problem of equilibrium due to the opposing forces of average
consumption and average income in discounting function in the framework of a representative
agent model.2 I extend the model to study the issue of wealth convergence by introducing
1On the other hand, the recent literature on “symmetry-breaking” such as Matsuyama [2004] pays more
attention to endogenous inequality after international financial integration.
2Here, I briefly review the concept of indeterminacy. In a discrete time framework under the assumption
of rational expectation, let A be the matrix governing dynamics of a model. Let n||>1 be the number of
eigenvalues of A outside the unit circle and m be the number of non-predetermined variables of the model.
According to Blanchard and Kahn [1980], if n||>1 = m, the solution is unique. If n||>1 < m there exist
infinitely many solutions. In the literature, the latter case is also called ‘indeterminate.’ In a continuous time
framework, n||>1 is replaced by n+, the number of eigenvalues with a positive real part. Nice discussions
about indeterminacy problem are contained in Azariadis [1993, 28.5], Benhabib and Farmer [1999], and
Mitra and Nishimura [2001], among others. Regarding the indeterminacy problem of rational expectation
equilibrium (REE), related with interest rate rules, including the Taylor rule, I refer to Bullard and Mitra
1
heterogeneous agents with respect to initial wealth and examining the stability of the (sym-
metric) steady states in the model.
There are at least two ways of modeling social factors. One is to modify the utility
function by adding social variables. 3 Another approach is to replace the standard constant
discount rate with variable one which depends on some social variables. In this paper I
consider the second approach.
This paper is related with the literature on an endogenous discounting rate starting with
Uzawa [1968]. The general properties of endogenous discounting specification, including re-
cursive property, are extensively analyzed by Epstein and Hynes [1983], Epstein [1987], and
Obstfeld [1990] under the assumption that discounting depends on his or her own consump-
tion profile. Drugeon [1998] studies a model including average consumption in discounting.
This paper is also related with the literature on long-run wealth dynamics. Wealth
inequality has been one of the most controversial issues in our society. Since wealth is a
stock variable determined by a flow variable saving, wealth dynamics is closely connected
with saving decisions, in other words, consumption decisions. In an important paper, Stiglitz
[1969] investigates economic factors which determine asymptotic convergence of wealth by
using the Solow growth model. Given the saving function, he shows the convergence of
wealth under the assumption of concavity of production function. But in that model, the
consumer does not optimize her consumption. In optimal growth literature, Ramsey [1928]
conjectures extreme wealth distribution in competitive equilibrium (where the agents with
the lowest discounting rate hold the whole wealth in the economy) when agents have different
discounting rates, which is confirmed by Becker [1980].4 Recently, Bliss [2004] highlights
these different results about convergence. Long and Shimomura [2004] shows that catching
up by the poor may happen even under optimal consumption if status-seeking behavior is
included in a model.
The main findings in this paper are as follows: In the heterogeneous agents model, I
[2007].
3For example, the utility function in Nakamoto [2009] includes private consumption, average consumption,
and private capital.
4By dropping the assumption of constant discount rate, Epstein and Hynes [1983] and Lucas and Stokey
[1984] show that the steady state where more patient agent holds a little more asset exists.
2
find that convergence of wealth can be a unique solution in optimization framework with
the endogenous discounting which depends on social factors, if agents decision depends only
on his or her reference group rather than on an economy-wide average and if consumption
is more important in discounting around the steady state than income.5
In addition, an interesting question is whether the opposing forces, keeping up with Jones
and status seeking, can induce the emergence of limit cycles. In Appendix C, I perturb a
representative agent model in Meng [2006] and, by employing the Hopf bifurcation theorem
and numerical investigation, I find that there exists an unstable limit cycle. I view the
finding as an example of the so-called “corridor stability.”
In section 1.2, I extend a model in Meng [2006] into a heterogeneous agents model with
respect to initial wealth, and study the issue of wealth convergence. In particular, I consider
different discounting functions between groups in subsection 1.2.2, and in subsection 1.2.3,
I assume the same discounting function for each group.
1.2 HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS WITH ENDOGENOUS DISCOUNTING
I assume that there exist two types of agents in the economy. Agent of type i has initial
endowment ki0 with i=1, 2. Labor supply is identical. I assume integrated capital and labor
markets. Thus, the rate of return on capital and wage are identical to everybody. This
set-up is interesting in analyzing the effect of intertemporal consumption choices on wealth
distribution because other objective economic factors are the same to everybody except
initial endowment. In this section, I consider several possible discounting functions. My
primary concern in this section is the local stability of the symmetric steady state (s.s.s.),
i.e., the situation where consumption and capitals are equalized in the long run.
5In other words, in that case, the model has saddle path stability proposed by Sargent and Wallace [1973].
This paper does not deal with the issue of coordination regarding saddle path stability. For the issue, I refer
to Evans and Guesnerie [2005], for instance.
3
1.2.1 General set-up
The model is an extended version of Meng [2006] with heterogeneous agents. I consider one
sector growth model with an endogenous discounting rate. I will assume that the instanta-
neous utility function is the CRRA ( constant relative risk aversion).
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ (1.1)
For simplicity, I assume that the depreciation rate δ(t) = 0 for all t≥0. I assume the standard
neoclassical aggregate production function,
y = f(k) = Akθ (1.2)
where k is the per capita capital:
k = pi1k¯1 + pi2k¯2, pii ∈ (0, 1), pi1 + pi2 = 1 (1.3)
where pii denotes the fraction of type i. Then in a competitive market, the rate of interest r
and the wage rate w are determined by
r = f ′(k) = Aθkθ−1 (1.4)
w = f(k)− f ′(k)k = A(1− θ)kθ (1.5)
I look at two different cases due to different discounting functions.
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1.2.2 Case 1; different discounting
Agent of type i, i=1,2, solves the following utility maximization problem;
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
u(ci(t))e[−
∫ t
0 ρ(c¯
i(s),y¯i(s))ds]dt (1.6)
subject to
k˙i = rki + w − ci, k(0) = ki0 (1.7)
where c¯i(s) and y¯i(s) are average consumption and income of type i at time s, respectively.
Note that the rate of time preference is ρ(c¯i(s), y¯i(s)), (Meng [2006, 2675]). The assumption
that ρ is a function of average consumption and income of each type reflects the idea that an
individual’s consumption decision is affected by social factors. Later, in the Section 1.2.3,
I also consider the case where ρ is a function of economy-wide average consumption and
income. Let k¯i(s) are average per capita capital of type i at time s. Then,
y¯i(s) = w + rk¯i(s) (1.8)
Since there exists a continuum of agents, each agent takes c¯i(s) and y¯i(s) as exogenous
variables. r is the rate of interest and w is the wage rate.
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is given by
Hi = u(c
i) + λi(rk
i + w − ci), i = 1, 2 (1.9)
where λi(t) = µi(t)e
[
∫ t
0 ρ(c¯
i(s),y¯i(s))ds], µi(t) is the present-value lagrange multiplier. The nec-
essary conditions for maximization are
u′(ci) = λi
λ˙i = ρ(c¯
i, y¯i)λi − rλi, i = 1, 2
(1.10)
with the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
λi(t)e
[− ∫ t0 ρ(c¯i(s),y¯i(s))ds]ki(t) = 0, i = 1, 2 (1.11)
From 1.10, the Euler equation is
c˙i =
u′(ci)
u′′(ci)
[ρ(c¯i, y¯i)− r], i = 1, 2. (1.12)
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DEFINITION 1.2.1. A Competitive equilibrium is {r(t), w(t), ci(t), ki(t)}t≥0,i=1,2 satisfying
Eq. 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 1.11, and 1.12 with the equilibrium conditions ; ci(t) = c¯i(t),
ki(t) = k¯i(t), (i=1,2).
ρ(·, ·) is affine to each variable as in Meng [2006, 2678].
ρ(c¯i(t), y¯i(t)) = αc¯i(t)− βy¯i(t) + γ, α, β, γ > 0 (1.13)
Eq. 1.13 implies that if the average income of a reference group becomes higher, people
discount the future less and that if the average consumption of a reference group becomes
higher, people discount the future more. By using 1.4, 1.5, 1.8, and the equilibrium conditions
that ci = c¯i, ki = k¯i, (i = 1, 2), the model becomes as follows:
c˙i = −c
i
σ
[
αci − β[Aθkθ−1(ki − k) + Akθ] + γ − θAkθ−1], (1.14)
k˙i(t) = Aθkθ−1(ki − k) + Akθ − ci, (1.15)
where k = pi1k1 + pi2k2, pii ∈ (0, 1), pi1 + pi2 = 1, i = 1, 2.
1.2.2.1 Basic results First, I show that in this model, the symmetric steady states are
the only steady states.
Proposition 1.2.1. If α 6= β, then the symmetric steady states, c1 = c2 = c∗ = A(k∗)θ and
k∗ = k1 = k2, are the only steady states in the model.
Proof. Note that the dynamics of capital per capita in an economy is given by
k˙ = pi1k˙1 + pi2k˙2, (1.16)
With the steady state conditions, k˙i = 0, i = 1, 2 (hence k˙ = 0), we can see that from
1.15 and 1.16
Akθ = c (1.17)
should hold at a steady state where c = pi1c1 +pi2c2, per capita consumption in the economy.
Similarly, the dynamics of per capita consumption in the economy is given by
c˙ = pi1c˙1 + pi2c˙2, (1.18)
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Since c˙i = 0, i = 1, 2 (hence c˙ = 0), should hold as well, we have from 1.14 and 1.18
αc− βAkθ + γ − θAkθ−1 = 0 (1.19)
Then, (k∗, c∗) at steady states can be determined by 1.17 and 1.19. Note that I have the same
steady state conditions for (k,c) as in Meng [2006] due to the linearity of the discounting
function. Given (k∗, c∗), by imposing the conditions of c˙i = 0 and k˙i = 0 in Eqs. 1.14 and
1.15, Eqs. 1.14 and 1.15 become a system of linear equations with two unknowns, ci and ki.
In other words, we have the following system of linear equations: 1 −Aθ(k∗)θ−1
−α βAθ(k∗)θ−1
 ci
ki
 =
 (1− θ)A(k∗)θ
−(1− θ)βA(k∗)θ − γ + θA(k∗)θ−1
 (1.20)
If α 6= β, then the matrix
 1 −Aθ(k∗)θ−1
−α βAθ(k∗)θ−1
 is nonsingular and the solution of the
system of linear equations is unique. Moreover, clearly (ci, ki) = (k∗, c∗) where (k∗, c∗)
satisfies Eqs. 1.17 and 1.19, is a solution for c˙i = 0 and k˙i = 0.
Further, if α > β, the symmetric steady state is uniquely determined.
Corollary. If α > β, the symmetric steady state is uniquely determined. If α < β, multiple
symmetric steady states are possible.
Proof. From the Proposition 1.2.1, we know that symmetric steady states are the only steady
states in the model. To determine the level of capital per capita at steady state, I obtain
the following equation for k∗ by combining 1.17 and 1.19
(α− β)k + ( γ
A
)k1−θ = θ (1.21)
which is the same condition for a representative model as in as Meng [2006, 2679] because
of linear structure of discounting function. If α > β Eq. 1.21 uniquely pins down the level
of capital per capita. If α > β, then the left-hand side is strictly increasing and the right-
hand side is constant, so there can be only one solution for k∗. If α < β, the left-hand
side is potentially nonmonotonic so there is the possibility of multiple solutions. Thus, the
uniqueness of the symmetric steady state for α > β follows from Eq. 1.21.
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Before analyzing the local stability of the model, I briefly review the main results on
local stability of nonlinear dynamical systems. Let’s assume that the following dynamical
system is given:
x˙ = f(x), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn (1.22)
Let φ(t, x0) be the solution at time t with initial condition x(0) = x0. Define
φt(x) := φ(t, x0) (1.23)
The set of mappings φt(x), x ∈ Rn, is called a flow (see Perko [2001, 96]). Let x∗ be a steady
state. Then, a local stable manifold W sloc(x
∗) of x∗ is defined as follows:
W sloc(x
∗) = {x ∈ N | φt(x) →
t→∞
x∗, φt(x) ∈ N,∀t ≥ 0} (1.24)
where N is a neighborhood of x∗. A local unstable manifold of W uloc(x
∗) is defined similarly
by reversing the direction of time (see Guckenheimer and Holmes [1983, 13]).
By linearizing Eq. 1.22 at x∗, we have the linearized system of f.
x˙ = J(x∗)(x− x∗), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn (1.25)
Let’s assume that the Jacobian matrix J(x∗) has no eigenvalues with zero real part. Then,
the stable manifold theorem states that the dimension of a local stable manifold is equal
to the dimension of the stable subspace of the linearized system. In turn, the dimension of
stable subspace is equal to the number of eigenvalues with negative real parts. In short, if
J(x∗) has no eigenvalues with zero real part, we have the following relationship:
dimension of stable manifold
= dimension of stable subspace
= number of eigenvalues with negative real part
(1.26)
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Figure 1: Local stable and unstable manifolds
Therefore, the stable manifold theorem justifies the convention of investigating the local
stability of f by analyzing the linearized system of f around a steady state.6 Figure 1 illus-
trates local stable and unstable manifolds in a two-dimensional dynamical system.7 Note
that the local stable manifold (W sloc) is a curve whereas the stable subspace (E
s) is a straight
line.
If the dimension of the stable manifold is larger than the number of pieces of available
information then there is indeterminacy. That is, for a given k1(0) and k2(0), there will be
a continuum of choices of (c1(0), c2(0)) that give an equilibrium.
6For the stable manifold theorem, see Perko [2001, 107-108], for example.
7Figure 1 is based on Guckenheimer and Holmes [1983, Figure 1,3.1 (b)] and Perko [2001, p. 113, Figure
2 ].
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Now, I check local dynamics around the symmetric steady state, k1 = k2 = k∗, c1 =
c2 = c∗ where (k∗, c∗) is determined by Eqs. 1.17 and 1.19.
Proposition 1.2.2. If α > β, there exists a unique equilibrium which converges to the unique
symmetric steady state. If α < β, local indeterminacy can occur in a heterogeneous agents
model with different discounting under some values parameters.
Proof. Substituting the definition of k = pi1k1 +pi2k2 into 1.14 and 1.15, and linearizing 1.14
and 1.15, I obtain the following Jacobian matrix J |s.s.s. at symmetric steady state (s.s.s.):
J |s.s.s.=

−αc∗
σ
0 c
∗
σ
[βAθ(k∗)θ−1 − pi1Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2] − c∗
σ
[pi2Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2]
0 −αc∗
σ
− c∗
σ
[pi1Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2] c∗
σ
[βAθ(k∗)θ−1 − pi2Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2]
−1 0 Aθ(k∗)θ−1 0
0 −1 0 Aθ(k∗)θ−1
 (1.27)
Then, the characteristic polynomial P (λ) of J |s.s.s. is given by
P (λ) =
[
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β)
][
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β) + ab2)
]
=
[
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β)
]
P1(λ)
(1.28)
where P1(λ) =
[
λ2−(aα+b1)λ+ab1(α−β)+ab2)
]
, a = − c∗
σ
, b1 = Aθ(k
∗)θ−1, and b2 = Aθ(1−
θ)(k∗)θ−2. For derivation, see Appendix A.1. The stability at steady state is determined by
1.28. If α > β then, I have two negative and two positive eigenvalues. Then, by the stable
manifold theorem, there exists a two dimensional stable manifold. Since there are two pre-
determined variables (the initial levels of capitals, k10 and k20), the solution is uniquely
determined. But if α < β, then more than two negative eigenvalues can be obtained.
if α > β (so, average consumption has more effect), then, I have a unique convergent
solution for each initial conditions around the steady state. Notice that from the symmetric
structure of differential equations, it is clear that if k1(0) = k2(0) and c1(0) = c2(0), then
the paths of the two groups will be the same. This implies that the set, M = {k1 = k2
and c1 = c2}, is a two-dimensional invariant set in the system. On M, the system becomes
two-dimensional, i.e., it reduces to a representative agent model. As we will see in Eq.
C.8 in Appendix C, P1(λ) corresponds to the characteristic polynomial for a representative
agent model. If α > β, then from P1(λ) I always have one negative eigenvalue and one
positive eigenvalue, which implies that if α > β, the stable manifold in this system includes
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a one-dimensional subset of M, but the stable manifold is not a subset of M, because the
stable manifold is two-dimensional. So we can conclude that by extending the model into
heterogenous agents model, one more dimension for the stable manifold emerges. On the
other hand, as shown in Meng [2006], if α < β, then indeterminacy is possible. I illustrate
the sample paths. In this case, since in this model the level of consumption directly affects
Figure 2: A convergent path (I): α > β
the discounting function, so if the impact is sufficiently large enough relative to income, there
exists a unique choice of initial level of consumption. Note that since the model has only
a two dimensional stable manifold, given initial conditions, numerical approximation is not
trivial.
I approximate a convergent path by using the shooting method. Here I closely follow
an approach discussed in Stemp and Herbert [2006]. I use two MATLABMathworks [2010]
programs; ode45 as an initial value problem solver and fminsearch as a search method.8 I
8fminsearch implements a Nelder-Meade direct simplex search.
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set θ = 0.31, pi1 = 0.7, pi2 = 0.3. I also set the other parameters as follows: α = 1, β =
0.8, γ = −1.3304, σ = 0.8, and A=2.9 Then, the values of k and c at steady state are
given by k∗ ≈ 53.1032, c∗ ≈ 6.8520. By numerical computation, eigenvalues in that case
approximately are -8.5325, -8.5330, 0.0075, and 0.0080. I pick k1(0) = 51, k2(0) = 50. Note
that k2(0) < k1(0) < k∗. Then, I have c1(0) ' 0.4914, c2(0) ' 0.1402 and (c1, k1, c2, k2)|t=2 =
(6.8520, 53.1040, 6.8520, 53.1042). Approximation error in norm (=‖(c1, k1, c2, k2)|t=2 −
(c∗, k∗, c∗, k∗)‖) is 0.0013.10 The path is shown in Figure 2.11
Now, I pick k1(0) = 54 > k∗ > k2(0) = 52. Then, I have c1(0) ' 21.0043, c2(0) ' 1.7219
and (c1, k1, c2, k2)|t=2 =( 6.8520 ,53.1033, 6.8520, 53.1034). Approximation error in norm is
2.2422× 10−4. The path is illustrated in Figure 3.12
To get some intuitive understanding, I fix the initial level of (k1, c2, k2) = (54, 1.7219, 52)
as before and compare three paths from different initial levels of c1, including c1(0) = 21.0043.
Figure 28 in Appendix B exhibits three different paths. Given the choice of the other group,
the figure shows that there is a unique level of c1(0) from which the path converges to steady
state.
A necessary condition for indeterminacy is α < β. To get some idea about dynamics,
I approximate paths which start with different initial conditions. I set θ = 0.31, pi1 =
0.7, pi2 = 0.3. And for other parameters I follow a numerical example in Meng [2006] by
assuming that α = 0.012, β = 1, γ = 0.6, σ = 0.8, A = 0.2. Then, with θ = 0.31, the larger
symmetric steady state is given by k∗ ≈ 34.9538, c∗ ≈ 0.6019. Approximately, eigenvalues in
that case are -0.0018±0.0636i and -0.0018±0.0630i. Note that, in the case of indeterminacy,
9I pick α = 1, β = 0.8 and A=2. Then I determine steady state values of k and parameter γ from the
following two constraints;
Aθkθ−1 − [(α− β)Akθ + γ] = 0 from 1.17 and 1.19
(α− β)Akθ + γ = 0.04
where I’m assuming that in standard constant rate of discounting e−ρt, ρ = 0.04. For instance, ρ = 0.02 in
Barro and i Martin [1995, 78] and ρ = 0.05 in Carroll et al. [1997, 366].
10In this paper, approximation error means the distance between a trajectory and a steady state.
11Figure 26 in Appendix B displays an example of divergent paths where I pick initial levels for consumption
randomly with the same initial levels for capital. One of the purposes of this exercise is to check whether
the symmetric steady state has the saddle-path stability.
12 If I pick arbitrary initial values of c1(0) and c2(0), then the result is shown in Figure 27 in Appendix
B. We can see that the paths are diverging.
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Figure 3: A convergent path (II): α > β
there are multiple solutions which converge to a steady state from the same initial condition
of capitals. To verify the property, I pick arbitrary initial level of consumptions and compute
the trajectory (recall that, if the solution is unique, this procedure generally yields a divergent
trajectory).
I put k1(0) = 34, k2(0) = 32, c1(0) = 0.5145, c2(0) = 0.4165. With these initial values
I obtain (c1, k1, c2, k2)|t=2000 =(0.6025, 34.8847, 0.5964, 34.8323). Approximation error in
norm is 0.1399. Figure 4 displays the path. Note that the path does converge.
Now, I compare two different initial conditions:
IC1 := (c
1(0), k1(0), c2(0), k2(0)) = (0.7870, 36, 0.4226, 32)
IC2 := (c1(0), k1(0), c2(0), k2(0)) = (0.7870, 36, 0.1, 32).
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Figure 4: A convergent path: α < β
Note that IC1 and IC2 differ only in terms of c2(0). Figure 29 in Appendix B exhibits
the paths. The two paths of type 1 look similar and converge to the same point. In contrast,
the two paths of type 2 look different but still converge to the same point. This numerical
experiment clearly shows that the steady state does not have saddle-path stability.
Note that, when a discount rate decreases because of higher capital, an interest rate
decreases as well, which may offset the effect of decreasing discount rate. Is the movement
of the interest rate necessary to get indeterminacy? To see the role of the interest rate in
generating indeterminate solutions, in Section 1.2.2.2 I study a partial equilibrium where
factor prices, wage and interest rate, are fixed.
Figure 5 displays the movements of the discount rates and the interest rate in the case
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i) of Section 1.2.2.1. Note that the average discount rate (ρ) monotonically increases during
the transition to the symmetric steady state.13 The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows that the
Figure 5: Discount rates and the interest rate: α > β
discount rate of the poor is indeed lower than that of the rich during the transition dynamics,
which makes the catch-up possible.
Next, the top panel of Figure 6 exhibits the movements of the discount rates and the
interest rate in the case ii) of Section 1.2.2.1. In contrast with the case of the unique solution
(α > β), the average discount rate and the interest rate oscillate in similar fashions. The
bottom panel of Figure 6 exhibits that two discount rates of the two groups may move in
different directions. But, the heterogenous discounting behaviors of the two groups eventually
yield the convergence of wealth.
13The average discount rate ρ is defined by ρ := pi1ρ1 + pi2ρ2.
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Figure 6: Discount rates and the interest rate: α < β
1.2.2.2 Partial equilibrium analysis The main question in the partial equilibrium
analysis is whether the oscillation of the interest rate is responsible for the indeterminacy.
Let’s assume that there are two small villages in an economy.14 Since they are small
villages, their economic decisions do not affect economy-wide averages. Thus, we may assume
that factor prices are given as constants to the two villages:
w = w0 (1.29)
r = r0 (1.30)
14In contrast, two groups in general equilibrium model may be viewed as two countries or races.
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With Eqs. 1.29 and 1.30, the dynamical system becomes
c˙i = −c
i
σ
[
αci − β[w0 + r0ai] + γ − r0], i = 1, 2 (1.31)
a˙i = r0a
i + w0 − ci, i = 1, 2 (1.32)
ai(0) = ai0, i = 1, 2 (1.33)
where ai denotes wealth. Note that, by introducing the conditions of Eqs. 1.29 and 1.30,
there is no interplay between the two villages. As a result, the system boils down to a two-
dimensional continuous dynamical system. Because I am interested in the long-run behavior
of a two-dimensional continuous dynamical system, the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem is a
useful guidance (see Perko [2001, 245, Theorem 1], for instance). Suppose that a trajectory
is bounded. The Poincare´-Bendixson theorem implies the the trajectory is attracted to a
point or a limit cycle (= periodic orbit). The theorem makes the analysis of two-dimensional
continuous dynamical systems easier than the analysis of higher dynamical systems. For
example, according to the theorem, chaotic dynamics is impossible in a two-dimensional
continuous dynamical system.
Let J be the Jacobian matrix at a steady state. Then, the eigenvalues of J can be
obtained by the formula:
λ± =
1
2
[tr(J)±
√
(tr(J))2 − 4det(J)] (1.34)
In short, the information about the trace and the determinant of the matrix J is sufficient
to determine the local stability of a steady state.15
Proposition 1.2.3. There exists a unique steady state if α 6= β. And the unique steady
state is given by (c∗, a∗) = ( r0−γ
α−β ,
c∗−w0
r0
) .
15For a detailed discussion about two-dimensional continuous dynamical systems , I refer to Hirsh et al.
[2004, ch.4].
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Proof. By imposing the steady state conditions, c˙i = a˙i = 0 in Eqs. 1.31 and 1.32, we have
the following system of linear equations: α −βr0
−1 r0
 ci
ai
 =
 βw0 + r0 − γ
−w0
 (1.35)
If α 6= β, the matrix
 α −βr0
−1 r0
 is nonsingular. Thus, we have a unique solution, if
α 6= β. Then, the unique steady state, (c∗, a∗) = ( r0−γ
α−β ,
c∗−w0
r0
), is obtained from Eq. 1.35.
Note that Proposition 1.2.3 rules out the possibility of a continuum of steady states.
Thanks to the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem, I conclude that any bounded trajectory in the
dynamical system converges to the unique steady state or to a limit cycle, if any. In the
following, since my interest is in the convergence of wealth, I focus on the local stability of
the unique steady state.
Regarding the convergence of wealth, Proposition 1.2.3 implies that if the levels of wealth
of the two villages converge, then they converge to the same level. Note that there is no
interaction between economic decisions of the two villages since factor prices are constants.
The levels of wealth of two villages converge to the same level because they independently
confront the same long-run constraints, in other words, the same steady state conditions.
Proposition 1.2.4. The unique steady state has saddle-path stability if α > β. If α < β
and −αc∗
σ
+ r0 < 0 hold, indeterminacy occurs.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix J at the steady state is given by
J =
 −αc∗σ βr0c∗σ
−1 r0
 (1.36)
So, we have
tr(J) = −αc
∗
σ
+ r0 (1.37)
det(J) = (β − α)c
∗r0
σ
(1.38)
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If α > β, then det(J) < 0 from Eq. 1.38. In turn, from Eq. 1.34, the matrix J has one
negative and one positive eigenvalue. Hence, the unique steady state is a saddle point.
If α < β, then det(J) > 0 from Eq. 1.38. Furthermore, if αc
∗
σ
> r0, then tr(J) < 0 from
Eq. 1.37. With the two conditions, both eigenvalues of J have negative real part as we can
see from Eq. 1.34. In other words, the unique steady state is a sink in that case. Therefore,
the indeterminacy of rational expectation equilibrium occurs because the two-dimensional
continuous dynamical system has the only one predetermined variable of wealth, as we can
see from Eq. 1.33.
Proposition 1.2.4 reveals that the movement of an interest rate is not necessary in order
to obtain indeterminacy because even with a fixed interest rate, the model generates an
indeterminate solution under some parameter values.
Assume that α = 0 which implies that there is no centripetal force (consumption) in the
discount function. Then, we have tr(J) = r0 > 0 from Eq. 1.37 and det(J) = β
c∗r0
σ
> 0
from Eq. 1.38. The two conditions imply that both eigenvalues of J have positive real part
from Eq. 1.34. In other words, the unique steady state is a source. The same conclusion
holds for the very small α.
Only when α gets large enough, the unique steady state becomes a sink and indeterminacy
occurs. Which mechanism makes indeterminacy happen? From Eq. 1.36, we know that
∂c˙i
∂ai
=
βr0c
∗
σ
> 0 (1.39)
Suppose that the level of wealth becomes higher than the level at steady state. Then,
discount rate decreases for a while due to higher wealth. But as people become wealthier,
their consumption eventually grows as Eq. 1.39 implies. Indeterminacy conditions imply
that if α is sufficiently large, rising consumption will eventually reverse the decreasing trend
of the discount rate. Figure 7 reveals this mechanism. In the simulation of the model that
generates Figure 7, the parameter values specified in case ii) of Section 1.2.2.1 are used.
The initial condition for the simulation is ( c(0), a(0))=(0.7870, 36). Note that in Figure
7, income goes through a trough before consumption goes through the trough. In that
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Figure 7: Indeterminacy in partial equilibrium
way, consumption follows the income trend with a time lag. The bottom panel shows that
the interaction of the two oscillation of the two variables, consumption and income, makes
discount rate oscillate around the fixed interest rate.
Now, suppose that α becomes even larger. Recall that if α > β, the unique steady state
is a saddle point. Thus, if α becomes too large relative to β, the convergence of a path gets
sensitive on initial conditions. Therefore, I conclude that the existence of two conflicting
forces and the balance of two forces as specified in indeterminacy condition are essential in
generating indeterminacy.16
Figure 8 shows how the local stability of the dynamical system depends on the two
parameters of α and β.
16The interpretation in this paper regarding indeterminacy problem is in line with Meng [2006, 2678].
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Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram
1.2.2.3 Discussion: Comparison with earlier literature One of the factors causing
the convergence of wealth in Stiglitz [1969] is the assumption that the saving function is an
affine function of income. Note that, as a saving decision depends only on income, the growth
rate of wealth may be a decreasing function of wealth under some conditions. The intuition
is clarified by the assumption of the Kaldorian saving function in Stiglitz [1969, 391]. In
the case of Kaldorian saving function, the growth rate of wealth of the poor is higher than
that of the rich if the saving from labor income is positive. Bliss [2004] shows that under
recursive preference framework, by using the Negishi approach in computing competitive
equilibrium, strict wealth convergence cannot be optimal based on the fact that in the optimal
equilibrium, agents with higher initial wealth have more weights in social utility function.
Therefore convergence result in Stiglitz [1969] cannot be competitive equilibrium in recursive
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preference framework.17 Long and Shimomura [2004] adds status seeking behavior into the
model with the following felicity function under constant discounting;
u(ci(t)) + v(
ki(t)
k˜(t)
) (1.40)
And they assume that u and v are strictly concave, which implies that the poor get more
utility from a marginal increase in relative wealth. With this assumption, they showed that
under some conditions, the symmetric steady state is the only a steady state in the model,
and the symmetric steady state is saddle-path stable.
The model in this paper with the different reference levels (so, different discounting)
do not require status-seeking in Long and Shimomura [2004]. Instead, the discount rate
ρ(c˜i(s), y˜i(s)), is different across agents of different types. As Proposition 1.2.1 shows, the
heterogeneity in discounting makes the symmetric steady states only possible steady states.18
In other words, the heterogeneity in discounting rules out the solutions which converge to
a state different from a symmetric steady state. Next, the convergence case with a unique
solution in this paper is based on the assumption that the consumption has more importance
in a discounting function (in the sense that |ρc| > |ρy|) around the steady state. So, I can
say that the assumption is the mirror image of the “status seeking” in Long and Shimomura
[2004] in that two different assumptions yield the similar result: stronger saving incentive
for the poor, as the bottom panel of Figure 5 shows.
The indeterminacy example where income is more important in discounting function,
shows that, in that case, the convergence of wealth still may happen even though the solu-
tion is not unique. Note that the interaction of a centrifugal force (income) in discounting
function and a centripetal force (consumption) generates dynamic stability in the case of
indeterminacy and the symmetric steady state becomes a sink of the dynamical system.19
The pattern of the convergence of wealth is also different from the case of α > β. The
17If I consider multi-agent balanced growth model under recursive preference, then it turned out that the
restriction on the discount factor is quite tight. Farmer and Lahiri [2006] demonstrates that with these
assumptions, only one of two things is possible; no balanced growth path or the same discount factor. To
rescue the motivation of recurve preference framework, they suggest an exogenous time-dependent factor in
preference.
18For the literature on the relation between heterogeneity and stability of equilibria, I refer to Grandmont
[1992] and Herrendorf et al. [2000], for instance.
19Artige et al. [2004] provides an example with a limit cycle in a two region model.
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bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that each of two groups becomes more patient alternatively,
while the levels of wealth of the two groups eventually converge to the same level.
1.2.3 Case 2; same discounting
1.2.3.1 Basic results Now I assume that discounting depends on the overall average of
consumption and income to explicitly consider interactions among agents due to interdepen-
dent intertemporal preferences via discounting functions. In this case, agent of type i, i=1,2,
solves the following utility maximization problem;
max
ci(t)
∫ ∞
0
u(ci(t))e[−
∫ t
0 ρ(c(s),y(s))ds]dt (1.41)
subject to
k˙i = rki + w − ci, k(i0) = ki0 (1.42)
where c(s) and y(s) are average consumption and income at time s, respectively. Then the
system of differential equations for competitive equilibrium solution in this case becomes as
follows:
c˙i = −c
i
σ
[
αc− β(Akθ) + γ − θAkθ−1], i = 1, 2 (1.43)
k˙i = Aθkθ−1(ki − k) + Akθ − ci, i = 1, 2 (1.44)
k = pi1k1 + pi2k2, (1.45)
c = pi1c1 + pi2c2, pii ∈ (0, 1), pi1 + pi2 = 1 (1.46)
In this case, by substituting 1.45 and 1.46 into 1.43 and 1.44, and linearizing 1.43 and 1.44
at symmetric steady state (s.s.s.), I get the following Jacobian matrix:
J |s.s.s. =
(
−αc∗
σ
pi1 −αc∗
σ
pi2 c
∗
σ
pi1[βAθ(k∗)θ−1 − Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2] c∗
σ
pi2[βAθ(k∗)θ−1 − Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2]
−αc∗
σ
pi1 − c∗
σ
pi2 c
∗
σ
pi1[βAθ(k∗)θ−1 − Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2] c∗
σ
pi2[βAθ(k∗)θ−1 − Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−2]
−1 0 Aθ(k∗)θ−1 0
0 −1 0 Aθ(k∗)θ−1
)
=

aαpi1 aαpi2 −api1[βb1 − b2] −api2[βb1 − b2]
aαpi1 aαpi2 −api1[βb1 − b2] −api2[βb1 − b2]
−1 0 b1 0
0 −1 0 b1

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Then, the characteristic polynomial P (λ) of J |s.s.s. is given by
P (λ) = λ(λ− b1)
[
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β) + ab2
]
= λ(λ− b1)P1(λ)
(1.47)
Hence, the matrix J |s.s.s. always has a zero eigenvalue and one positive eigenvalue (b1 > 0).
So, by the Center Manifold theorem (see, for example, Perko [2001, 116]), there exists one
dimensional center manifold.20 The definition of a center manifold is as follows:
DEFINITION 1.2.2. The definition of a center manifold (Carr [1981, 3]).
x˙ = Ax+ f(x, y)
y˙ = By + g(x, y)
(1.48)
where x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rm and A and B are constant matrices such that all the eigenvalues of
A have zero real parts while all the eigenvalues of B have negative real parts. f and g are C2
with f(0,0)=0, f ′(0, 0) = 0, g(0, 0) = 0, g′(0, 0) = 0. In general, if y=h(x) is an invariant
manifold for 1.48 and h is smooth, then it is called a center manifold if h(0)=0, h′(0) = 0.
Thus, I will have to look at a center manifold to fully determine the local stability of the
dynamic system.
Proposition 1.2.5. There exists a continuum of steady states S,
where s ∈ S if s =

c1
c2
k1
k2
 =

pi2b1k∗
pi1
+ c∗
−b1k∗ + c∗
k∗
pi1
0
+ j

−(pi2
pi1
)b1
b1
−pi2
pi1
1

with j ∈ (0,∞). Moreover,

−(pi2
pi1
)b1
b1
−pi2
pi1
1
 is an eigenvector of zero eigenvalue of Jacobian
matrix at each point of the continuum of steady state.
20For a more detailed discussion about a center manifold in macroeconomic models, I refer to Gomis-
Porqueras and Haro [2009].
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Proof. By using the steady state conditions k˙1 = k˙2 = 0, I have from 1.44 that c = Akθ.
So, with the result, steady state values of averaged capital and consumption are determined
from 1.43. Given k∗ and c∗, from 1.44 - 1.46, I have the desired expression for steady states.
To see why v ≡ [−pi2
pi1
b1, b1,−pi2pi1 , 1] is the eigenvector of zero eigenvalue, I write the system
after substituting 1.45 and 1.46 as follows;
x˙ = f(x), x = [c1, c2, k1, k2]
′ ∈ R4 (1.49)
Let xˆ ≡ [pi2b1k∗
pi1
+ c∗,−b1k∗ + c∗, k∗pi1 , 0]′. Then we have
f(xˆ+ jv) ≡ 0, j ∈ (0,∞) (1.50)
From 1.50, by using chain rule,
d
dj
f(xˆ+ jv) = Df(xˆ+ jv)v = 0 (1.51)
So, we can conclude that since the directional derivative of f at xˆ + jv in the direction v
should be zero, v is the eigenvector of zero eigenvalue at xˆ+ jv.
Proposition 1.2.5 shows that center subspace= Span([−pi2
pi1
b1, b1,−pi2pi1 , 1]).
This different result about steady state, compared with the previous case, comes from
the fact that discounting functions between different groups have the same arguments c and
y. Note that with the condition of c˙i = 0, there is no ci in Eq. 1.43 whereas ci still appears
in Eq. 1.14. Examples in macroeconomics which have a continuum of equilibria are Becker
[1980] with the common discount factor in discrete time and Lucas [1988] in continuous
time.21
Proposition 1.2.6. The continuum of steady states S is a center manifold of symmetric
steady state (s.s.s.).
21 Benhabib and Rustichini [1994] is a nice explanation about the existence of zero eigenvalue in balanced
growth model.
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Proof. Let’s call center subspace Ec and stable subspace Es. Assume that the origin is an
equilibrium. Then, h(x) in the definition is a map such that
h : Ec → Es with h(0) = 0 and h′(0) = 0.
To apply the definition, I make the origin an equilibrium by changing coordinates;
s′ = s− (c∗, c∗, k∗, k∗)
If s ∈ S, then
s′ =

pi2b1k∗
pi1
+ c∗
−b1k∗ + c∗
k∗
pi1
0
+ j

−(pi2
pi1
)b1
b1
−pi2
pi1
1
−

c∗
c∗
k∗
k∗

=

pi2b1k∗
pi1
−b1k∗
pi2
pi1
k∗
−k∗
+ j

−(pi2
pi1
)b1
b1
−pi2
pi1
1

= (j − k∗)

−(pi2
pi1
)b1
b1
−pi2
pi1
1
 = (x)

−(pi2
pi1
)b1
b1
−pi2
pi1
1
 ∈ E
c where x ≡ j − k∗
Hence I have S-(c∗, c∗, k∗, k∗) ⊂ Ec. So, with new coordinates, if we think of S-(c∗, c∗, k∗,
k∗) as a graph, we have (x, h(x)) = (x, 0) ∀x, i.e., h(x)≡ 0. Clearly, S-(c∗, c∗, k∗, k∗) is
invariant, and h(0)=0, h′(0) = 0, trivially. It follows that S is a center manifold in original
coordinates.
Proposition 1.2.7. There is no solution which converges to symmetric steady state in the
heterogeneous agents model with the same reference level except the trivial cases, i.e. the
paths which start with the same initial conditions.
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Proof. Since the center manifold is a continuum of equilibria, it does not increase the di-
mension of the stable region. From the symmetric structure of differential equations, it is
clear that the set, M = {k1 = k2 and c1 = c2}, is a two-dimensional invariant set in the
system. On M, the system becomes two-dimensional, i.e., it reduces to a representative
agent model. Since negative eigenvalues can come only from P1(λ) corresponding to the
characteristic polynomial for a representative agent model, I can conclude that the stable
manifold of symmetric steady state is always included in M. So, if k1(0) 6= k2(0), the path
cannot converge to the symmetric steady state. 22
To get the economic interpretation for this result, first note that 1.43 implies the same
growth rate of consumption between different groups. If I consider convergent paths to
the symmetric steady state, from this observation, it follows that initial consumption levels
should be the same. Furthermore, from 1.44 I have
k˙i
ki
= Aθkθ−1(1− k
ki
) +
Akθ
ki
− c
i
ki
= Aθkθ−1 − Aθk
θ
ki
+
Akθ
ki
− c
i
ki
= Aθkθ−1 +
(1− θ)Akθ
ki
− c
i
ki
, i = 1, 2
So, the difference in the growth rate of capital in the two groups is given by
k˙1
k1
− k˙
2
k2
= (1− θ)Akθ
{ 1
k1
− 1
k2
}
−
{ c1
k1
− c
2
k2
}
=
{
(1− θ)Akθ − c
}{ 1
k1
− 1
k2
}
since c1 = c2 = c along convergent paths
(1.52)
Since all agents in this case consume the same amount at each time, and since I assume
k1(0) > k2(0), it follows that k1(t) > k2(t) ∀t. Hence the following holds
k˙1
k1
− k˙
2
k2
> 0⇔
{
(1− θ)Akθ − c
}
< 0 (1.53)
This condition is intuitive; since (1 − θ)Akθ is labor income share, the condition just says
that k˙
1
k1
− k˙2
k2
> 0 holds if agents consume more than the labor income. If agents consume
22So, this case violates the regularity condition in Epstein [1987].
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exactly the amount of labor income, then the growth rates of capital will be the same: the
rate of return on capital r. But, if they consume more than the labor income, because agent
of type 2 has smaller capital, obviously agent of type 2 consumes more portion of capital
income because everybody consumes the same amount. So, the growth rate of capital of
agent of type 2 will be lower. Now, we can see that 1.53 implies the impossibility of the
convergence to the symmetric steady state in this model since the converging path will satisfy
1.53 eventually, a contradiction.
1.2.3.2 Several special cases Case 1. α = β = 0. The model becomes a constant
discount rate case like Becker [1980]. Then, the characteristic polynomial P (λ) of J |s.s.s. (θ)
is given by
P (λ) = λ(λ− b1)
[
λ2 − b1λ+ ab2
]
(1.54)
Hence, λ = b1, 0,
b1±
√
b21−4ab2
2
. Since a < 0, there is only one negative eigenvalue. Because the
stable manifold is one-dimensional, the convergence to symmetric steady state can happen
only with the same initial values. But, since there is a continuum of steady states, depending
on initial values, the equilibrium solution may converge to a steady state (not necessarily a
symmetric one). This case was extensively analyzed by Kemp and Shimomura [1992]
Case 2. β = 0. Then, the characteristic polynomial P (λ) of J |s.s.s. (θ) is given by
P (λ) = λ(λ− b1)
[
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1α + ab2
]
(1.55)
In this case, λ = b1, 0,
aα+b1±
√
(aα+b1)2−4(ab1α+ab2)
2
. So, the stability is the same as case 1. For
all values of parameters, there exists only the one-dimensional stable manifold.
Case 3. α = 0.The characteristic polynomial P (λ) of J |s.s.s. (θ) is given by
P (λ) = λ(λ− b1)
[
λ2 − b1λ− ab1β + ab2
]
(1.56)
λ = b1, 0,
b1±
√
b21−4a(−b1β+b2)
2
. Again, there exists at most one negative eigenvalue for all
values of parameters.
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Case 4. Dynan and Ravina [2007] suggest that relative concern may be more important
for an above-average income group. To see this effect I assume one group has a constant
discounting rate, i.e. α = β = 0 for the second group. Then,
J |s.s.s. =

aαpi1 aαpi2 −api1[βb1 − b2] −api2[βb1 − b2]
0 0 api1b2 api
2b2
−1 0 b1 0
0 −1 0 b1

P (λ) = λ(λ− b1)
[
λ2 + (api1(βb1 − α) + ab2 − b1)λ+ aαpi1b1
]
(1.57)
λ = b1, 0,
(api1(βb1−α)+ab2−b1)±
√
(api1(βb1−α)+ab2−b1)2−4aαpi1b1
2
. So, there exists only the one-
dimensional stable manifold.
1.2.3.3 Transition dynamics to a continuum of steady states
Proposition 1.2.8. Points in the continuum of steady states S share the same eigenvalues,
therefore they show the same type of stability.
Proof. The proposition follows from the fact that the characteristic polynomial at each point
of the continuum of steady states is identical with the characteristic polynomial at the
symmetric steady state. For the proof, see Appendix A.2.
So, If the symmetric steady state has two negative eigenvalues, so does each point of
the continuum of steady states. Since the model has two state variables, it implies that an
indeterminacy of equilibria is possible if there exist two negative eigenvalues.
Here, I focus on the case of α > β, which implies that each point at the continuum
of steady states has one dimensional stable manifold. Hence, the dynamics now depends
on initial conditions in the sense that solutions from different initial values converge to
different points in the continuum of steady states. I study the following numerical example:
α = 0.5, β = 0.495, A = 3, γ = 0.001, σ = 0.8, θ = 0.31, pi2 = 0.3. Then, I have k∗ =
60.8647, c∗ = 10.7220. I report two cases;
i) j = 50, (c1, k1, c2, k2) |c.s.s.= (10.9762, 65.5210, 10.1286, 50.0000)
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ii) j = 70, (c1, k1, c2, k2) |c.s.s.= (10.5082, 56.9495, 11.2208, 70.0000).
So, for the first case, the wealthier people have more weight. To approximate the solution,
following [Judd, 1998, 335], I use the idea of reverse shooting. I change the direction of
time by transforming t to (-t). Then, by using the standard Matlab program (ode45 ), I
approximate the orbit. Figure 9 displays the path. And Figure 30 in Appendix B exhibits
relative ratios of capital and consumption in two groups. Since the direction of time is
Figure 9: A convergent path (I) in reverse time
reversed, we have to look at the graph from the right to the left. So, along the transition
path, capital and consumption are growing, and the ratio of k1/k2 is decreasing. And since
the discounting functions are the same, the ratio of consumption is constant.
For the second case, again, we can see the same pattern. Figure 31 in Appendix B shows
the path. And Figure 32 in Appendix B displays relative ratios of capital and consumption
in two groups. Thus, the weight is not important for the result.
Finally, I pick one point on this path, (c1, k1, c2, k2)=(0.1111, 49.8289, 0.1187, 62.3715)
and approximate the solution in the original time direction. Figure 33 in Appendix B shows
the path.
30
1.2.3.4 Discussion In contrast with the heterogeneous discounting, if people’s economic
decisions depend only on economy-wide averages, there exists a continuum of steady states.
In that case, if economy-wide averages satisfy certain conditions for steady states, there is no
reason for people to change their decisions because economy-wide averages are only relevant
variables for their decisions. As there is no more constraint for people’s decisions, there exist
infinitely many possible distributions of wealth.
But, in the case of heterogeneous discounting, two groups pay attention to their own eco-
nomic variables, which is an element of heterogeneity. The element of heterogeneity excludes
non-symmetric steady states by adding one more constraint at steady states. Further, note
that the functional form of discounting function or the discounting rule is the same between
the two groups, which is an element of homogeneity. The element of homogeneity together
with the element of heterogeneity also reveals that there is no reason to believe the existence
of non-symmetric steady states, considering the same decision rule, the same conditions for
steady states, and different reference groups.
I think the analysis in this section can be applied to economic integration among na-
tions. My analysis suggests the speed of convergence in preference does matter for wealth
convergence. In other words, after economic integration, if discounting quickly converges
to the new average level, the positive effect of economic integration on wealth convergence
will be smaller. For German reunification, Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln [2007] expect 1-2
generations for preference convergence.
Regarding the transition dynamics to the continuum of steady state, Kemp and Shi-
momura [1992] shows that with the same constant discounting, the wealth is more evenly
distributed if the initial total wealth is larger than the steady state level and vice versa. My
result with social effects seems to be the opposite. But, as my results depend only on one
numerical method, it might be better to employ additional numerical procedures in order to
draw firm conclusions about transition dynamics. I will leave the task to be a future research
topic.23
23For example, recently, Trimborn et al. [2008] proposes “relaxation algorithm” for computing transition
dynamics.
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1.3 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I investigated long-run wealth dynamics of a one-sector growth model with
endogenous discounting by extending a representative agent model in Meng [2006] into a
heterogeneous agents model. In the heterogeneous agents model, if agent’s decision depends
only on his or her reference group, then the symmetric steady state is the unique steady state
of the model. Moreover, I found that if consumption is more important in discounting around
the steady state than income, the convergence of wealth distribution to the symmetric steady
state is the unique solution in optimization framework with the endogenous discounting which
depends on social factors. To my knowledge, this result is new. But, if discounting function
depends only on economy-wide average, then the inclusion of social factors does not result
in converging wealth dynamics except the special case of the same initial values. In general,
because there exists the continuum of steady states, if consumption is more important in
discounting around the steady state than income, then the resulting dynamics depends on
initial conditions.
Regarding the policy implication of the models in this paper, this paper highlights the
necessity of gradual economic integration in order to generate more even distribution of
wealth after economic integration.
Finally, an interesting question is whether the opposing forces of keeping up with Jones
and status seeking can lead to the emergence of limit cycles. In Appendix C, I explored this
possibility in a representative agent model in [Meng, 2006, example 2.3]. I found an unstable
limit cycle. I viewed the finding as an example of the so-called “corridor stability.”
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2.0 WEALTH DISTRIBUTION WITH WEALTH-DEPENDENT LABOR
INCOME SHOCK, MISSPECIFICATION, AND STATUS-SEEKING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is a well-known regularity that the distribution of wealth is much more concentrated than
the distribution of income. It has also been well recognized that replicating the regularity in
a standard incomplete market model is a very hard task. This paper aims at contributing
to the literature on the distribution of wealth by building an incomplete market model that
can generate the highly concentrated distribution of wealth.
After seminal works of Huggett [1993] and Aiyagari [1994], there have been lots of efforts
in the explanation of highly skewed wealth distribution. Several newly introduced mech-
anisms have made progress in replicating the highly concentrated distribution of wealth.1
But, whereas our understanding about amplifying mechanisms related with uninsurable id-
iosyncratic income risk has been better, from my personal viewpoint, there has not been
enough discussion about possible feedback from wealth to the income process and its re-
cursive effect on wealth distribution. Recently, Campanale [2007] filles this gap in capital
income by introducing the assumption of the increasing return function with respect to the
level of wealth. Similarly but instead of capital income, I will show that the labor income
process is also wealth-dependent via several channels and try to quantify the size of the effect
on the wealth distribution (particularly on shares of the top 1%/5%/20% of population in
wealth distribution).
On the other hand, recently, Nirei and Souma [2007] provides a model for a Pareto
1I will only briefly review the most closely related papers. For a up-to-date survey, see Cagetti and Nardi
[2008].
33
distribution of income and conjectures similar results would follow from incomplete market
model. Instead of an income distribution, I will try to replicate a Pareto distribution of
wealth in the right-hand tail in the model. Therefore, the main targets of this paper are i)
wealth shares of the top 1%/5%/20% of the population and ii) Pareto distribution of the
right-tail in wealth distribution.2
A model in this paper can be evaluated by looking at whether the model is able to
replicate the main targets. Moreover, since there exist several competing models, we also
need to compare testable predictions of the models. Regarding testable predictions, for
example, Bru¨ckner et al. [2010] provides evidences for the positive impact of wealth inequality
on real interest rates by time series analysis for Sweden, the UK, and the US. Aiyagari [1993,
30] shows that more volatile or persistent earning process results in lower real interest rates.
In that case, the impact of the wealth inequality on real interest rates would be negative.
As we see later, a model in this paper implies the positive impact of the wealth inequality
on real interest rates.
Broadly speaking, in this paper, the following three mechanisms are employed for gener-
ating a wealth distribution similar to the data, especially with respect to the shares of the top
1%/5%/20% of the population in the distribution of wealth. First, the labor income shock
is wealth-dependent. In other words, since the level of individual wealth is an endogenous
state variable in the model, labor income shock is viewed as endogenous or state-dependent.
Shocks in economic models are normally defined as an purely exogenous processes. But
more generally, we can assume that the realization of shock depends on the state of the
individual (therefore, my current decision affects the realization of shock in the future). In
this paper, I will study the effect of this modification by focusing on the issue of wealth
inequality. Figure 10 illustrates the mutual feedback between wealth and labor income.3 In
Figure 10, wealth, personal traits, and skill are stock variables, whereas labor income is a
flow variable. In Figure 10, we can see three different ways by which wealth may be related
with the realization of labor income shock. First, wealth directly affects labor income by
influencing reservation wage or occupational choice. Second, wealth indirectly affects labor
2 Besides, I will look at other several aspects of distribution.
3A literature review on the feedback from wealth to labor income is given in Section 2.2.1.
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Figure 10: Mutual feedback between wealth and labor income
income by influencing the factors which are determinants of labor income such as skill and
personal traits. Personal traits include work ethic and attitude. Finally, labor income also
affects wealth by saving. Labor income has influence on determinants of labor income via
learning at work as well. In this respect, we may expect that favorable labor income shock
induces both higher wealth and better skill and personal traits. In this context, wealth may
be a proxy variable for determinants of labor income, skill and personal traits. Note that,
in standard incomplete market models, exogenous labor income shock depends only on the
level of the current labor income. This means that if the poorest and the richest in a society
happen to earn the same labor income in the current year, the expected labor income in the
next year is the same. But, Figure 10 illustrates why we may expect unequal opportunity
even conditional on the current labor income. In short, wealth-dependent labor income shock
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implies that labor income shock will be more favorable to the richest than to the poorest,
on average.
Second, I will consider the case where people do not take into account the dependence
of the labor income process on wealth when they make consumption decisions.4 These two
mechanisms generate skewed distributions. In other words, I will investigate the effect of
the underparameterization of the stochastic process which is related with the policy function
of consumers.5 This mechanism is naturally related with the concept of bounded rationality
as in Simon [1955] and Kahneman [2003], for instance. There are two rationales for the
mechanism. First, the feedback from wealth to labor income is complex, and therefore hard
to exactly measure the feedback effect. Second, learning optimal consumption seems to
be more difficult if wealth is involved.6 Note that knowing the distribution of wealth of
coworkers is normally much harder than knowing the distribution of their labor income. In
other words, wealth is much more private information than labor income. But, as we can
expect, it turns out these two mechanisms are not sufficient to generate a high concentration
at the right tail of distribution in data, since these two mechanisms cannot differentiate the
very rich from the rich.
Third, to generate a realistic concentration of wealth in the right tail, I borrow the idea
of the spirit of capitalism that wealth may affect utility directly (wealth in utility model).
However, I apply the idea only after some threshold (or at the highest level of asset space).7
I call this mechanism status seeking. I will analyze the effect of this modification.
Since wealth accumulation can be viewed as a combination of an income process and
a saving decision at an individual level, I will briefly review the literature along the two
dimensions. First, heterogeneity in saving behavior is introduced into a model either as
an exogenous stochastic process like Krusell and Smith [1998] or as an endogenous process
notably due to heterogeneous budget constraints (particulary, financial constraint) among
different types of agents via occupation choices such as Quadrini [2000], Meh [2005], Boha´cˆek
4Another way of achieving similar effect would be introducing mortality into a model. I leave this approach
an open research question.
5I do not investigate the case where people do consider the dependence of the labor income process on
wealth. I leave the topic an open research question.
6For the difficulty related with individual learning about consumption, I refer to Allen and Carroll [2001].
7For example, the lowest level in “the Forbes 400” - the 400 richest Americans - is a candidate for the
threshold.
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[2006], Cagetti and Nardi [2006], Kitao [2008], and Flode´n [2008]. Second, regarding the
income process, a parsimonious but more skewed income process is considered in Castaneda
et al. [2003]. Whereas Castaneda et al. [2003] look at the channel from income to wealth,
Campanale [2007] looks at positive feedback from wealth to the capital income process.
From this point of view, this paper is investigating a wealth-dependent labor income process
and wealth-dependent saving behavior because of status-seeking as determinants of wealth
distribution.
The fact that the saving behavior of the rich is different from the poor is discussed in
Carroll [2000]. The functional form suggested by Carroll [2000] is extensively investigated by
Francis [2009] and Luo and Young [2009]. I borrow the idea from the literature that wealth
may be related with social status. But, I will model the idea in a simple way: there is a
direct utility gain by wealth only after some threshold of asset space. It turns out that this
simple modification helps to match the high share of the top 1% in wealth distribution given
wealth dependent labor income shock with misspecification.
So, the main contribution of this paper is to pay attention to the labor markets regarding
wealth distribution whereas other papers normally focus on capital markets. Rather than
denying the importance of capital market in explaining a fat-tailed distribution of wealth, the
point of this paper is that if we take into account frictions from labor markets, it seems to be
easier to generate realistic distributions of wealth by incomplete market models. Moreover,
since the feedback from wealth to labor income generally hinges on historical, institutional,
and social factors, the model highlights these factors as determinants of the distribution of
wealth. In this respect, this paper is in line with Mulder et al. [2009] where they provide
evidences for the argument that both the technology and the institutions and norms are
important in understanding the differences in “intergenerational wealth transmission” of dif-
ferent economic systems. I also expect that this approach is helpful in explaining temporal
or cross-country variations of wealth distribution. Besides, from a policy perspective, con-
trolling the distribution of wealth within some tolerable range is might be desirable since
too high wealth inequality may jeopardize the social stability. In this context, this paper
shed some light on the question of what would happen in general equilibrium framework if
policies such as enhancing public education, aiming at reducing the feedback from wealth to
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labor income, are employed.
Another contribution of this paper is to discuss the Pareto distribution of wealth in the
framework of incomplete market models. A Pareto distribution, or more generally a power
law distribution has been often discussed as a characterization of the right-tail in wealth
distribution.8 Interestingly, several examples of fat-tailed wealth distributions before modern
societies were found. For examples, Abul-Magd [2002] provides evidence in ancient Egypt
with respect to house area and Hegyi et al. [2007] reports evidence in medieval Hungary with
respect to the number of owned serf families. Those findings were one of the motivations of
this paper in considering status-seeking behavior because they imply that we need general
principles which apply to both ancient and modern societies. Several models have been
proposed to explain fat-tailed distributions of income and wealth.9 Recent contributions on
the Pareto distribution of wealth are Levy [2003] and Benhabib and Bisin [2009].
The composition of this paper is the following: in Section 2.2, I provide empirical and
theoretical evidence for the wealth-dependent labor income process. In Section 2.3, I intro-
duce wealth-dependent labor income shock into Aiyagari [1994] and in Section 2.4 I analyze
the effect by numerically solving the model (value function iteration). Section 2.5 is the
conclusion.
2.2 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
2.2.1 Review of mechanisms for the feedback from wealth to labor income
I list four mechanisms for the feedback from wealth to labor income. First, there is the inter-
generational channel. Endowment is an important factor in lifetime earning. According to
Keane and Wolpin [1997, 515], unobserved endowment heterogeneity at age 16 is responsible
for 90 percent of the variation in lifetime utility. Bowles and Gintis [2002] provides a very
8 Mitzenmacher [2004] and Newman [2005] contain nice discussion about power law distributions. Clauset
et al. [2009] provides empirical analysis regarding power law distributions.
9Gabarix [2009] provides an extensive literature review on empirical and theoretical works regarding
power laws in economics and finance. Yakovenko and Rosser [2009] reviews “econophysics” approach on
distribution of income, money, and wealth.
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interesting viewpoint related to the channel.
It thus seems likely that the intergenerational persistence of wealth reflects, at least in part,
parent-offspring similarities in traits influencing wealth accumulation, such as orientation
toward the future, sense of personal efficacy, work ethic, schooling attainment and risk
taking. Some of these traits covary with the level of wealth: for example, less well-off
people may be more likely to be risk averse, to discount the future and have a low sense of
efficacy (Bowles and Gintis [2002, 18]).
They speak about the traits related with wealth accumulation. But, similarly, the traits
related with the performance in labor markets such as work ethic, may co-move with wealth.
According to Bowles and Gintis [2002, 19], other variables which affect economic success
include group membership. Note that group membership may depend on the level of wealth
as well. Another particular mechanism works through the health of children as Currie [2009]
shows. Condliffe and Link [2008] provides empirical evidence for the impact of economic
status on child health for the U.S. Other mechanisms include education and crime. For
example, Akee et al. [2010] investigates the long-run effect of exogenous increase in household
income on children’s outcome. According to their study, in the case of the poorest households,
an additional increase in household income by $4,000 per each year resulted in two things:
longer education by one year at age 21 and the reduction of the probability of committing a
minor crime by 22 percent for 16 and 17 year olds.
Second channel works through social networks in labor market. For example, Weinberg
et al. [2004] reports that the improvement of one standard deviation in the qualities of a
neighborhood leads to increase in yearly working-hours by 6.1%. Weinberg et al. [2004]
also finds that the effect is nonlinear in the sense that the effect is stronger for the poor.
Magruder [2010] investigates intergeneration networks in South Africa. He documents that
the fathers’ network connections may account for a one-third increase in the employment
rates of their sons.
Third, occupational choice like being entrepreneurs may depend on initial wealth. In
general, more wealth enlarges the size of a choice set for individual utility optimization
particularly when financial markets are not perfect (and in an actual economy, for exam-
ple, asymmetric information and moral hazard make financial markets imperfect). Because
the choice cannot be worse with a bigger choice set, we can expect some positive correlation
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between outcome and wealth. But, empirical evidence seems to be mixed. For example, Mon-
drago´n-Ve´lez [2009] documents evidence for a hump-shaped transition probability, whereas
Hurst and Lusardi [2004] suggests that wealth matters only after the 95th percentile in
wealth.
Finally, the reservation wage depends on the level of wealth. Bloemen and Stancanelli
[2001] reports that financial wealth has a significantly positive impact on reservation wage
whereas financial wealth has a negative impact on the probability of employment.
I do not explicitly model the above-mentioned channels. Rather, I model an implication
of the channels on the labor income shock process. In other words, based upon the literature,
I assume that the transition probability of labor income shock depends on not only the current
labor income but also the current wealth. Besides, the literature implies the nonlinear effect
of wealth on labor income. That is, the effect of wealth on labor income seems to be more
important to the poor, which is a rationale for the nonlinear specification of wealth effect in
this paper. I expect that these modifications of the stochastic endowment process will help
to generate the highly concentrated distribution of wealth.
2.2.2 Review of distributions of labor income and wealth from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID)
In this Subsection, I briefly review the main characteristics of distributions of labor income
and wealth from PSID. Particularly, I am interested in a Pareto distribution of wealth.
According to Mitzenmacher [2004], a Pareto distribution is defined as follows:
Pr[X ≥ x] = ( x
constant
)−α, constant, α > 0, X : random variable (2.1)
which implies that
log(1− F (x)) = constant− α log(x) (2.2)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function (=c.d.f.). The coefficient α is called
Pareto exponent in this paper. Note that rare events or extreme values cannot be ignored if
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a random variable follows the Pareto distribution since the Pareto distribution has a fatter
right-tail than other distributions such as a normal distribution.10
2.2.2.1 Labor income Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix D summarize several descriptive
statistics for head’s wage and labor income. It is interesting to notice from Tables 17 and 18
that the coefficients of variation (:= standard deviation
mean
) of head’s yearly wage and labor income
are not very different from 1 except 2002 and 2004, given the fact that the coefficient of
variation of the exponential distribution is 1.11
The higher coefficient of variation in recent years reflects rising inequality documented in
Kennickell [2009].12 Particularly, we can see the rising tendencies of share of the top 1%
and the Gini coefficient of the top quartile from Tables 17 and 18. Autor et al. [2006, 189]
characterizes the past trend of the US labor market as a “polarization”.
Another interesting point regarding labor income is that labor income becomes more
important in the composition of income. Kennickell [2009] reports the share of interest,
dividends and capital gains in income composition declined from 1989 to 2007. Similarly,
Piketty and Saez [2007, Figure 2] documents that the rising share of wage income in income
composition of top 0.1% of tax units was important in the surge of the share of the top 0.1%
from the 1970s.
2.2.2.2 Wealth From Table 19 in Appendix D, we can see that the Gini coefficients
for wealth is much higher than the Gini coefficients for income.13 In contrast with labor
income, there is no clear rising tendency in the Gini coefficients for wealth.14 To see the
tail distribution of wealth (= V17389, total wealth in 1989 from PSID), I use a log-log plot
10For example, it is well-known that stock market returns follow power law distributions (Gabarix [2009,
276-9]).
11Using different data, Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko [2001] provides some evidence for exponential distribu-
tion of individual income in the U.S.
12According to Kennickell [2009, Table 3] with the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Gini coefficient of
income increases from 0.5399 (1989) to 0.5643 (2001), 0.5406 (2004), and 0.5745 (2007). The long-run effect
of rising income inequality is interesting. For example, Iacoviello [2007] shows that rising income inequality
was responsible for rising household debt.
13To compute a Gini coefficient, I use trapezoidal rule for numerical integration.
14But, according to Kennickell [2009, Table 3], Gini coefficient of net worth becomes higher from 0.7863
(1989) to 0.8030 (2001), 0.8047 (2004), and 0.8120 (2007). And according to Heathcote et al. [2010, 16], the
Gini coefficient for net worth in SCF increases by 5 points between 1983 and 2007.
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in Eq. 2.2. As we can see from Figure 11 the Pareto exponent of wealth is around 1.5, as
mentioned in Gabarix [2009]. To see how stable estimated Pareto exponents of wealth are, I
look at nine data sets from PSID. Table 19 in Appendix D shows the Pareto exponents stay
within the interval of [1.3, 1.7].
By using Forbes data of 400 richest people in the U.S., Klass et al. [2006, 291] shows
that in the period of 1988 - 2003, Pareto exponents belong roughly to the interval of [1.1,
1.6] and that there was a decreasing trend in the 1990s. But as Clauset et al. [2009] shows,
it is not clear whether wealth distribution follows Pareto distribution in a strict sense.
Instead of going into the issue, I will focus on the fact that the log-log plot in the right
tail of a distribution of wealth is a roughly straight line with the slope around 1.5. After I
calibrate the model to match the shares of the top 1%/5%/20% of population in the wealth
distribution from data, I will look at whether the model generates a similar slope in a log-log
plot.
Figure 11: Complementary cumulative distribution function of wealth (data)
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2.2.2.3 The relation between labor income and wealth Figure 12 displays the
relation between wealth in 1984 (=S117 in PSID) and labor income in 1985 (=V13624 in
PSID).15 As we can see from Figure 12, the relation between labor income and wealth is not
Figure 12: Data and inverse tangent
linear.
As we see later, possible values of labor income shocks in this paper are exogenously given
and the same for the poor and the rich. Different specifications regarding the feedback from
wealth to labor income affect only chances of good shocks and bad shocks, more formally,
transition probabilities of labor income shock. In this paper I will employ an inverse tangent
function to capture the feedback from wealth to labor because of the following three reasons:
First, the specification is simple in the sense I need only one parameter (ξ, as we see later)
to represent the strength of wealth effect. The feature makes comparative study easier.
Second, since the function is nonlinear, the feature helps to capture the nonlinear effect of
wealth. Third, since the function is bounded, the function is consistent with the idea that
151984 is the first year wealth data in PSID is available.
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the feedback from wealth to labor income has only a limited impact. Since the function is
monotonically increasing and bounded, the specification implies that the marginal effect of
wealth on transition probabilities of the labor income shock process is negligible after some
threshold. Other possible alternatives include a logistic function and a hyperbolic function
as in Campanale [2007]. Note that all of the three functions are monotonically increasing. I
leave the task of checking the robustness of the results in this paper by employing a logistic
function or a hyperbolic function as a future research topic.
To quantify the effect of wealth on labor income for the model in this paper, I use a
regression analysis, while controlling for other important variables such as age, schooling,
previous labor income.16 The results of the regression will guide the choices of values of
parameters. First, I normalize wealth(=a) by the following transformation:
h(a) := arctan(10a/(amax)− a˜∗), a˜∗: reference level (2.3)
So, transformed data has the domain of [−a˜∗, 10− a˜∗] under the assumption of nonnegative
wealth. For computational purposes, I choose the ratio of the max/mean of wealth around
45 in the main models in this paper. In the data (=S117 in PSID) if I drop the wealthiest 9
observations, the ratio of the max/mean of wealth is around 46.2076. For regression analysis,
the following five variables from PSID are used: Age of 1984 head (V10419), education 1984
head (V11042), wealth 1984 (S117),17 total head labor Y 84 (V12372),18 total head labor Y
85 (V13624). In the model in this paper, I assume that wealth is non-negative because of
borrowing constraint. And unemployment is not included in the model. Taking into account
the restrictions, I extract data from raw data based on the following criteria:
Wealth ≥ 0, Labor income > 0 (2.4)
Then labor income is normalized as follows:
labori,t = log(Total Head Labor Y )it −mean(log(Total Head Labor Y )it) (2.5)
16For a recent study on the effect of wealth on earning mobility, I refer to Morillas [2007].
17For detailed description of the variable, I refer to Hurst et al. [1998, appendix A]
18According to the PSID data custom codebook, labor income includes the followings: labor part of farm
income, labor part of business income, head’s wages income, head’s bonuses, overtime, commissions, head’s
income from professional practice or trade, labor part of market gardening income, and labor part of roomers
and boarders income.
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Finally, the regression equations is as follows:
labori,t =β0 + β1agei,t−1 + β2educationi,t−1
+ β3arctan(10(wealthi,t−1/(max{wealthi,t−1}))− a˜∗) + β4labori,t−1 + ui,t
(2.6)
Regression results in Table 1 show that there is positive impact of wealth on labor income.19
For a reference level a˜∗, I compare the alternatives, a˜∗ = 1 and a˜∗ = 2. Table 1 displays that
the goodness-fit (adjusted R-square) is marginally better in the case of a˜∗ = 1. Drawing
upon the result, I will set a˜∗ = 1. Based on the regression, I will set ξ (= β3) = 0.1, and
θ (= β4) = 0.8 that belong to the confident intervals with sample size =4,131. ξ (= β3) =
0.1 is chosen since it seems that ξ (= β3) = 0.158702 is too high in a simulation of model.
Instead of 0.780981, θ (= β4) = 0.8 is chosen to emphasize the persistence of labor income
shock.
Table 1: OLS of 2.6
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
1984 -1985
full sample (4,140 obs.), a˜∗ = 1 0.113596 -0.004142 0.043190 0.223012 0.783486
C.I. [-0.0198 0.2470] [-0.0056 -0.0027] [0.0320 0.0543] [0.1059 0.3401] [ 0.7632 0.8037]
( 0.136935 ) ( 0.000037 ) ( 0.000000 ) ( 0.000277 ) ( 0.000000 )
adj. R2 DW σˆ
0.6511 1.9839 0.5733
sub-sample (4,131 obs.), a˜∗ = 1 0.094253 -0.004859 0.040282 0.158702 0.780981
C.I. [-0.0173 0.2058] [-0.0064 -0.0033] [0.0290 0.0515] [0.0884 0.2290 ] [ 0.7604 0.8015]
( 0.160559 ) ( 0.000003 ) ( 0.000000 ) ( 0.000024 ) ( 0.000000 )
adj. R2 DW σˆ
0.6509 1.9850 0.5727
full sample (4,140 obs.), a˜∗ = 2 0.137604 -0.003831 0.044323 0.190321 0.786217
C.I. [-0.0354 0.3106] [-0.0053 -0.0024] [0.0332 0.0554] [0.0608 0.3198] [0.7661 0.8064]
( 0.149740 ) ( 0.000113 ) ( 0.000000 ) ( 0.005404 ) ( 0.000000 )
adj. R2 DW σˆ
0.6507 1.9833 0.5738
sub-sample (4,131 obs.), a˜∗ = 2 0.1090 -0.0043 0.0425 0.1454 0.7847
C.I. [-0.0248 0.2428] [-0.0058 -0.0028] [ 0.0314 0.0537] [ 0.0619 0.2288 ] [ 0.7643 0.8051]
( 0.152855 ) ( 0.000021 ) ( 0.000000 ) ( 0.000575 ) ( 0.000000 )
adj. R2 DW σˆ
0.6502 1.9842 0.5732
C.I.: confidence interval
(): White Heteroscedastic Consistent p-value
I also try a quadratic specification for wealth as in Eq. 2.7 as a robustness check. Table 2
shows that the linear and quadratic terms are statistically significant. In particular, thanks
19I use Matlab codes in ”Econometrics Toolbox” written by James P. LeSage (LeSage [1999]) for regression
.
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to the quadratic term, the results confirm the nonlinear effect of wealth as well.
labori,t =β0 + β1agei,t−1 + β2educationi,t−1
+ β3(10(wealthi,t−1/(max{wealthi,t−1})) + β4(10(wealthi,t−1/(max{wealthi,t−1}))2
+ β5labori,t−1 + ui,t
(2.7)
Table 2: OLS of 2.7
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
1984 -1985
full sample (4,140 obs.) -0.050999 -0.004473 0.042068 0.253841 -0.022517 0.780308
C.I. [-0.1354 0.0334] [-0.0060 -0.0030] [0.0309 0.0533] [0.1259 0.3817] [-0.0367 -0.0083] [0.7598 0.8008]
( 0.353637 ) ( 0.000014 ) ( 0.000000 ) ( 0.000174 ) ( 0.005208 ) ( 0.000000 )
adj. R2 DW σˆ
0.6514 1.9841 0.5731
sub-sample (4,131 obs.) -0.020174 -0.005231 0.039117 0.168928 -0.017730 0.778380
C.I. [-0.1061 0.0657] [-0.0068 -0.0037] [ 0.0278 0.0504] [ 0.0941 0.2438] [-0.0307 -0.0047] [ 0.7577 0.7990]
( 0.715606) ( 0.000001 ) ( 0.000000 ) ( 0.000041 ) ( 0.007645 ) ( 0.000000 )
adj. R2 DW σˆ
0.6512 1.9860 0.5724
C.I.: confidence interval
(): White Heteroscedastic Consistent p-value
2.3 MODEL
The model is identical to Aiyagari [1994] except for the labor income shock process. I
differentiate the true labor income shock process (=Q) from the perceived labor income
shock process (=Q˜).20
2.3.1 Household’s problem
There exists a continuum of households of measure one. Each household solves the utility
maximization problem with known wage (=w), real interest rate (=r), and perceived labor
income shock process (=Q˜). Following Aiyagari [1994, footnote 11], I assume the labor
supply in the physical term (=labor hour) is fixed. So labor income fluctuates only due to
the change of labor in the effective term. lt represents effective labor at time t. Let at and
20Appendix E provides general framework of the model including formal definitions of Q and Q˜
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ct be asset and consumption at time t respectively. Then, household is characterized by
the state st = (at, lt) and a probability measure (λ) is defined on the state.
21 Preference is
given by utility function u(·). The maximization problem of individual household is given
as follows:
max
ct,at+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
s.t.ct + at+1 = at(1 + r) + wlt
c ≥ 0
at ≥ −φ a.s.
(2.8)
where β is discount factor, φ is borrowing constraint, and E0 is conditional expectation
operator at time 0.
Value function is
V (a, l) = max
a′
{u(a(1 + r) + wl − a′) + β
∫
Z
V (a′, l′)Q˜(l, dl′)}
s.t. at(1 + r) + wlt − at+1 ≥ 0
at ≥ −φ a.s.
(2.9)
Note that in Eq. 2.9, the value function is integrated with respect to Q˜ instead of Q. In this
sense, the representative agent solves a misspecified problem.22 In other words, the repre-
sentative agent does not take into account the fact that different levels of wealth (=a) will
induce different labor income processes. Note that since labor income shock depends on the
level of wealth as well, the total labor of the economy will depend on the wealth distribution
in general, whereas the total labor of the economy is fixed with the exogenous labor shock
process. To make the problem simple, I will only consider the stationary equilibrium of the
economy in this paper. From Eq. 2.9, policy function gQ˜(s;w, r) is obtained.
21For more detail, I refer to Ljungqvist and Sargent [2004, 570].
22Actually, Eq. 2.9 is the set-up in Aiyagari [1994]. It is called a misspecified model because I assume true
process also depends on wealth.
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2.3.2 Wealth-dependent labor income shock: finite approximation of Q and Q˜
To approximate Q, I follow Tauchen [1986] with a straightforward modification. For the true
labor income shock process (Q), I assume the following stochastic law of motion:
lt = θlt−1 + ξh(at−1) + ut, θ, ξ, and h′ > 0, ut ∼ Normal(0, σ2u) (2.10)
where lt : log(y
′
t), y
′
t :=
yt
y¯
, y¯ = expE(log(yt)), yt : labor income, at−1 : wealth. The function h
in this paper is specified by Eq. 2.3.23 Labor income shock (=l˜t) takes discrete values as
follows:
l˜t ∈ Z := {l¯1, · · · , l¯N} where l¯1 ≤ · · · ≤ l¯N , N = 7 (2.11)
As in Tauchen [1986], l˜i is determined by the following procedure: first, l¯N is chosen as a
multiple m of σu where σu is the standard deviation of random shock in the labor income
process. Second, l¯1 = −l¯N , Finally, the remaining is equally distributed over the interval
[l¯1, l¯N ]. Let w := l¯k − l¯k−1. Then, the transition probability from l¯j to l¯k given (l¯j, a) is the
following:
pjk(a) : = Pr[lt = l¯
k | lt−1 = l¯j, at−1 = a]
= Pr[l¯k − w/2 ≤ θl¯j + ξh(a) + ut ≤ l¯k + w/2 | lt−1 = l¯j, at−1 = a]
= F (
l¯k + w/2− (θl¯j + ξh(a))
σu
)− F ( l¯
k − w/2− (θl¯j + ξh(a))
σu
)
(2.12)
where F is a cumulative distribution function of Normal(0, σ2u). I will also use a finite number
of states for asset space to employ finite state approximation for dynamic programming. Let
X := {a1, a2, · · · , aK} where K is the number of grid points for wealth. Let P(Z) be the
power set of Z. With state space S = X×Z, pjk(a) defines a true labor income shock process
Q on (S, P (Z)) in the following way.
Q((ai, l¯
j), A) :=
∑
l¯k∈A
pjk(ai), A ⊂ Z (2.13)
A perceived labor income shock process Q˜ in this paper is defined as a special case of Q with
ξ = 0 in Eq. 2.12.
Q˜(l¯j, A) := Q((ai, l¯
j), A)|ξ=0 (2.14)
23So, the choices of values of θ and ξ depends on the estimation in this paper
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Table 20 in Appendix F displays a part of Q. A perceived labor income shock process Q˜
corresponds to a transition matrix with at−1=30. Now, if the person becomes the poorest
(at−1=0) and if the labor income in this year is l¯1, then the probability of the same labor
income in the next year is 50.811% . If the wealth in this year is at−1=30, the probability is
43.382%. If the person is the richest, the probability is 30.351%.
Summing up, given (a, l) of the state variables in the current period, household determines
the level of wealth in the next period (= a′) by policy function gQ˜(s;w, r). Then by the
nature (=Q), taking into account (a, l), the level of labor income (= l′) in the next period
is determined. Note that this feature is the only deviation from Aiyagari [1994] where the
nature determines (l′) based on (l) alone. Then, in the next period, given (a′, l′), the process
will continue. Note that this procedure defines a stochastic process on the state space of
(wealth×labor). Proposition E.0.1 in Appendix E formally shows that this procedure defines
a transition function on the state space.24 And since the state space is finite in numerical
computation, the transition function can be expressed by a finite Markov chain which always
has a stationary distribution. The uniqueness of a stationary distribution is guaranteed if
the Markov chain is irreducible (Durret [1999, 55]).
2.3.3 Stationary Competitive Market Equilibrium
2.3.3.1 Definition of Stationary Competitive Market Equilibrium There exists
a firm with the following aggregate production function:
F (K,L) = AKαL1−α (2.15)
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent [2004, 573], I define stationary competitive market equi-
librium (gQ˜(s), λ,K, L, r, w) as the following:
1. gQ˜(s) solves the household’s problem.
2. The probability measure λ is stationary with respect to adjoint operator T ∗
Q˜,Q
.25
T ∗
Q˜,Q
λ = λ (2.16)
24Note that the Proposition E.0.1 is a minor modification from Theorem 9.13 in Stokey and Lucas [1989,
284] due to endogenous shock.
25The definition of adjoint operator T ∗
Q˜,Q
is given in Appendix E
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3. Markets clear
K =
∫
S
g(s)λ(ds) (2.17)
L =
∫
S
projZ(s)λ(ds) (2.18)
4. Each factor price is competitively determined.
w = FL (2.19)
r = FK − δ (2.20)
2.3.3.2 Computation of an equilibrium
Assumption 2.3.1. Labor income shock has bounded support.
l ∈ [l, l¯], l > 0 (2.21)
Assumption 2.3.2. I assume that there is a physical or institutional upper bound for asset
accumulation. And I impose no borrowing restriction (φ = 0). Then, the asset space is
bounded:
a ∈ [0, amax] (2.22)
Assumptions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 guarantee that the state space is compact. The argument
for the existence of equilibrium is similar to Aiyagari [1994] with a minor modification due
to endogenous determination of an aggregate amount of effective labor. I briefly review the
argument together with algorithm for computation.26
step 1 Given r, w(r) is obtained from Eq. 2.19 and 2.20.
w(r) = (1− α)(A(α/(r + δ))α)1/(1−α) (2.23)
step 2 Given r and w(r), policy function gQ˜(s; r, w(r)) is given as a solution of Eq. 2.9.
Particularly, with a finite state space, a policy function can be written as a matrix,
G(K×N).
26I use Matlab codes in Ljungqvist and Sargent [2004, 584, footnote 9] with a modification due to endoge-
nous shock.
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step 3 Policy function gQ˜(s; r, w(r)) and the true labor income shock process Q define a
transition function PQ˜,Q. More concretely, let kth state be sk = (ai, l¯
j) where k =
(i− 1)N + j. Similarly, let k′th state be sk′ = (ai′ , l¯j′) where k′ = (i′ − 1)N + j′. Then,
similar to Ljungqvist and Sargent [2004, 569],
PQ˜,Q(k, l) = Prob(s
′ = sl | s = sk)
=
Q((ai, l¯
j), {l¯j′}) if gQ˜(sk; r, w(r)) = ai′
0 otherwise
(2.24)
where Q comes from Eq. 2.13. Note that if Q˜ replaces Q in Eq. 2.24, then the model
becomes identical to Aiyagari [1994]. The transition function PQ˜,Q(k, l) can be expressed
as a matrix P(K×N)×(K×N) if state space is finite. Then stationary probability measure
λ(r) satisfying Eq. 2.16 can be computed from the Markov chain P(K×N)×(K×N). λ(r)
can be written as Λ(K×N) in a matrix form.
step 4 Given stationary probability measure λ(r), the aggregate supply of effective labor
Ls(r) is determined from the right-hand side of Eq. 2.18. For a finite state space S, the
state space can be written as S(K×N) in a matrix form. Let’s define a projection map
projZ from S to Z by
projZ((ai, l¯
j)) = l¯j, (ai, l¯
j) ∈ S (2.25)
Applying the projection map to S(K×N) componentwise, we have the following matrix:
Ls(K×N) = projZ(S(K×N)) (2.26)
Then, labor supply (=Ls) as finite version of right-hand side of Ls, is given by
Ls = < Ls(K×N),Λ(K×N) > (2.27)
where < ·, · > denotes an inner product in R(K×N). Under the condition that the labor
market is clear in Eq. 2.18, I put L(r) = Ls(r) where L depends on r via stationary
probability measure λ(r).
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step 5 Given r, w(r), gQ˜(s; r, w(r)), λ(r), and L(r), we can obtain K
d(r, L(r)) from Eq. 2.20
Kd(r, L(r)) = L(r)(
Aα
r + δ
)
1
1−α (2.28)
step 6 Then, we can compute the distance: |ED(r) := (Kd(r, L(r)) − ∫
S
g(s; r)dλ)| from
2.17. A finite version of Ks =
∫
S
g(s; r)dλ) is given by
Ks = < G(K×N),Λ(K×N) > (2.29)
step 7 If some convergence criteria are not satisfied, r is updated by some numerical methods
for root finding and the computation restarts with step 1.
In practice, I use the bisection method for an update rule as in Aiyagari [1994] and the
following two distances as convergence criteria:
|rt − rt−1
rt−1
| < ε1 and |ED(r)| < ε2 (2.30)
To show the existence of equilibrium with r > −δ, it suffices to show that ED(r)=0 has a
solution in r > −δ. The main difference from Aiyagari [1994] is in Eq. 2.28. In Aiyagari
[1994], L is a constant. But in this model, L depends on r due to endogenous shock. And L(r)
seems to be an increasing function of r from numerical computation. So, now Kd(r, L(r))
may not be a strictly decreasing function of r in some range of r. But, this does not preclude
the existence of equilibrium since we still have
lim
r↓−δ
Kd(r, L(r)) =∞, lim
r→∞
Kd(r, L(r)) = 0 (2.31)
due to boundedness of L. Ks is bounded as well, because asset space is also bounded (0 ≤∫
S
g(s; r)dλ ≤ amax). Therefore, the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed with r > −δ.
But, the uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed. And since now Kd(r, L(r)) may not
be a strictly decreasing function of r in some range of r, it is more plausible to obtain multiple
equilibria than in the case of the exogenous shock model.
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2.4 RESULTS
2.4.1 The effect of wealth-dependent shock
Wealth-dependent shock in this Section always means wealth-dependent shock with misspec-
ification since I assume that people do not consider the dependence.
2.4.1.1 Calibration The utility function is a constant relative risk aversion (=CRRA)
function.
u(c) =
c1−µ − 1
1− µ (2.32)
A relative risk aversion coefficient (= µ) is 1.5 as in Cagetti and Nardi [2006, 849]. θ in Eq.
2.10 is 0.8 roughly as estimated in this paper (Table 1). Then, I calibrate standard deviation
(=σu) in Eq. 2.10 to match the coefficient of variation of labor income in data (' 1) with
a benchmark model where no endogenous shock and no status-seeking are considered. I set
σu = 0.42. Table 3 summarizes values of all parameters in this paper. Other model-specific
parameters will be explained later.
Table 3: Parameter values
parameter
(Technology)
Capital share α 0.36 Aiyagari [1994]
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.08 Aiyagari [1994]
(Preference)
Discount factor β 0.95 0.96 in Aiyagari [1994]
Relative risk aversion coefficient µ 1.5 Cagetti and Nardi [2006, 849]
(Spirit of capitalism)
Reference level γ {50, 150, 250, 500} See the text
s 1.385 See the text
(Status seeking)
ss 0.00015 calibrated in this paper
(Labor endowment shock)
Standard deviation σu 0.42 calibrated in this paper
coefficient of lt−1, θ 0.8 calibrated, based on the estimation in this paper
m 3 Aiyagari [1993, footnote 33]
(Wealth-dependent shock)
ξ 0.1 calibrated, based on the estimation in this paper
Reference level a˜∗ 1 (=one-tenth of amax ) See the text
Upper bound for asset amax 300 See the text
(Borrowing constraint)
φ 0 No borrowing constraint
Now I try to quantify the effect of wealth dependent shock. Because I do not take into
account frictions from capital market directly the goal of this exercise is assessing the relative
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importance of mechanisms introduced in this paper within plausible values of parameters.
Choices of a˜∗ is based on the regression analysis. And θ and ξ are calibrated, based on the
regression analysis as explained in the Section 2.2.2.3. I set amax = 300 to match the ratio of
the max/mean of wealth around 45 (see Table 4 and 5).27 Table 20 in Appendix F illustrates
finite approximation of Q with this specification.
2.4.1.2 The effect of wealth-dependent shock Table 4 reports the results for a
benchmark model and a wealth-dependent labor income shock model. Grid points are uni-
formly distributed in logarithmic scale as in Francis [2009]. The statistics from data (SCF)
come from Rodr´ıguez et al. [2002, Table 1]. Note that statistics from SCF are a little higher
than from PSID. We can see improvements by wealth-dependent shock in several dimen-
sions compared with the benchmark model. Particularly, first, the Gini coefficient of wealth
increases from 0.5157 to 0.6774. Second, the share of the top 1% increases from 5.86%
to 13.47%. Finally, the Gini coefficients in quartiles of wealth become closer to the data.
Recently, Sierminska et al. [2006, Table V] reports the distribution of net worth for five coun-
tries (Canada, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and US). Among them, the result with endogenous
shock in Table 4 is closest to the distribution of net worth in Finland where shares of the top
1% / 5% are 13% / 31% respectively and the Gini coefficient of net worth is 0.68 according
to Sierminska et al. [2006, Table V]). The result is also comparable with Campanale [2007]
where the model with the assumption of increasing returns to saving matches the data ex-
cept the top 1 percentile of wealth. So, it seems that the wealth-dependent (labor or capital)
income process helps to understand wealth concentration except the very rich. But, it is also
clear that the wealth-dependent labor income shock alone cannot match the share of the
top 1%. So, to explain the share of the top 1%, I will try to modify the assumption about
preference based on the observation that models with wealth-dependent (labor or capital)
income process alone are not so successful in matching the share of the top 1% of the U.S.
In Appendix G, I study wealth-in-utility (or the spirit of capitalism) models as in Carroll
[2000], Francis [2009], and Luo and Young [2009] for comparison. The study points out that
we need a utility function which generates stronger saving incentive only when people become
27But, I also report the results with different upper bounds in Table 23 in Appendix F.
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very rich in some sense. In the Section 2.4.2, I consider alternative functional forms from
this perspective.
Regarding the relation between wealth inequality and interest rate, Table 4 clearly dis-
plays the positive impact of wealth inequality on interest rate as the interest rate increases
from 2.35% to 3.14%.
Table 4: Benchmark model and endogenous shock
Data benchmark model endogenous shock
(ξperceived, ξactual)=(0,0.1)
Number of grid points (wealth) 500 500
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0235 0.0314
amax/amean 31.7535 48.1248
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.803 / 0.553 0.5157 / 0.3840 0.6774 / 0.4184
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.4233/0.1654/0.1279/0.2252 0.6072/0.2458/0.1902/0.3854
Top. 1%/5%/20% 34.7 / 57.8 / 81.7 0.0586 / 0.2135 / 0.5425 0.1347 / 0.3768 / 0.7176
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 6.53 1.0482 1.8721
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.8735 0.9385
Corr (wealth, labor income) 0.3282 0.3807
2.4.2 Wealth-dependent shock and status seeking
Let’s think about Robinson Crusoe living alone on an island. He has 100 apples. It might be
plausible that the marginal utility from eating one more apple after he eats 90 apples would
be lower than the marginal utility from eating one more apple after he eats 89 apples. Now,
let’s imagine that Robinson Crusoe goes to a high school in New York. The class size is 100.
Suppose that he is ranked 10th in the second math exam. If he is ranked 9th in the third
exam, his marginal utility due to his rising ranking from 10th to 9th would not be lower
than the marginal utility due to his rising ranking from 11th in the first exam to 10th. In
other words, the marginal utility from better status may not be decreasing as higher status
gets obtained. And, since being a top student may entail extra utility, the relative distance
between the current status and the highest status is an important factor affecting a person’s
utility.
Drawing upon the above discussion and the study in Appendix G, I look at a straightfor-
ward modification of the standard utility function. In other words, I assume wealth induces
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extra utility after some threshold, and the utility is linearly increasing in wealth. The thresh-
old would be affected by diverse institutional and social factors, including tax systems. In
this respect, it is interesting to observe that Hurst and Lusardi [2004] documents the pos-
itive relation between wealth and being an entrepreneur holds only after 95% of wealth
distribution.
The assumption of status-seeking generates the following utility function:
un(ct, at+1) =

c1−µt −1
1−µ , at+1 < (amax − n)
c1−µt −1
1−µ +
ssamax
n
(at+1 − (amax − n)), at+1 ≥ (amax − n)
(2.33)
where the value of ss is chosen to roughly match the share of the top 1%, if the utility function
takes the final functional form in this paper. I call the utility function un in Eq.2.33 the
utility function with status-seeking. So, the utility function with status-seeking is different
from the standard utility function only after some threshold (= (amax − n)) of asset space.
And if wealth reaches the maximum level, the utility gain is ss(amax). Intuitively speaking,
this modification does not affect the poor’s consumption decisions because they are far away
from the threshold.28 But as a person becomes richer, he or she may pay more attention to
the possibility of reaching the threshold, which may induce different consumption decisions
from the poor. So, I view this specification as a straightforward modeling of the insight
from Carroll [2000] that the rich are different because they are rich. Table 21 in Appendix
F shows the results of simulation as n goes to zero(0). Note that as the threshold becomes
higher, the share of the top 1% increases.
14.27%(n = 100)→ 15.94%(n = 75)→ 19.95%(n = 50)
→ 20.36%(n = 40)→ 24.59%(n = 30)→ 27.73%(n = 3)
(2.34)
Finally, motivated from this observation, I define the utility function with the strongest
status-seeking in this paper as follows:
u(ct, at+1) =: lim
n→∞
un(ct, at+1) =
c1−µt − 1
1− µ + ss(amax)1{amax}(at+1) (2.35)
28The threshold level considered in this paper is higher than wealth level of 99% of population
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where 1 denotes the indicator function. In other words, u is a pointwise limit of the sequence
{un}n≥0 where n ↓ 0. Note that u is discontinuous at a = amax whereas un is clearly
continuous function. But, discontinuity of u at boundary is not a critical issue because close
approximation to u by un is feasible as we will see later. To highlight the intuition regarding
status-seeking, I use the specification in Eq. 2.35 in this paper.
Now, I report the result from the specification in Eq. 2.35 and compare it with the
model of wealth-dependent shock in Subsection 2.4.1. Table 5 shows that the strongest
status-seeking behavior specified in this paper indeed has sizable effect on the right tail of
the wealth distribution. With 500 grid points, first, the Gini coefficient of wealth increases
from 0.6774 (wealth dependent shock) to 0.7206. Second, the shares (= 28.38 % / 49.17 %
/ 77.37% ) of the top 1% / 5% / 20% become closer to the data Third, the correlation (=
0.2729) between capital and labor income is lower than the correlation (= 0.3282) between
capital and labor income in the benchmark model without wealth-dependent shock. It is
interesting to notice that change in the utility function only at the top of asset space induces
remarkable impact on wealth distribution. Finally, in order to evaluate the accuracy of the
numerical approximation of the value function (=Vtrue), I report the distance of ‖Vn+1−Vn‖∞
at the last iteration in the numerical approximation, based on the fact that 1
1−β‖Vn+1−Vn‖∞
is an upper bound of ‖Vtrue− Vn‖∞ as shown in Judd [1998, 413]. As expected, the distance
of ‖Vn+1−Vn‖∞ decreases as the number of grid points increases. I also perform an accuracy
test developed in Den Haan and Marcet [1994]. The results are reported in Appendix H.
Table 22 in Appendix F displays the results with different values of parameters. As we
can expect, higher ξ or ss induces a higher Gini coefficient. We can see also that an increase
in ξ (=change in labor income process) induces a higher share of top 20% compared to an
increase in ss, whereas an increase in ss (=change in preference at top level of wealth) results
in a higher share of the top 1% compared to an increase in ξ, which seems to be consistent
with our intuition. Finally, note that the results in Table 5 are not so different from the
results in Table 21 in Appendix F with  = 3. So, it seems that the close approximation is
feasible.29
29 But, there is one unusual feature of this model: a concentration of measure at the upper bound of asset
space. The portion of people in a population at the upper bound is 0.46%. But this is not an inevitable
consequence of utility function with status-seeking in general. Table 23 in Appendix F displays that with
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Table 5: Wealth-dependent shock and the strongest status-seeking
endogenous shock (ES) ES+Status-seeking ES+Status-seeking ES+Status-seeking
Number of grid points (wealth) 500 500 750 1,000
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300] [0,300] [0,300]
Interest rate 0.0314 0.0279 0.0281 0.0280
amax/amean 48.1248 46.2061 46.3358 46.2347
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.6774 / 0.4184 0.7206 / 0.4270 0.7176 / 0.4271 0.7183 / 0.4262
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.1347/0.3768/0.7176 0.2838/0.4917/0.7737 0.2794/0.4846/0.7696 0.2820/0.4861/0.7695
Prob(amax) 0.46% 0.46% 0.46%
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 1.8721 3.4123 3.4006 3.4170
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9385 0.9390 0.9383 0.9385
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3807 0.2729 0.2709 0.2708
‖Vn+1 − Vn‖∞ 0.0085 0.0078 0.0034
To see why status-seeking has sizable effect on wealth distribution, I look at policy
functions in Figure 13. The top panel of Figure 13 shows policy function of the model with
the strongest status seeking. In bottom panels, to find differences among policy functions
I look at the difference between policy functions. We can see from the panels that the full
model is clearly different from the other specifications especially around the top level of asset.
Since the status-seeking parameter is calibrated to match the right tail of the wealth
distribution, it is important to see whether the size of the effect of status-seeking is reason-
able. To quantify the implied effect, I calculate the required compensation for the wealth
effect. At the top level of wealth, minimum consumption is 8.6895 and maximum con-
sumption is 18.6702. Given that the extra-utility of being at the top level of wealth is
0.00015 × 300 = 0.045, required compensation for not being at the top of wealth is the
increase in consumption by 14.71% (minimum) or 22.70% (maximum). According to an
estimated model in Clark et al. [2009] increase in relative income rank in the small neigh-
borhood from 51% to the 100% corresponds to 0.55 point increase in satisfaction on an 1-6
scale. I also look at whether the slope of a log-log plot regarding Pareto distribution is
similar to the data. Figure 14 displays slopes from simulated data. In the second plot, for
the top 20% with the exclusion of the last grid, the slope is 1.1745. And if I drop the flatter
larger asset space, the model can generate a similar distribution to Table 5 without concentration of measure
on the upper bound. For example, in the case of amax = 500,  = 250, ξ = 0.12 and ss = 0.00015 × (3/5),
Gini coefficient is 0.7282 and the shares of the top 1% / 5% / 20% are 29.31% / 50.15% / 78.07%. But, the
portion of people at the upper bound is 0.0087%.
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Figure 13: Policy function
part, the slope is 1.4291 for the region of (80th percentile, 99.5th percentile) in the lowest
plot. The slope in the data is around 1.5. Figure 37 in Appendix F shows that as  in
Eq. 2.33 becomes smaller, the slopes tend to be lower but still higher than 1.4291. For the
benchmark model, the slope is 2.8516 and for the wealth-dependent labor income shock the
slope is 1.6147. So, we can see that the wealth-dependent labor income shock also plays a
role in generating the Pareto exponent around 1.5. Another example is given by Figure 38
in Appendix F with amax = 500. In this case, the model can generate roughly a straight line
in the range of 80th percentile-99.9th percentile with slope = 1.28.
To see the implication of the full model regarding mobility, I calculate a mobility matrix
regarding the wealth quintile based on a transition matrix obtained in the model. Since one-
period in the model corresponds to one-year, I calculate five iterations of a one-year mobility
matrix for the comparison with the data provided by Rodr´ıguez et al. [2002, Table 15] where
five year (1989 → 1994) mobility matrix is available. The result is reported in Table 24
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Figure 14: Complementary cumulative distribution function of wealth (models)
in Appendix F. In terms of the Frobenius norm, the difference between a mobility matrix
generated by full model and data is 0.2141 whereas the difference between the mobility
matrix generated by the benchmark model and the mobility matrix from the data is 0.2566.
Therefore, we can see the improvement of model performance in this dimension as well.
Note that in Table 5, the interest rate (' 2.79%) is lower than that in the case of wealth-
dependent shock alone, which implies that status-seeking may induce the negative impact of
wealth inequality on the interest rate. Table 22 in Appendix F shows that, given the same
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size of status seeking (s = 0.00015), a stronger effect of wealth-dependent shock (ξ = 0.11)
results in the higher interest rate (' 2.82%).
To see whether the wealth dependent shock is essential for matching the data, I look at
the effect of the strongest status-seeking alone.
Table 6: The strongest status seeking without endogenous shock
Benchmark Status-seeking (SS) Endogenous shock (ES) ES + SS
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0235 0.0234 0.0314 0.0279
amax/amean 31.7535 31.7535 48.1248 46.2061
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.5157/0.3840 0.5163/0.3840 0.6774/0.4184 0.7206/0.4270
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.0586/0.2135/0.5425 0.0586/0.2136/0.5426 0.1347/0.3768/0.7176 0.2838/0.4917/0.7737
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 1.0482 1.0489 1.8721 3.4123
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.8735 0.8735 0.9385 0.9390
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3282 0.3283 0.3807 0.2729
In Table 6, the numbers for the other three cases (’Benchmark,’ Status-seeking (SS),’
and ’ES+SS’) come from Tables 4 and 5. Table 6 reports that status seeking without the
wealth-dependent shock does not generate a fat-tailed distribution under the same parameter
values. This is not surprising given that status-seeking is mostly relevant for a very high level
of wealth, because without the wealth-dependent shock the chance of entering a high level
of wealth is small. So, we can say that the wealth-dependent shock is essential in explaining
the division between the bottom 80% and the top 20% and given the wealth-dependent
shock, status-seeking speaks to the share of the top 1%. Summing up, two mechanisms play
different roles in matching wealth distribution, and so two mechanisms are essential for the
result.
Table 7: Models on wealth distribution
Top. 1%/5%/20% Gini (wealth) Main mechanisms
Krusell and Smith [1998, 884, Table 1] 24 / 55 /88 0.82 stochastic discount factor
Quadrini [2000, 32, Table 11] 24.9 / 45.8 / 73.2 0.74 entrepreneurship
Castaneda et al. [2003, 845, Table 7] 29.85 /48.06 / 81.97 0.79 earning process
Cagetti and Nardi [2009, 97, Table 3] 30 / 60 / 85 0.82 entrepreneurship
This paper 28.38 / 49.17 / 77.37 0.72 wealth-dependent shock with
misspecifiation & status-seeking
As we can see from Table 7, there are several works on wealth distribution which can
match the data very well. My paper is different from others at least in two aspects. First,
the main mechanisms in this paper (wealth dependent shock with misspecification + status
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seeking ) are different from others mainly because this model pays more attention to fric-
tions in labor markets than other models. Moreover, two main mechanisms play different
roles as we saw before. So, this paper highlights the interaction between two sources of
wealth inequality. Second, as we saw, the Pareto exponent (' 1.4291) for the region of 80th
percentile-99.5th percentile generated by the model in this paper roughly matches the Pareto
exponent of wealth (' 1.5).
2.5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I introduce three mechanisms (wealth-dependent labor income shock, mis-
specification, and status-seeking) to generate wealth distribution similar to data. The main
findings are as follows. First, wealth-dependent labor income shock with misspecification
helps to explain wealth concentration. Second, the model with spirit of capitalism (or wealth
in utility) does not generate wealth concentration like the data with the specification in this
paper. But the model suggests the direction of modification of the utility function. Third, in
the full model (wealth-dependent labor income shock with misspecification + the strongest
status-seeking ), a Gini coefficient of wealth (= 0.7206) and shares of the top 1% / 5% /
20% (= 28.38 % / 49.17% / 77.37 %) become closer to the data.
The full model also speaks to other aspects of the data. First, the Pareto exponent ('
1.4291) in the region of 80th percentile-99.5th percentile generated by the model in this paper
roughly matches the Pareto exponent of wealth ('1.5), which is new in the literature to my
knowledge. Second, regarding 5-year mobility, the difference between a mobility matrix
generated by the full model and data is 0.2141 in terms of Frobenius norm, whereas for the
benchmark model the difference is 0.2566.
Finally, I find wealth-dependent labor income shock with misspecification is essential
for the result in the sense that the strongest status seeking without the wealth-dependent
shock does not generate a fat-tailed distribution under the same parameter values. So, the
conclusion is that two mechanisms play different roles in determining wealth distribution.
Wealth-dependent labor income shock with misspecification is important in determining the
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share of the upper 20%. But status-seeking is essential for a Pareto-like distribution and for
share of the top 1%.
Findings in this paper have important policy implication. If policy-makers are concerned
about the share of the lower 80%, frictions regarding labor market are important.
Regarding a testable prediction, stronger wealth-dependent shock in this paper results in
higher wealth inequality and a higher interest rate. In this respect, a long-run relationship
between wealth inequality and interest rates is an interesting research topic. Besides, Piketty
[2005] documents the remarkable drop of the top 1% income share in 1914-1945 and no
recovery until the 1970s. Piketty [2005, 386] points out changes in tax systems as one of
possible explanations. It will be also interesting to investigate whether the model in this
paper can explain the temporal movement of the top 1% income share by integrating tax
systems into the model.
63
3.0 FROM THE “GREAT MODERATION” TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
OF 2007-9: ON THE INTERACTIVE DYNAMICS OF SHORT-TERM
NOMINAL INTEREST RATES OF THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
RISK APPETITE WITH BIFURCATION ANALYSIS
“The first theorem of financial instability hypothesis is that economy has financial regimes
under which it is stable, and financial regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem
of financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy
transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that
make for an unstable system (Minsky [1992]).”
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007-9 highlights the huge cost of a severe financial crisis. Moreover,
Cerra and Saxena [2008] demonstrates that there is no automatic compensating recovery of
the output growth after financial crises. Motivated by these observations, in this paper, I
study the financial crisis of 2007-9 in order to learn lessons for preventing similar financial
crises, or more realistically, for reducing the social cost of the next financial crisis. The
financial crisis of 2007-9 was a surprising event to most people. One of the reasons for this
surprise is the so-called “Great Moderation” (low volatility of economic variables such as
output growth and inflation rate) before the financial crisis of 2007-9.1 In this respect, the
recent financial crisis can be viewed as an example of sudden shift of system dynamics. The
ultimate goal of this research is to develop a framework that can coherently explain the
very different states of an economy. As we see later, this paper counts on the concept of
1Blanchard et al. [2010] contains a nice discussion about the impact of the “Great Moderation” on ways
of thinking of macroeconomists and policy makers.
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bifurcation to reach the goal.
There are at least four important topics regarding the financial crisis of 2007-9. In chrono-
logical order, the first is about the causes of the housing bubble before the financial crisis
of 2007-9. The second is understanding the boom and burst process of the housing bubble.
The third is about the freeze of interbank markets in August 2007. The fourth is about
the spill-over (or contagion) and real effect of the financial crisis after the failure of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. This paper focuses on the first topic and does not speak about
the housing bubble.2 Incorporating housing markets into a model in this paper would be an
interesting research topic.
Several authors point out that low interest rates are one of the important sources for the
recent housing bubble in the U.S. economy (see, for examples, Brunnermeier [2009, 77] and
Allen et al. [2009]). In general, the movement of an asset bubble is closely related with
the supply of credit. For example, regarding the “cycle of manias and panics” related with
financial crises, Kindleberger and Aliber [2005, 10] points out procyclical movement of the
supply of credit as one of sources of the cycle. Recent works such as Reinhart and Rogoff
[2008] and Schularick and Taylor [2009] also highlight credit booms as one of the precursors
of financial crises. In turn, the supply of credit is naturally related with short-term interest
rates. Borio and Zhu [2008] presents a “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy with high-
lighting the possibility that risk appetite in financial markets are affected by policy interest
rates. Similarly, Adrian and Shin [forthcoming] emphasizes the effect of short-term interest
rates on “risk-taking capacity” of a banking system. The literature reveals that short-term
nominal interest rates can affect the movement of an asset bubble indirectly by changing
the supply of credit. Recently, Taylor [2009] documents the deviations of the short-term
nominal interest rates of EU and U.S. from the Taylor rule, particularly during the period
of low interest rates (2003-2004).
Drawing upon the literature, in this paper, I study the transition from the so-called the
“Great Moderation” to the financial crisis of 2007-9 while focusing on short-term nominal
interest rate dynamics before the financial crisis of 2007-9.3
2Allen et al. [2009] contains a nice survey about the literature on financial crises.
3The unusual movements in the money markets started on August 9, 2007, as Cecchetti [2009] and Taylor
and Williams [2009] point out. Thus, I consider the date as the starting date of the financial crisis of 2007-9.
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The co-movement of short-term nominal interest rates across countries is pointed out,
among others, by Dokko et al. [2009] and Taylor [2009]. It seems that the data indeed
suggests a close co-movement of short-term nominal interest rates. The top panel of Figure
15 shows the time series of a 3-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (:=EURIBOR , hence-
forth) of EU and a 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (:= TB, henceforth) of US for 01/04/1999
- 12/29/2006.4 The bottom panel displays the same data as a trajectory in the space of
these two interest-rate variables. We can see that the two short-term nominal interest rates
came back together around the initial position. The bottom panel suggests a nonlinear co-
movement of the two rates.
The financial crisis of 2007-9 also highlights the close interconnectedness of the world econ-
omy, for example, by the unexpected remarkable contagion effects of the U.S. financial crisis.
Motivated from the observations, I investigate the short-term nominal interest rates of sev-
eral countries including the U.S. with special attention to EU-US.
Instead of treating each country’s interest rate separately, this paper aims at contributing to
understanding international co-movements and interactions of short-term nominal interest
rates by building a simple model.
The two key mechanisms of the model are as follows: One is the interaction between the
short-term interest rates of the U.S. as a key currency country and the risk appetite of the
world economy. The other is nonlinear dynamics with heterogeneous agents (domestic vs.
international investors).
Regarding the interaction, on the one hand, there is the effect of the risk appetite of
the world economy on the interest rates of the U.S. First, the concept of “flight to quality”
indicates a higher demand for safe assets such as the U.S. Treasuries in bad times, like
financial crises of emerging markets. The literature on global imbalances such as Bernanke
[2005] points out Asian countries’ demand for safe assets after the Asian crisis of 1997 as one
4Sahuc and Smets [2007] and Christiano et al. [2008] study the sources of apparent difference in amplitude
in Figure 15 by employing New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models in closed
economy setups.
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Figure 15: Three-month EURIBOR and Three-month U.S. TB
of reasons of low U.S. interest rates.5 Second, an interesting question was what would happen
if a financial crisis happened in the U.S. As we know now, the answer is that international
capital surprisingly inflows to the U.S. in the middle of the financial crisis of 2007-9. These
two observations lead to the assumption of the asymmetric role of the key currency country
as a safe haven in the world economy. The assumption implies that lower risk appetite of
the world economy makes U.S. interest rates lower via capital inflows to the U.S. in times of
economic distress.
5Brunnermeier [2009, 77] points out two sources of lower U.S. interest rates: capital inflow from Asian
countries after Asian crisis and benign monetary policy after bursting of IT bubble. Coulibaly and Millar
[2008] documents that the share of aggregate investment in GDP in non-China Emerging Asia decreased
roughly from 33 percent to 25 percent on average. And they find that this change is related with decline in
corporate spending on fixed investment after Asian crisis.
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On the other hand, there is literature on the leading role of the U.S. monetary policy in
the world economy. In addition, the recent literature on “risk-taking channel” of monetary
policy emphasizes the effect of level of short-term interest rates on investors’ risk appetite.
Following the literature, I assume that the risk appetite of the world economy is also affected
mainly by U.S. interest rates.6
The second mechanism is nonlinear dynamics with heterogeneous agents. Note that the
bottom panel of the Figure 15 looks like a closed curve, which suggests nonlinear movements
of interest rates.7 The unexpectedly huge repercussion of the financial crisis of 2007-9 demon-
strated the importance of nonlinear effects in financial markets. Based on these considera-
tions, I add a nonlinear mechanism due to heterogeneous agents (domestic vs. international
investors) and international capital flow into a model. The reason a model with heteroge-
neous agents may have nonlinearity can be illustrated as follows: Let’s assume two types of
players and call their strategies g(x) and h(x), respectively, where x is a state variable. If
the composition (α, 1 − α) of two types also depends on state variable x, then, the average
of two strategies is given by α(x)g(x) + (1− α(x))h(x), which must be nonlinear as long as
α, g, and h are not constants. The distinction between domestic and international investors
implies a difference in the portfolios of investors. I assume that international investors are
more sensitive on the risks such as an exchange risk. As we see later, domestic (international)
investors act as a centripetal (centrifugal) force in the model and international capital flows
constantly change the relative strength of two forces. It turns out that this simple set-up
can lead to complex dynamics such as chaos. In that respect, this paper highlights the un-
certainty endogenously generated by chaotic dynamics. In economics, there is a well-known
distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty. In the case of risk, the distribution of an
event is known, whereas in the case of Knightian uncertainty, it is not. Recently, Caballero
and Krishnamurthy [2008] highlights Knightian uncertainty as a cause of “flight to quality.”
Considering the long-run unpredictability of chaos, the similarity between the uncertainty
generated by chaotic dynamics and Knightian uncertainty would be an interesting research
6A “two-way causality” is an important mechanism in the literate on “symmetry-breaking” as nicely
exposited in Matsuyama [2008].
7For a recent discussion about the nonlinearity of short-term interest rates such as the Federal funds rate
and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, I refer to Kyrtsou and Vorlow [2009].
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topic.
In the literature, the possibility of chaotic dynamics with the Taylor rule in a closed econ-
omy is investigated by Benhabib et al. [2002]. Airaudo and Zanna [2005] studies the issue in
an open economy. There is extensive literature on nonlinear dynamics with heterogeneous
agents in financial markets.8 Day and Huang [1990] is an early work in this field. This paper
is also close to Brock and Hommes [1997, 1998] in this respect.
With the two main mechanisms in the model, the main analytical tool for the stability of
dynamics is a bifurcation analysis as a nonlinear version of comparative statics.9 A sudden
and noticeable change of a system like the transition from the “Great Moderation” to the
financial crisis of 2007-9 is observed in other several areas such as climate. Scheffer et al.
[2009] discusses early warning signals for such “critical transitions” in complex dynamical
systems and introduces two types of bifurcations as relevant bifurcations for the “critical
transitions”: One is a “catastrophic bifurcation.” In a “catastrophic bifurcations,” a dynam-
ical system has multiple equilibria in some range of parameters and the system undergoes
a dramatic change as the system passes thresholds (also called “cusp points” as in Strogatz
[2000, 70]). The other is the bifurcations related with the change of attractor from a stable
equilibrium point to a cyclic or chaotic attractor. One of the differences in the two types of
bifurcations is that in “catastrophic bifurcation” both equilibria (an equilibrium before the
bifurcation and another equilibrium after the bifurcation) are locally stable, whereas in the
other type, an attractor such as a chaos after a bifurcation is not locally stable. In this paper,
I study the second type of bifurcation mainly because it seems that unstable dynamics after
bifurcation is more consistent with the data.10
In a nutshell, in this paper, a bifurcation analysis is employed as a unifying device in
analyzing two different states of an economy, stable and unstable as illustrated in Figure 16.
The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper provides a simple model
8Hommes [2006] is a nice survey on this subject.
9For the formal definition of bifurcation in dynamical systems, I refer to Kuznetsov [1998, 57]. Grandmont
[2008] provides a nice overview on the subject.
10For more detailed discussion about applications of catastrophe theory in economics, I refer to Rosser
[2007].
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Figure 16: Regime shift as a bifurcation
for the interaction between the interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite.
The model may be useful as a thought experiment for policy-making regarding necessary
institutional reforms in international financial markets.11 The bifurcation analysis in this
paper sheds some light on the relation between the stability of interest rate dynamics and
the institutional environment in the sense that the values of bifurcation parameters naturally
depend on institutional environment. The absence of policy variables is one limitation of the
model. Adding policy rates into the model may be an interesting extension of the model.
Second, the empirical investigation in this paper also contributes to the literature on early
warning indicators in financial markets by highlighting the potential of complexity measures
11For example, the extension of currency swaps related with the U.S. dollar is in line with the implications
of the simple model.
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as early warning indicators.
The composition of this paper is as follows: Section 3.2 is a literature review on the
interaction between interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite. Section 3.3 is
an empirical investigation of short-term nominal interest rates of selected countries including
the U.S. In Section 3.4.1, I briefly review the other components of the model in this paper.
In Section 3.4.2, I present a simple model for short-term nominal interest rates dynamics.
Section 3.5 is the conclusion of this paper.
3.2 INTERACTION BETWEEN INTEREST RATES OF THE U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL RISK APPETITE
3.2.1 The U.S. as a key currency country
Because I am interested in the co-movement of international nominal interest rates, it seems
that a version of interest rate parity condition, i.e. UIRP(:= uncovered interest rate parity)
is a natural starting point.12 Whereas UIRP treats each country in a symmetric way, one
of the lessons from the financial crisis of 2007-9 is the asymmetric role of a key currency
country like the U.S. as a provider for safe assets. Appreciation of the U.S. dollar after the
advent of the financial crisis was not usual, particularly considering that 18 banking crises
out of total 23 cases in 1980 - 1995 identified by Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999] were followed
by currency crises (see Table 1 in Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999, 477]). Fratzscher [2009,
Figure 1] displays that the U.S. dollar appreciated in the middle of the financial crisis of
2007-9 approximately from July 2008.13
In addition to the foreign exchange markets, several papers document that the U.S. is a
leading country in bond markets as well (see Chinn and Frankel [2005], for example).
12One of possible resolution of the difficulty in empirically validating UIRP (for nice survey, see e.g. Engel
[1996]) is time varying risk premium. There are several candidates for determinants of time varying risk
premium: external habits (Verdelhan [2010]), rare disasters (Gabaix [2008] and Farhi and Gabaix [2008]),
heterogeneity with segmented markets (Alvarez et al. [2009]).
13Fratzscher [2009] shows that three factors were important in determining the size of appreciation of the
U.S. dollar against other currencies after summer of 2008: weight of the U.S. investors in domestic financial
markets, size of foreign exchange (FX) reserves, and current accounts.
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From these observations, in this paper, I consider the asymmetric role of a key currency
country as a source of deviation from UIRP, following Blanchard et al. [2005] and Canzoneri
et al. [2008].
3.2.2 International risk appetite
According to Gonza´lez-Hermosillo [2008], risk appetite is related with “the willingness of
investors to bear risk.” In a similar vein, I use the term ’international risk appetite’ to
indicate international investors’ willingness to bear risk.14 We can observe the co-movement
of risk appetites measured by interest rate spreads in markets of the EU and the U.S. as shown
in Figure 17. Bekaert et al. [2009] documents the co-movement of risk aversion in Germany
and the U.S. So, there may be a common factor which is related with risk aversions of both
regions. Indeed, according to Manganelli and Wolswijk [2009, 194] in the literature on bond
markets of Euro area, a common factor has been recognized and called an “international risk
aversion.”15
Manganelli and Wolswijk [2009, 194] also points out that the common factor may be
affected by the level of short-term interest rates “in normal times.” As we see below, there
is growing evidence for the interaction between interest rate and risk appetite (or animal
spirit in broad sense). For example, Felices et al. [2009] provides the evidence of reciprocal
interaction (“flight to quality” and “search for yield”) between emerging market sovereign
debt spreads and the U.S. interest rates by employing structural VAR. Whereas this paper
shares the viewpoints in Felices et al. [2009], special attention in this paper is given to
possible nonlinear effects in mutual interaction between short-term nominal interest rates of
the U.S. and international risk appetite as we see in Section 3.4.2.
Drawing upon the literature, in the model of this paper, I will assume the interaction
between interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite as illustrated in Figure 18
14The term “risk appetite” is also used in Adrian et al. [2009], for example. In this paper, the two terms,
risk appetite and risk aversion, are interchangeable. In other words, risk aversion does not mean a structural
parameter related with preference.
15For Latin America, for example, see Garc´ıa-Herrero and Ort´ız [2006].
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Figure 17: Interest rates and interest spreads in three financial markets
that is similar to the interaction in a well-known predator-prey model.16
3.2.3 The interaction between interest rates of the U.S. and international risk
appetite
In the following, I review the literature on the interaction between interest rates of the U.S.
and international risk appetite.
16We can think of interest rates of the U.S. as a predator and the risk appetite of the world as a prey. If I
replace international risk appetite with population, the figure illustrates famous Malthusian Trap. Investment
demand in Harrod [1939] is another example of self-reinforcing factors. Regarding credit cycle, Kiyotaki and
Moore [1997, 215] also uses the analogy of predator (= debt)-prey (= landholding).
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Figure 18: Interaction between interest rates (U.S.) and international risk appetite
One direction of the interaction is related with the increase in the demand for safe
assets due to lower international risk appetite. And higher demand for safe assets normally
induces stronger demand for the U.S. financial assets partially because the U.S. dollar is a
key currency, which in turn may lower interest rates in the U.S. (Caballero et al. [2008]).17
international risk appetite ↓→ demand for safe assets ↑→ U.S. interest rates ↓ (3.1)
17 The another possible channel is the monetary policy which reacts on unusual behaviors of credit spreads
as discussed in Paul and Toloui [2008] and in Taylor [2008]. Cu´rdia and Woodford [2009] provides extensive
analysis about the issue.
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On the other hand, nominal interest rates of the U.S. may affect risk appetite of an
economy (see Rajan [2006], Borio and Zhu [2008], and Manganelli and Wolswijk [2009], for
instances). The effect of monetary policy on risk appetites of people is called the “risk-taking
channel” of monetary policy by Borio and Zhu [2008]. Similar to Manganelli and Wolswijk
[2009, 194], I call two main mechanisms of “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy direct
and indirect mechanisms, respectively.
First, the direct mechanism also can be called the “search for yield” mechanism as in
Rajan [2006, 501]. A lower interest rate means lower return for fund-managers. Hence,
the “search for yield” by fund managers can occur given a fixed target rate of return with
lower interest rates. And “career risk” will enhance this tendency.18 The following remark
made by Chuck Prince, the former CEO of Citigroup, in an interview with Financial Times
succinctly illustrates the logic of the career risk.
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Nakamoto and
Wighton [2007]).
In short, the direct mechanism highlights the higher willingness of economic agents to take
riskier projects due to low interest rates even if the risk structures of financial assets are the
same as before.
U.S. interest Rate ↓, target rate of return (career risk)→ international risk appetite ↑ (3.2)
Second, the indirect mechanism works through the change of objective risk structure due
to a change of an interest rate. This channel is also closely related with a business cycle. A
lower interest rate means a lower borrowing cost for borrowers. Hence, the downside risk of
the economy becomes smaller with respect to business cycle when an interest rate becomes
lower.
U.S. interest Rate ↓→ downward risk of economy ↓→ international risk appetite ↑ (3.3)
18Guerrieri and Kondor [2009] is a recent contribution regarding career risk with general equilibrium
framework.
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Finally, the model in this paper will take into account the self-reinforcing mechanism of
international risk appetite as shown in Figure 18 due to the diffusion of information and herd
behavior. All in all, the main contribution of this paper is to analyze the stability of the
dynamical system implied in Figure 18 rather than to add a new channel into the literature.
3.3 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION ON SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
AND INTEREST SPREADS DURING THE “GREAT MODERATION”
In this Section, I empirically investigate short-term nominal interest rates of 10 selected
countries (Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and UK) and their spreads against TB(3m, U.S.) to see whether there is some
evidence for co-movement of international short-term nominal interest rates with TB(3m,
U.S.). Figures 40 and 41 in Appendix J display the short-term nominal interest rates of 10
countries against TB(3m, U.S.) for 1990-1998 and for 1999-08/08/2007, respectively. Note
that, compared to the trajectories of several countries in Figure 40, those in Figure 41 look
more like closed curves. With regard to the finding, I also pay attention to the possibility
of the structural change of interest rate dynamics. In particular, I divide the period of 1984
- 08/08/2007 into two roughly equal periods; 1984 - 1995 and 1996 - 08/08/2007. Note
that the second period includes several important episodes in international financial markets
before financial crisis of 2007-9; Asian crisis (1997-8), the introduction of Euro (1999), the
zero interest rate policy in Japan (1999), and the adoption of the Financial Services Mod-
ernization Act in the U.S. (1999).
By employing simple correlation analysis, first, I provide empirical evidence for the co-
movement of international short-term nominal interest rates. The correlation analysis re-
veals that the co-movement was particularly stronger during the second period (1996 -
08/08/2007). Second, I run a variance ratio test for each sub-sample.19 In addition to
19Charles and Darne´ [2009] provides a recent review of variance ratio tests. Applying variance ratio test to
subsamples to check the possibility of structural break is not new. For example, Liu and He [1991], revisiting
random walk hypothesis of nominal exchange rate, divides full sample ( 08/07/1974 - 03/29/1989) into two
subsampels; 08/07/1974 -10/10/1979 and 10/17/1979 - 03/29/1989. Another example is Yilmaz [2003] that
uses moving subsample windows to take into account possible structural breaks.
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the variance ratio test, I also look at the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) from the Dickey-
Fuller (DF) test for checking robustness, based on the observation that DW of DF test
and variance ratio of the variance ratio test tend to move in opposite directions.20 For the
empirical investigation in this Section, I look at daily observations of interest rates of the
U.S. and at those of short-term nominal interest rates of other selected countries. The data
description is given in Appendix I.
3.3.1 Interest rates and spreads in the U.S.
Table 8 displays that correlations between TB (3m, U.S.) and interest rate spreads, on av-
erage, become stronger in the second period (1996-08/08/2007) with respect to the levels
and the first differences of variables, respectively.21 Peculiarly, the sign of the correlation
between TB(3m, U.S.) and the credit spread of Baa-Aaa with respect to level changes from
positive to negative.
Table 8: Daily correlations between domestic interest spreads and TB(3m,U.S.)
Full sample 1984 -1995 1996-08/08/2007
FF(overnight) - TB(3m) 0.5873 / -0.1330 0.4646 / -0.0617 0.5114 / -0.1534
CD (3m) - TB (3m) 0.5203 / -0.5621 0.5674 / -0.5369 0.7040 / -0.7978
CP (financial, 3m) - TB (3m) - - 0.6902 / -0.7482
ED (London, 3m) - TB (3m) 0.5429 / -0.4072 0.6475 / -0.5195 0.7191 / -0.7339
Baa-Aaa -0.3372 / -0.0340 0.4000 / -0.0379 -0.5996 / -0.0537
Aaa-TCMNOM (30y) -0.3852 / -0.2520 -0.0866 / -0.3010 -0.1287 / -0.2723
TCMNOM (10y)-TB (3m) -0.4073 / -0.7462 -0.3717 / -0.4431 -0.8585/ -0.4130
TCMNOM (30y)-TB (3m) -0.5498 / -0.7952 -0.5224 / -0.5384 -0.7227 / -0.8620
Corr(x,TB(3m, U.S.)) / Corr(∆ x, ∆ TB(3m, U.S.))
Now, regarding random walk tests, to investigate quarterly movements of interest rates
and interest spreads, I use time lag = 65 days. The starting date is always the first date of
20I use Matlab built-in codes: adftest.m (DF test) and vraiotest.m (variance ratio test). Default options
of the codes are maintained for all computations.
21Generally speaking, it is well-known that in the U.S. there have been several monetary policy regimes.
For this point, I refer to Duffy and Engle-Warnick [2006].
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the investigation period.22 Table 9 shows the result of random walk tests.
First, in the case of spreads, estimated variance ratios of short-term interest spreads are
below unity in both periods.23 For each of the short-term interest rates, the variance ratio
test rejects the null hypothesis of random walk at 1% significance level in the second period
because the estimated variance ratio is much higher than unity. Moreover, in the second
period, estimated variance ratios of short-term interest rates increase for all variables and
DWs of DF test for the same variables decrease.
By contrast, for long-term nominal interest rate spreads, the null of random walk is accepted
with an exception. And the variance ratio tests do not reject the null for all long-term
nominal interest rates in both periods either. Moreover estimated variance ratios of long-
term nominal interest rates are below unity in the second period, which is at odds with the
result in the case of short-term nominal interest rates.24
All in all, the result of the variance ratio test indicates a difference between short-term and
long-term interest rates movements. It is an interesting open problem whether the difference
is related with the so-called “interest rate conundrum” in 2004-5.25
3.3.2 International comparison
Now, for international comparison, I examine short-term nominal interest rates of 10 coun-
tries. And since several events that were important in the world economy occurred in 1999, I
also look at the period of 1999-08/08/2007. Table 10 reports the result of correlation analy-
sis. In regard to the correlations between TB(3m, U.S.) and interest rates of other countries,
there are six countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and UK) where
the correlation becomes stronger in the second period (or in 1999-08/08/2007). Similarly,
Table 10 displays stronger negative correlations between international interest rate spreads
and TB(3m, U.S.). For the short-term interest rate spreads of 10 countries, the tendency of
stronger co-movements with TB(3m, U.S.) in terms of correlation holds without an exception.
22For example, in the case of Aaa in Table 9, the staring date for the period of 1984 - 1995 is 01/03/1984.
With time lag=65 days, the ending date is 10/27/1995. And the number of observations is 47.
23Short-term variables are CD,CP,ED,FF and TB. Aaa, Baa, TCMNOM(10y and 30y) belong to long-term
variables.
24 Table 27 in Appendix K exhibits the results of variance ratio tests with time lag = 30 days.
25For the recent contribution on “interest rate conundrum,” see, for example, Craine and Martin [2009].
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Table 9: Random walk tests of quarterly nominal interest rates and quarterly interest spreads
in U.S. (time lag = 65 days)
1984 - 1995 1996 - 08/08/2007
Interest spreads
Variance ratio obs. test stastistic (p-value) ratio obs. test stastistic (p-value) ratio
FF (overnight) - TB(3m) 47 -3.3666 (0.0008)∗∗∗ 0.6061 45 -2.0661 (0.0388)∗∗ 0.5463
CD (3m)-TB(3m) 47 -1.7464 (0.0807)∗ 0.4697 45 -1.8085 (0.0705)∗ 0.3648
CP (financial, 3m) - - - 41 -1.7548 (0.0793)∗ 0.5408
ED (3m) - TB(3m) 47 -1.5290 (0.1263) 0.5675 45 -1.9177 (0.0552)∗ 0.4020
Aaa - TCMNOM (30y) 47 -1.5759 (0.1151) 0.8227 30 0.2720 (0.7856) 1.0751
Baa - Aaa 39 -2.1011 (0.0356)∗∗ 0.6830 45 -1.0935 (0.2742) 0.8030
TCMNOM (10y) - TB(3m) 47 -0.1766 (0.8598) 0.9713 45 1.5845 (0.1131) 1.2164
TCMNOM (30y) - TB(3m) 47 0.6420 (0.5209) 1.1018 30 0.0631( 0.9497) 1.0126
DF test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW) test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW)
FF(overnight) - TB(3m) -1.6786 (0.0876) 0.8547 (2.2953) -3.8102 (0.0010) 0.5722 (2.1787)
CD (3m)-TB(3m) -2.0280 (0.0418) 0.8341 (2.8485) -1.6663 (0.0897) 0.8685 (2.9931)
CP (financial, 3m)-TB(3m) - - - -1.5032 (0.1227) 0.8771 (2.6048)
ED (3m)-TB(3m) -1.8467 (0.0621) 0.8648 (2.7170) -1.5482 (0.1133) 0.8797 (2.8539)
Aaa-TCMNOM (30y) -1.0176 (0.2746) 0.9521 (2.1272) -0.5786 (0.4318) 0.9796 ( 1.9843)
Baa-Aaa -1.6083 (0.1003) 0.9705 (2.6968) -0.2686 (0.5481) 0.9933 (2.4455)
TCMNOM (10y) - TB(3m) -1.1600 (0.2226) 0.9620 (2.1084) -1.0119 (0.2765) 0.9545 (1.4784)
TCMNOM (30y) - TB(3m) -1.0149 (0.2756) 0.9689 (1.7759) -1.7237 (0.0797) 0.8160 (1.8910)
Interest rates
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
FF (overnight) 47 1.3131 (0.1892) 1.1986 45 3.0921 (0.0020)∗∗∗ 1.5721
CD (3m) 47 1.8060 (0.0709)∗ 1.2573 45 2.6591 (0.0078)∗∗∗ 1.6293
CP (financial, 3m) - - - 41 2.8779 (0.0040)∗∗∗ 1.6160
ED (3m) 48 0.6009 ( 0.5479) 1.0873 46 3.0485 (0.0023)∗∗∗ 1.6616
TB (3m) 47 2.6976(0.0070)∗∗∗ 1.3395 45 2.7795(0.0054)∗∗∗ 1.7302
Aaa 47 0.6501 (0.5156) 1.0992 45 -0.5807 (0.5614) 0.9121
Baa 39 -0.0505 (0.9597) 0.9908 45 -0.9509 (0.3416) 0.8520
10 y 47 1.0410 (0.2979) 1.1510 45 -0.3376 (0.7357) 0.9492
30 y 47 1.1274 (0.2596) 1.1666 30 -1.0194 (0.3080) 0.7965
DF test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW) test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW)
FF (overnight) -1.3014 (0.1754) 0.9796 (1.6493) 0.6816 (0.3972) 0.9884 (0.8796)
CD (3m) -1.1876 (0.2125) 0.9811 (1.5308) -0.3990 (0.5005) 0.9936 (0.8846)
CP (financial, 3m) - - - -0.3978 (0.5005) 0.9928 (0.9116)
ED(3m) -1.1672(0.2201) 0.9800(1.8686) -0.4196( 0.4931) 0.9935(0.8163)
TB (3m) -1.3704(0.1561) 0.9804(1.3481) -0.4684(0.4752) 0.9925(0.6713)
Aaa -1.9132 (0.0538) 0.9856 (1.8749) -0.6517 (0.4082) 0.9949 (2.0140)
Baa -1.3393 (0.1641) 0.9891 (1.8988) -0.5004 (0.4635) 0.9963 (2.1400)
TCMNOM (10 y) -1.7570 (0.0748) 0.9815 (1.6938) -0.4892 (0.4676) 0.9940 (1.9884)
TCMNOM (30 y) -1.7878 (0.0702) 0.9830 (1.6585) -0.5688 (0.4354) 0.9936 (2.1488)
Table 11 reports the results of random walk tests for quarterly movements of interna-
tional short-term nominal interest rates of 10 countries. First, I inspect the results of random
walk tests of interest spreads. The null of random walk in the variance test is rejected at 5%
significance level more often in the second period (3 countries (the first period) → 7 coun-
tries (the second period)). And estimated variance ratios are higher than unity without an
exception in the second period, which is the main difference from the U.S. domestic interest
spreads with the same maturity as shown in Table 9.
Second, I examine the results of random walk tests of interest rates of 10 countries. Once
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Table 10: Daily correlation between international interest spreads and TB(3m, U.S.)
Interest rates Full sample 1984 -1995 1996-08/08/2007 1999-08/08/2007
Australia 0.7068 / 0.0139 0.7262 / -0.0160 0.5190 / 0.1080 0.6426 / 0.1207
Denmark 0.4622 / -0.0014 0.0242 / -0.0166 0.6443 / 0.0597 0.6334 / 0.0346
France 0.5151 / 0.0341 0.2008 / 0.0124 0.6014 / 0.1094 0.5671 / 0.1225
Germany 0.5984 / 0.0878 -0.1737 / 0.1171 0.6107 / 0.1509 0.6283 / 0.1959
Japan 0.7513 / 0.0208 0.5471 / -0.0062 0.7093 / 0.0173 0.6824 / 0.0601
New Zealand 0.6597 / -0.0196 0.6370 / -0.0393 0.5113 / 0.0839 0.4200 / 0.1422
Norway 0.5392 / 0.0013 0.3699 / 0.0034 0.2272 / 0.0065 0.2969 / -0.0005
Sweden 0.6657 / 0.0205 0.4029 / 0.0242 0.3676 / 0.0517 0.1742 / 0.0794
Switzerland 0.5623 / 0.0725 0.3528 / 0.0716 0.6935 / 0.1100 0.7292 / 0.0723
UK 0.8128 / 0.0822 0.6390 / 0.0892 0.7903 / 0.0940 0.8748 / 0.1155
Spreads Full sample 1984 -1995 1996-08/08/2007 1999-08/08/2007
Australia -0.0421 / -0.6007 0.3865 / -0.4310 -0.8835 / -0.7415 -0.9398/ -0.8080
Denmark -0.2062 / -0.2184 -0.6002 / -0.1326 -0.8142 / -0.5998 -0.7889 / -0.6700
France -0.1707 / -0.5501 -0.5977 / -0.3481 -0.8657 / -0.8250 -0.8504 / -0.8288
Germany -0.4977 / -0.8243 -0.7668 / -0.8239 -0.8800 / -0.8839 -0.8537 / -0.8661
Japan -0.3363 / -0.4050 -0.3941 / -0.4126 -0.9917 / -0.4212 -0.9952 / -0.7181
New Zealand 0.3349 / -0.2919 0.4240 / -0.2323 -0.6037 / -0.4443 -0.8132 / -0.7576
Norway 0.0265 / -0.1996 -0.1174 / -0.1318 -0.5388 / -0.4497 -0.4809/ -0.7036
Sweden 0.1440 / -0.2195 -0.3811 / -0.1439 -0.7367 / -0.8198 -0.8766 / -0.8415
Switzerland -0.1417 / -0.6071 -0.4654 / -0.4610 -0.8376 / -0.7033 -0.8070 / -0.7708
UK -0.0754 / -0.6855 -0.0176 / -0.3794 -0.7416 / -0.8114 -0.9378 / -0.8148
Corr(x,TB(3m, U.S.)) / Corr(∆ x, ∆ TB(3m, U.S.))
again, the null of random walk in the variance ratio test is rejected at 5% significance level
more often in the second period (2 countries (the first period) → 6 countries (the second
period)). In addition, estimated variance ratios are higher than unity with an exception,
Japan, in the second period. In particular, Table 9 and Table 11 show that for the five
countries (Denmark, France, Germany, UK, and U.S.), the variance ratio tests reject the
null hypothesis of random walk with 1% significance level during the second period and that
3-month Treasury Bill of the U.S. has the highest estimated variance ratio and the lowest
DW among short-term nominal interest rates of 11 countries in the second period.26 Table
29 in Appendix K shows the results of variance ratio tests for the period of 1999-08/08/2007
with time lag = 65 / 30 days. We can see that the estimated variance ratios are a little bit
lower than in the period of 1997-08/08/2007 but still higher than unity without an exception
with time lag = 65 days, for Euro area and the U.S., the estimated variance ratios are the
26 Table 28 in Appendix K exhibits the results of variance ratio tests with time lag = 30 days.
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highest among samples. And with time lag =30 days, the null of random walk is rejected at
5% significance level with the exception of Japan.
Table 11: Random walk tests: Quarterly nominal interest rates (time lag = 65 days)
1984 -1995 1996-08/08/2007
Interest spreads
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
Australia 46 -0.3753(0.7074) 0.9231 44 2.9841 ( 0.0028)∗∗∗ 1.3909
Denmark 27 1.1002( 0.2713) 1.1988 44 1.2829 (0.1995) 1.2428
France 26 0.1329 ( 0.8942) 1.0180 44 2.2897( 0.0220)∗∗ 1.4830
Germany 36 2.6311( 0.0085)∗∗∗ 1.4223 35 2.7626( 0.0057)∗∗∗ 1.5602
Japan 31 2.7288 (0.0064)∗∗∗ 1.5496 44 2.6365 (0.0084)∗∗∗ 1.4699
New Zealand 42 0.4596( 0.6458) 1.1270 44 1.4643( 0.1431) 1.2568
Norway 38 -0.4930( 0.6220) 0.7835 44 2.8735( 0.0041)∗∗∗ 1.5284
Sweden 45 -1.0243( 0.3057) 0.5846 44 2.3509( 0.0187)∗∗ 1.5313
Switzerland 27 2.8005( 0.0051)∗∗∗ 1.5542 44 0.2979( 0.7658) 1.0530
UK 46 -1.2998 (0.1937) 0.7926 44 3.4325( 5.9796e-004)∗∗∗ 1.5055
DF test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW) test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW)
Australia -0.8310 ( 0.3427) 0.9680(2.0260) -0.7712( 0.3644) 0.9788(1.0721)
Denmark -0.8310 ( 0.3387) 0.9462(1.7232) -1.1399( 0.2297) 0.9390( 1.4501)
France -0.6971( 0.3872) 0.9603(1.9786) - 0.8425( 0.3383) 0.9643(0.9182)
Germany -1.1321( 0.2312) 0.9422(1.2297) -1.0633(0.2561) 0.9436( 0.8327)
Japan 0.4850 (0.8135) 1.0272 (1.0657) -0.5124 (0.4590) 0.9910 (1.1895)
New Zealand -0.9862( 0.2856) 0.9619(1.4972) -0.7390( 0.3761) 0.9738 (1.5540)
Norway -1.6490(0.0926)∗ 0.8704( 2.3547) -1.0911( 0.2475) 0.9449(1.0126)
Sweden -1.8061( 0.0676)∗ 0.8569(2.6719) -2.0337( 0.0414)∗∗ 0.8932( 0.5470)
Switzerland -0.8380( 0.3361) 0.9420(0.9980) -0.9274( 0.3073) 0.9746(1.9080)
UK -0.8613( 0.3317) 0.9663(2.3875) -0.8763( 0.3260) 0.9692(1.0240)
Interest rates
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
Australia 47 0.3698( 0.7115) 1.0573 46 2.2084( 0.0272)∗∗ 1.3871
Denmark 28 -1.1542(0.2484) 0.5598 45 2.6015(0.0093)∗∗∗ 1.4164
France 27 1.1763( 0.2395) 1.2711 45 3.3437( 8.2654e-004)∗∗∗ 1.5757
Germany 47 3.9261( 8.6336e-005)∗∗∗ 1.4846 45 3.2281( 0.0012)∗∗∗ 1.4731
Japan 32 3.4670 (0.0005)∗∗∗ 1.7651 46 -0.9414 (0.3465) 0.8209
New Zealand 43 0.6742( 0.5002) 1.1184 45 1.9324( 0.0533)∗ 1.3798
Norway 39 0.3873( 0.6986) 1.0902 45 2.1579( 0.0309)∗∗ 1.4653
Sweden 46 -0.5000 ( 0.6170) 0.8970 45 1.6826( 0.0925)∗ 1.3488
Switzerland 28 1.3000(0.1936) 1.2453 46 0.2038 ( 0.8385) 1.0339
UK 47 -0.2636( 0.7921) 0.9589 46 2.7281( 0.0064)∗∗∗ 1.4671
DF test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW) test statistic (p-value) coefficient (DW)
Australia -0.5390( 0.4495) 0.9906(1.5389) -0.6246( 0.4182) 0.9939( 1.3336)
Denmark -0.7824(0.3567) 0.9643(2.8831) -0.5414( 0.4485) 0.9912(1.1667)
France -0.7697( 0.3611) 0.9850(1.5608) -0.8110( 0.3499) 0.9875(0.7483)
Germany -0.7185( 0.3840) 0.9918(1.1413) -0.1415( 0.5946) 0.9979 (1.0662)
Japan -0.8934 (0.3175) 0.9826 (0.6605) -1.1649 (0.2207) 0.9246 (2.2927)
New Zealand -0.9030( 0.3161) 0.9767( 1.5699) -0.5113( 0.4595) 0.9915(1.3455)
Norway -1.0668(0.2556) 0.9781(1.8846) -0.5529( 0.4443) 0.9891(1.1637)
Sweden -0.6780( 0.3986) 0.9875(2.2588) -3.1351( 0.0032) 0.9443(0.8458)
Switzerland -0.6450( 0.4069) 0.9850(1.4835) -0.3996(0.5004) 0.9860(1.9695)
UK -0.6314(0.4158) 0.9896(2.1505) -0.4451( 0.4838) 0.9951(1.1392)
In a nutshell, the correlation analysis of this Section reveals that correlation between
international interest rate spreads and TB(3m, U.S.) becomes stronger before the financial
crisis of 2007-9 for 10 countries without an exception whereas the correlation between interna-
tional interest rates and TB(3m, U.S.) becomes stronger for 6 countries. Stronger correlation
between international interest rate spreads and TB(3m, U.S.) before the financial crisis of
2007-9 is an encouraging evidence in light of the focus of this paper, interactive dynamics
between short-term nominal interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite.
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Regarding the variance ratio test, estimated variance ratios of interest rates are higher than
unity in the second period with the exception of the Euro market rate of Japan yen. In par-
ticular, the estimated variance ratios of international short-term interest spreads are higher
than unity in the second period without an exception, which is different from domestic inter-
est spreads of the U.S. with the same maturity. Thus we can conjecture that an international
factor might be responsible for the difference. And the variance ratio test is more often re-
jected in the second period. Note that these results from variance ratio tests may be useful
characteristics of data in the sense that models for dynamics of international short-term
nominal interest rates can be evaluated with regard to the characteristics. I will investigate
whether the model in this paper is helpful to understand the results from the variance ratio
tests. In other words, I will look at whether the model can generate some regularities of
data such as a variance ratio higher than unity before the financial crisis of 2007-9.
3.4 A MODEL
3.4.1 The overview of the model
In addition to the interaction between the interest rates of U.S. and international risk appetite
discussed in Section 3.2, in Section 3.4.1, I briefly discuss the remaining components of the
model.
3.4.1.1 Two sources of nonlinearity of the model One of the sources of nonlinearity
in the model is the fact that nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero, recently
highlighted by Benhabib and Uribe [2001] where they show that a stable limit cycle exists
around an active steady state with the Taylor rule under some conditions by using the
Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation. The zero interest rate policy in Japan from 1999 is a typical
example for the lower bound of nominal interest rates.
Another source of nonlinearity in dynamics of financial markets is related with adaptive
behaviors of heterogeneous agents which are systematically studied under the concept of
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“adaptively rational equilibrium” in Brock and Hommes [1997] including a chaotic attractor
via homoclinic bifurcation. Brock and Hommes [1998] also presents several bifurcation routes
to complicated dynamics in financial markets including limit cycles and chaos. In this paper
there exist two types of economic agents; domestic investors and international investors.
And due to different portfolios, I assume international investors are more risk-sensitive.
Moreover, I also assume that the weight of international investors in the U.S. financial
markets is higher in times of low risk appetite because of higher demand for safe assets.
In other words, the composition of two types in the U.S. financial markets depends on risk
appetite via international flow of funds.
risk appetite ↓→ demand for safe assets ↑→ fund inflows to the U.S.
→ the weight of international investors in the U.S. financial markets ↑
(3.4)
3.4.1.2 Bifurcation analysis The idea of bifurcation (including change of stability of
equilibrium point) especially related with economic depression is not new in economics.
Whereas the concept of the “natural price” of Adam Smith or the concept of the “natural rate
of interest” of Knut Wicksell assumes the existence of stable equilibrium points of relevant
dynamical systems, several destabilizing mechanisms of an economic system such as debt
deflation of Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes’ dynamic effect of lowering monetary
wage have been proposed.27 A seminal paper of Tobin [1975, 195] makes critical comments
on Keynes’s choice of equilibrium analysis and comparative statics.28 The famous Minsky’s
financial instability hypothesis clearly shows its connection with the idea of bifurcation as I
cited at the beginning of the paper.29
Since the model in this paper undergoes bifurcations eventually leading to chaotic mo-
tions, I briefly review relevant mechanisms for chaotic dynamics in this paper.30 Assume
27Mendoza [forthcoming] is an interesting recent application of the idea of debt deflation in DSGE frame-
work.
28 Tobin [1975] presents a classical continuous time model for Keynesian depression where attracting basin
of equilibrium point is bounded.
29See, for example, Minsky [1986, 10, footnote 9] where Minsky cited several early works on chaos in
economic systems.
30 Here I briefly review several bifurcation routes to nonlinear attractors such as limit cycles and chaos in
economics. The list is not at all complete. For introduction to bifurcation in intertemporal equilibrium theory,
I refer to Mitra and Nishimura [2001]. Boldrin and Montrucchio [1986] shows that in discrete optimal growth
model even chaotic dynamics can be admissible under some values of parameters. In business cycle theory, a
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that S is a square. Let F be a version of the well-known Smale horseshoe map: F maps S
into R2 as Figure 19 shows.31 Note that V1 = F (H2) and V2 = F (H1). We also can see that
F(S) looks like a horseshoe. As Figure and Table 12 exhibit, the Smale horseshoe map has
three elementary actions; contraction, expansion, and folding.
Figure 19: The Smale horseshoe map
Intuitively speaking, there are a centripetal force, a centrifugal force, and a change of
relative strengths of two forces. Similarly, in Brock and Hommes [1997, 1998] there are three
bifurcation analysis is often related with the endogenous business cycle literature as explained in Grandmont
[1985, 997]. In particular, homoclinic bifurcations in discrete time are also investigated in de Vildor [1996]
and Agliari et al. [2007]. In development theory, for example, Matsuyama [1991] in continuous time with
increasing returns presents a model with a homoclinic orbit. Artige et al. [2004] in discrete time with habit
formation is an example of application of Hopf bifurcation to show a stable limit cycle in economic growth
theory.
31Λ =
⋂∞
j=−∞ F
j(S) is an invariant cantor set of F. The interesting dynamics on Λ is normally analyzed
by introducing symbolic dynamics. The explanation about the Smale horseshoe map in this paper is based
on Perko [2001, 409-412]. For more details, I refer to Guckenheimer and Holmes [1983, 5.1]
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corresponding components; rational expectation or fundamentalists, naive expectation or
chartists, and switch of beliefs.32 In line with those modeling strategies, the model in this
paper contains three components; domestic investors, international investors, and capital
flow between the U.S. and the rest of the world.
Table 12: Main actions of a model
Smale horseshoe map Brock and Hommes [1997, 1998] This paper
contraction rational expectation or fundamentalists domestic investors
expansion naive expectation or chartists foreign investors
folding switch of beliefs international movement of funds
There are two reasons I study a delayed-logistic map. One is that the bifurcation routes
of the delayed-logistic map and the model in this paper turn out to be similar. The other
is that it can be viewed as a simple nonlinear model for leader-follower relation because y
(follower) just takes the previous value of x (leader).33 Eq. 3.5 represents a delayed-logistic
map.
xt+1 = Axt(1− yt)
yt+1 = xt
(3.5)
where x0 = 0.1, y0 = 0.1.
The map generates three different attractors depending on parameter A. A limit cy-
cle emerges at A=2 through Neimark-Sacker bifurcation (Kuznetsov [1998, 142-4]). Chaos
emerges around A=2.27. (Sprott [2003, 422]).34
Figure 20 shows three different trajectories corresponding to three different values of A.
Note that with A=1.9, the trajectory converges to the point attractor. But, with A=2.1,
the trajectory does not converge to any point. Instead, the trajectory is attracted to an
invariant closed curve (a limit cycle). Next, if A=2.7, the trajectory is attracted to a chaotic
32Kaizoji [2004] shows that the increase in the number of traders in a heterogeneous agents model may
lead to an intermittent chaos.
33Belke and Cui [2010] investigates the monetary policy interdependence between the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve (Fed) from 1999 to 2006 (see Figure 15 for three-month interest rates
of two regions during the period). By probing into the relation between the EONIA rate and the Fed Funds
rate, they find an evidence for the leader (Fed) - follower (ECB) relation in one of two models (general
VECM).
34 For the detailed analysis including related homoclinic bifurcation, I refer to Aronson et al. [1982].
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Figure 20: Delayed-logistic map
attractor. We can see from Figure 20 that the diameter of a trajectory gets longer as the
parameter of A becomes larger. This is a useful observation in modeling the big swing of a
state variable.
3.4.2 Model
Before I discuss the model, I make a few remarks in terms of methodological issues. The
model in this paper is not strictly based upon the so-called micro foundations of macro
models. With respect to the issue, I share the following viewpoint:
To make the needed break from the past, macroeconomists must acknowledge that micro
foundations are a choice variable of theorists. The appropriate choice cannot be determined
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a priori; it needs to be made in reference to empirical data and educated common sense in
a way that will lead to useful macro models (Colander et al. [2008, 236]).
Regarding this point, we can find several cases where useful insights for policy-making are
obtained without strict adherence to the micro foundations of macro models. Among them
is the following observation made by a leading scholar of the regulation school:
The stability of an equity-based regime depends on monetary policy which controls financial
bubbles and thus the diffusion of finance may push the economy into a zone of structural
instability. The next major financial crisis may originate in the USA whose economy
approximates most closely to the model (Boyer [2000, 111]).
Given the fact that the financial crisis of 2007-9 was a surprising event to most people, the
insight in Boyer [2000] is remarkable.
How can we evaluate different models that take competing methodological approaches?
We can evaluate models by comparing explanatory power of each model. In other words,
we can investigate whether each model replicates the essential properties of data. And I
include several complexity measures as parts of essential properties of data (see Section 3.5
for more discussion). An advantage of complexity measures is that they are invariant at least
to monotone transformation. Thus, it is not difficult to compare simulated data with real
data with respect to complexity measures. Finally, as the model in this paper does not have
solid micro foundations, I do not claim that it is a general model. Rather, I admit that the
model is primarily specific to interest rates dynamics before the financial crisis of 2007-9.
3.4.2.1 A simple model for interactive dynamics of the U.S. interest rates and
international risk appetite Here I present a simple two-country model for interest rate
dynamics as a simple model to investigate the stability of interaction between interest rates
of the U.S. and international risk appetite measured by interest rate spreads. The uncovered
interest rate parity (=UIRP) holds if the following no-arbitrage condition holds:
(1 + it,$) = (EtS(t+1,¿/$))
−1(1 + it,¿)St,¿/$ (3.6)
where it,$ and it,¿ denotes interest rates of two countries and St,¿/$ is a spot foreign exchange
rate, and Et is conditional expectation operator at time t, respectively. The model does not
deal with the movement of a foreign exchange rate by making a simplifying assumption:
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Assumption 3.4.1. Conditional expectation of foreign exchange rate is identical to current
foreign exchange rate.
A sufficient condition for the assumption is that a foreign exchange rate follows a simple
random walk. Note that with the above assumption, UIRP just means that
it,$ = it,¿,∀t. (3.7)
But, due to several frictions including demand for safe assets, the financial assets of the U.S.
are treated as special. So, modified UIRP becomes
it,¿ = it,$ + spt,∀t. (3.8)
where spt represents required spread (or premium) due to time-varying international risk
appetite. I assume it,¿ is fully determined by two variables it,$ and spt.
spt is determined by autoregressive process with a little modification as follows:
spt+1 = sspspt + si(it,$ − i¯$), ssp > 1, si > 0 (3.9)
where i¯$ is some reference level like natural rate of interest. I assume that ssp > 1 and si > 0
because of the reasons reviewed in Section 3.2.3. We can imagine that spt = 0 represents
market situation where investors accept no premium for holding other countries’ financial
assets given it,$ = i¯$. So, the specification implies that with spt = 0, if it,$ > i¯$, then
since the probability of downturn of world economy becomes higher, investors want positive
premium in the next period.
In bond market, there are two types of players, domestic and international investors.
Assumption 3.4.2. The supply of bond is fixed. Thus, the price of bond is demand-
determined. The rate of return or interest rate is determined by a weighted average of the
expectations of two types of players.
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Even though a representative agent with rational expectation as a model-consistent ex-
pectation is popular in economics, there are several rationales for assuming adaptive ex-
pectation in financial markets in some cases, which are mainly related with the concept of
complexity.35 First, the rational expectation may not be obtainable just because the ‘correct’
model is not known due to the inherent complexity of the relevant system. Second, as in
Brock and Hommes [1997], there may exist information cost in obtaining rational expec-
tation. And if the benefit from using rational expectation instead of simpler expectation
formation rules such as adaptive expectation is smaller than the cost, it would be better to
use adaptive expectation with no information cost. And as a system becomes more complex,
the information cost will be larger. I assume that the expectation of domestic investors is
adaptive expectation.
idt+1,$ = idi¯$ + (1− id)it,$, 0 < id < 1 (3.10)
where i¯$ is a reference level reflecting the natural rate of interest. Thus, domestic investors
act like fundamentalists in a fundamentalist-chartist model.36 If a price (it,$) deviates from
the fundamental value (i¯$), domestic investors expect that the price will gradually come back
to the fundamental value.37 I assume that the expectation of international investors is also
adaptive expectation with a little modification mainly due to a demand for safe asset.
iwt+1,$ = iw(max{i¯$ − iwsspt, 0}) + (1− iw)it,$, iws > 0, 0 < iw < 1 (3.11)
Eq. 3.11 means that if spt = 0, then the reference level is i¯$ but if international investor
becomes pessimistic (spt > 0), then the demand for safe assets is stronger and his reference
level becomes lower by iwsspt. Caballero and Krishnamurthy [2009, 584] points out the
demand for safe assets as the main cause of capital inflow to the U.S. Symmetrically, if
spt < 0, international investors are optimistic, then the demand for safe assets is weaker and
his reference level becomes higher by iwsspt mainly because he may find more investment
35For a recent overview on complexity in economics and finance, I refer to Anufriev and Branch [2009].
And also see the works at the Santa Fe Institute.
36For an overview on fundamentalist-chartist models, I refer to Hommes [2006]. Note that domestic
investors (international investors) roughly correspond to α-investors (β-investors) in Day and Huang [1990].
37Another possible interpretation is that the strategy of domestic investors represents a monetary policy
that employs a simple adaptive rule. Then, market interest rates would be determined by a weighted average
of a monetary policy and strategy of international investors.
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opportunities outside the U.S. The simple symmetric specification succinctly represents the
idea that “the more fear is, the more greed is, and vice versa.” Given spt, the extent of
adjustment depends on the parameter of iws. I call iws a parameter of risk-attitude. Zero (0)
is included in Eq. 3.11 because of the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates.
The weight of international investors in the market (= αt) depends on spt in the following
way:
αt(spt) = α1(atan(−α2(spt − sˆp)2)) + α0, α0, α1, α2, and sˆp > 0 (3.12)
Thus I assume that the weight of international investors in the U.S. bond markets is at
the maximum (=α0) if spt = sˆp(> 0) due to the status of the U.S. as a key currency country.
And since spt > 0 means a positive excess return in holding non-US assets, if spt > sˆp, I
assume that ‘excess return effect’ dominates the pessimism implied by spt > 0. Another
rationale for the specification of Eq. 3.12 is related with foreign exchange rate movements.
Note that rising α means the appreciation of the U.S. dollar because of capital inflow into the
U.S. Therefore, unusually high α(> α0) would be related with the unusually appreciated U.S.
dollar. In that case, investing in non-US assets would get gain from currency appreciation
against the U.S. dollar. Thus, expected gain from foreign exchange markets provides another
incentive for investing in risky non-US assets if α > α0.
38
Whereas Eq. 3.12 succinctly represents a folding mechanism which is necessary to gen-
erate complicated dynamics, the folding mechanism exogenously specified in Eq. 3.12 is
obviously too simple. Thus, I suggest possible extensions of the model. First, considering
heterogeneous predictors within international investors, including change of predictors as in
Brock and Hommes [1997, 1998], would be interesting. Second, adding foreign exchange
markets with heterogeneous predictors into the model would be promising as well.
Then, it+1,$ is determined by the following equation:
it+1,$ = (1− α(spt))idt+1,$ + α(spt)iwt+1,$ (3.13)
This completes the description of the model.
38According to Farhi and Gabaix [2008], the failure of UIRP or the so-called “forward premium puzzle” is
related with the empirical regularity that currencies with low interest rates experience depreciation. In the
habit-based model of Verdelhan [2010], domestic investors are more risk averse and interest rates are low in
bad times.
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Plugging Eq. 3.10-3.12 into Eq. 3.13, we have the following:
it+1,$ = (1− (α1(atan(α2(spt − sˆp)2)) + α0))(idi¯$ + (1− id)it,$)
+ (α1(atan(α2(spt − sˆp)2)) + α0)(iw(max{i¯$ − iwsspt, 0}) + (1− iw)it,$)
(3.14)
{spt, it,$}t≥0 is fully determined by Eq. 3.9 and Eq. 3.14 with initial conditions. Then, it,¿
is passively determined by Eq. 3.8. Note that by construction, (sp, i$) = (0, i¯$) is a steady
state. It will be a formidable task to fully characterize the dynamics of this dynamical
system. Instead of it, since I am interested in interactive dynamics between short-term
nominal interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite, I probe into the effect of
changes of iws and si on the stability of the dynamical system.
3.4.2.2 The stronger influence of international risk appetite on the U.S. interest
rates (iws ↑) and its effect on dynamics of the model As Kindleberger and Aliber
[2005, 55] points out, asset bubbles depend on the expansion of credit. Regarding the
financial crisis of 2007-9, the global imbalance is identified as a source of supply of credit.
In turn, the “saving-glut” of Asian countries is somewhat related with the Asian crisis of
1997 and the response of the IMF (see, Brunnermeier [2009, 77], Diamond and Rajan [2009,
606], and Allen et al. [2009], for instances). In other words, the historical events induce
higher demand for safer assets, particularly for the U.S. financial assets. The related surge
of international reserves in Asian countries especially after the Asian crisis of 1997 implies the
change of attitude toward financial crises.39 The trend can be modeled as a more sensitive
risk-attitude or higher iws in the model. Thus, it is interesting to see the implication of
change in risk-attitude in the simple model. Table 13 summarizes parameter values for the
experiment about the effect of change in risk-attitude.
Parameter values are chosen to roughly match interest rate dynamics of EURIOBR (3m,
EU) and TB (3m, U.S.) (the bottom panel of Figure 21) after bifurcation. Given the other
parameters, I investigate the effect of increase in influence of international risk appetite on
39About the surge of international reserve in Asian countries after the Asian crisis of 1997, see Jeanne
[2007] for example. Frankel and Saravelos [2010] reports that central bank reserves are one of the two most
useful leading indicators for crisis incidence. Their finding supports the importance of international reserve
as self-insurance.
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Figure 21: Effect of change in risk-attitude: EU-US
interest rates of the U.S by looking at different trajectories due to different values of a pa-
rameter (iws). The upper panel of Figure 21 displays the result: As iws increases from 1.7 to
3.3, the steady state loses the stability and a new attractor (limit cycle) emerges. Regarding
bifurcation analysis, a bifurcation diagram is a nice tool of looking at the effect of the change
of a parameter on dynamics. The top panel of Figure 44 in Appendix shows a bifurcation
diagram where iws is a bifurcation parameter.
40 The experiment exhibits that the more sen-
sitive risk-attitude around the globe due to frequent financial crises before financial crisis of
40A bifurcation diagram for the delayed-logistic map is given in Sprott [2003, 170].
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Table 13: Parameter values (I)
(sp) ssp si i¯$
1.11 0.3 5
(i$) id iw iws α0 α1 α2 sˆp
0.1 0.5 (1.7 → 3.3) 0.5 0.2 2.5 1
(sp0, i0,$) = (1, 2)
2007-9 may induce not only low interest rates but also unstable interest rate dynamics. Re-
garding the relation between ECB and Fed, the model suggests the following three elements
are important: Asymmetric role of the U.S. as a key currency country, modified UIRP, and
strong interaction between interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite.41
3.4.2.3 The stronger influence of the U.S. interest rates on international risk
appetite (si ↑) and its effect on dynamics of the model As financial globalization has
advanced, the influence of the the U.S. interest rates on the international financial markets
has grown. For example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher [2005] provides evidences for stronger
interdependence between Euro area and the U.S. after the introduction of Euro in 1999.
In order to investigate the repercussion of this development on interactive dynamics, I look
at the situation where the U.S. interest rates have a bigger impact on international risk
appetite, which implies higher si in the model. Table 14 shows that the only difference from
the previous experiment is higher si (0.3→ 0.5).
As Figure 22 illustrates, higher si has two impacts regarding levels of interest rates:
Higher interest rate in the rest of the world when U.S. interest rate decreases and lower the
lower-bound for the U.S. interest rate due to higher demand for safe assets. Several authors
point out the Asian crisis of 1997 and related global imbalance lowered interest rates of the
U.S. due to more sensitive risk attitude. Figure 22 represents the idea that, given mutual
41Interestingly, as Belke and Cui [2010, 778-779] points out, ECB did not follow Fed in early 2008 but
made huge cuts in interest rates by the end of 2008.
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Table 14: Parameter values (II)
(sp) ssp si i¯$
1.11 0.3 → 0.5 2.5
(i$) id iw iws α0 α1 α2 sˆp
0.1 0.5 3.3 0.5 0.2 2.5 1.5
(sp0, i0,$) = (1, 2)
Figure 22: Model with higher si
feedbacks between short-term nominal interest rate and international risk appetite, stronger
influence of interest rates on international risk appetite also may contribute to lowering the
lower bounds of interest rates of the U.S. The bifurcation diagram where si is a bifurcation
parameter is given in the bottom panel of Figure 44.
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Another implication of the model is about uncertainty, which comes from the fact that
the dynamics under investigation is chaotic. Among several properties of a chaotic system,
I focus on the condition of “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” mainly because
the condition implies the unpredictability of paths due to computational errors involved in
identifying initial conditions or in computing a path from an initial condition.42 To highlight
the uncertainty generated by chaotic dynamics, I look at the difference of two trajectories
which start from very close initial conditions. I choose (sp01, i01,$) = (1, 2.00001) as a new
initial condition. So the initial difference of two trajectories is 0.00001 with respect to the
U.S. interest rate. Figure 42 in Appendix L reports the difference of two trajectories up
to t=1,999 for three different attractors. From Figure 42, we can see that the difference of
two trajectories in the case of chaos does not converge and displays irregular pattern (the
so-called ”butterfly effect”).43
I also employ a Poincare´ plot to appreciate the uncertainty generated by chaotic dy-
namics. Figure 23 shows more scattered points in Poincare´ plots for chaotic dynamics that
highlight endogenous uncertainty generated by endogenous dynamics rather than by exoge-
nous shock.44
42A definition of chaotic map is given in Devaney [2003]:
“Let V be a set. f : V → V is said to be chaotic on V if
1. f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions
2. f is topologically transitive
3. periodic points are dense in V (Devaney [2003, 50]).”
According to Hirsh et al. [2004, 321], sensitive dependence on initial conditions is “the hallmark of a chaotic
system.”
43The idea of connecting financial turbulence with chaotic movement is not new. See, for example, the
following statement made by President of the European Central Bank.
“The features of such exceptional circumstances are not only that they occur largely unex-
pectedly or that they make inference based on past observations inadequate, but also that
the complex intertwining of economic relationships characterising this turbulent period can
hardly be captured by our mostly linear models. These are times in which the ‘flap of a
butterfly’s wings’ causes tornadoes (chaos theory) (Trichet [2009]).”
44For top panels, Poincare´ plots are constructed as follows: Let {(xt, yt)}1≤t≤T be a two-dimensional data.
Let A = {yjt(j)}1≤j≤K be the points in a Poincare´ plot. K ≤ T and t(j) denotes the original index. Then
yt0 ∈ A if the following condition hold: 4 ≤ xt0 < 4.5 and xt0+1 ≤ 4.
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Figure 23: Poincare´ plots
Note that one possible mechanism for more sensitive risk attitude (higher iws) is rising
uncertainty and precautionary demand for a key currency. Then, insofar as more uncertainty
induces more sensitive risk attitude, the experiments in this paper implies that the following
vicious spiral of uncertainty may occur under some circumstances where dynamics is chaotic:
Unceratainty ↑→ More sensitive risk attitude (iws ↑) chaotic motion→ Uncertainty ↑ (3.15)
The two pillars for the vicious spiral of uncertainty are the endogenous uncertainty gener-
ated by a chaotic system and the uncertainty-related parameter of iws included in the chaotic
system itself.45
The uncertainty discussed so far is general for any chaotic system because the uncertainty
45To fully model the vicious spiral of uncertainty, it would be better approach to treat risk attitude itself
as a slowly changing endogenous variable. I leave this extension a future research topic.
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depends only on the property of sensitive dependence on initial conditions. As we can see
from Figure 22, one of the most interesting results from the experiment is that the impact
of higher si is not symmetric: It has bigger impact when U.S. interest rate decreases in
the sense that the paths become more diverse. In other words, It seems that there is more
uncertainty for the movement of interest rates of the rest of the world when interest rates of
the U.S. decreases. The asymmetric implication regarding uncertainty is indeed specific to
the model rather than general.
In a nutshell, strong interaction between interest rates of the U.S. and international risk
appetite may generate chaotic dynamics. The resulting chaotic dynamics has two main im-
plications for the financial crisis of 2007-9: First, it contributes to generating low interest
rates of the U.S. Second, it highlights that the stronger interaction may generate endogenous
uncertainty due to “butterfly effect” and in worse case the vicious spiral of uncertainty.
Figure 43 in Appendix M summarizes dynamics of main components of model. From
the top panel of Figure 43, domestic investors (=idt,$) closely follow the realized interest rate
(=it,$) but international investors (=i
w
t,$) deviate significantly from the realized interest rate
and prevent the system from converging to a steady state. The bottom panel of Figure 43
displays that there is sometimes irregular increase in share of international investors (=αt).
3.4.2.4 The simultaneous effect of two parameters, iws and si Finally, Figure 24
shows the simultaneous effect of two parameters, iws and si on the stability of the dynamical
system. The points denoted by circles represent the combinations of iws and si where the
steady state is locally stable. Figure 24 clearly shows that, as the interaction between the
short-term interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite becomes stronger, the
dynamical system is more likely to lose local stability.
From the 1980’s, the financial globalization made the U.S. interest rates more important in
international financial markets (si ↑). And several financial crises in the 1990’s may have
resulted in a more sensitive risk attitude (iws ↑). These historical events are examples of
the unstabilizing movement shown in Figure 24. In this way, Figure 24 displays a concrete
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Figure 24: The simultaneous effect of two parameters, iws and si
mechanism for the bifurcation illustrated in Figure 16.
3.4.2.5 Random shock and variance ratios Now, I investigate the effect of random
shock with focusing on its impact on variance ratios.46
spt+1 = sspspt + si(it,$ − i¯$) + sp,t+1, sp,t+1 ∼ i.i.d. Normal(0, σ2sp) (3.16)
it+1,$ = (1− (α1(atan(α2(spt − sˆp)2)) + α0))(idi¯$ + (1− id)it,$)
+ (α1(atan(α2(spt − sˆp)2)) + α0)(iw(max{i¯$ − iwsspt, 0})
+ (1− iw)it,$) + i$,t+1, i$,t+1 ∼ i.i.d. Normal(0, σ2i$)
(3.17)
Table 15 shows the estimated variance ratios with different specifications.
46For a replicable simulation, I use the Matlab command, randn(‘state’,0), in generating random shock.
The initial condition is (sp0, i0,$) = (1, 2) as before.
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Table 15: Random shock and variance ratio tests, t=0-49
Equilibrium point Limit cycle Chaos
(iws, si) = (1.7, 0.3) (iws, si) = (3.3, 0.3) (iws, si) = (3.3, 0.5)
coefficient (p-value) ratio coefficient (p-value) ratio coefficient (p-value) ratio
σsp = σi$
=0.5
(sp) 2.8023 ( 0.0051) 1.4172 3.7155 (2.0280e-004) 1.5761 3.5238 (4.2534e-004) 1.6491
(i$) 2.6097 (0.0091) 1.4236 3.9275 (8.5834e-005) 1.6293 2.4554 (0.0141) 1.5626
(i¿) 1.6453 ( 0.0999) 1.1675 3.6923(2.2223e-004) 1.4812 2.8134(0.0049) 1.5639
σsp = σi$
=0.4
(sp) 2.9390(0.0033) 1.4820 4.0908 (4.2982e-005) 1.6922 3.8501(1.1808e-004) 1.7394
(i$) 2.8944(0.0038) 1.4895 4.2435(2.2004e-005) 1.7385 2.6977(0.0070) 1.6506
(i¿) 2.1634( 0.0305) 1.2170 4.1342(3.5614e-005) 1.6543 3.1622(0.0016) 1.6563
σsp = σi$
=0.3
(sp) 3.0749(0.0021) 1.5772 4.3466(1.3828e-005) 1.7622 4.1747 (2.9834e-005) 1.8347
(i$) 3.5015(4.6259e-004) 1.6266 4.2076(2.5813e-005) 1.7966 3.9545( 7.6696e-005) 1.8008
(i¿) 3.0983(0.0019) 1.3480 4.2997(1.7100e-005) 1.6886 3.7651(1.6650e-004) 1.7551
σsp = σi$
=0.2
(sp) 3.4226(6.2020e-004) 1.7166 4.8608( 1.1689e-006) 1.8601 4.6714( 2.9921e-006) 1.9025
(i$) 4.0414( 5.3127e-005) 1.8069 4.6709(2.9995e-006) 1.8529 4.1408( 3.4616e-005) 1.8252
(i¿) 3.9420(8.0806e-005) 1.5454 5.0068(5.5337e-007) 1.8244 4.4731( 7.7087e-006) 1.8807
σsp = σi$
=0.1
(sp) 3.9457(7.9559e-005) 1.8697 5.2922(1.2085e-007) 1.9470 4.3285(1.5010e-005) 1.9679
(i$) 4.2580(2.0625e-005) 1.9561 5.0228(5.0934e-007) 1.9116 3.5641(3.6505e-004) 1.8739
(i¿) 4.4739(7.6803e-006) 1.8078 5.4577( 4.8241e-008) 1.9144 3.7051(2.1127e-004) 1.9213
σsp = σi$
=0
(sp) 4.6466 (3.3750e-006) 1.9456 5.5332(3.1438e-008) 1.9985 5.1311( 2.8801e-007) 1.9848
(i$) 4.4824(7.3803e-006) 2.0082 5.1794(2.2256e-007) 1.9584 4.8269(1.3866e-006) 1.9266
(i¿) 5.0788(3.7988e-007) 1.9997 5.7295(1.0073e-008) 1.9406 4.5588(5.1443e-006) 1.9272
Regardless of the size of random shock and the type of an attractor, estimated variance
ratios are larger than unity for interest rates and spreads, respectively without an exception.
In most cases, the null of random walk is rejected at 5% significance level. These results are
consistent with the data we saw in Section 3.3. Figure 25 displays paths of i$ and it,¿ with
different sizes of random shock. We can see that circle-like motions in the cases of limit cycle
and chaos are roughly preserved.47
Regarding higher variance ratios in the second period shown in Section 3.3, there are two
important patterns in the above numerical experiment. First, given attractors (equilibrium
point, limit cycle, and chaos), smaller random shock induces a higher estimated variance
ratio without an exception in the Table 15. And the highest levels of variance ratios are
obtained in the cases of deterministic dynamical systems. Since the variance ratios higher
47The basins of attraction in cases of limit cycle and chaos in the simple model are bounded, which implies
that with random shock dynamic paths will eventually diverge. The boundedness of the basins of attraction is
natural consequence of the existence of the zero-bound of a nominal interest rate, considering the stabilizing
role of a nominal interest rate. Of course, in a real economy, there exist several unconventional monetary
policies which may be conducted at the zero interest rate, including “quantitative easing.” Regarding this
point, I refer to Bernanke and Reinhart [2004] and Cecchetti [2009].
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than unity imply positive autocorrelation of the first differences of data as in Charles and
Darne´ [2009, 505-6], the result reveals that the models without random shock in this paper
generate the highly positively autocorrelated first-differences. Adding random shock into
dynamics turns out to reduce the positive autocorrelation. Second, given moderate random
shock (0.2 ≤ σsp = σi$ ≤ 0.5), change of attractors from equilibrium point to limit cycles or
chaos results in a higher variance ratio.
Summing up, the numerical experiment shows that the model can easily generate vari-
ance ratios higher than unity. Regarding rising variance ratios, the numerical experiment
suggests two possible explanations: One is the reduction of random shock and the other is
the bifurcation of a dynamical system. Of course, two explanations may be intertwined. The
emergence of limit cycles or chaos usually implies the existence of strong feedback mecha-
nisms in a dynamical system. And these strong feedback mechanisms may reduce the effect
of exogenous random shock. For example, suppose that an economy is dominated by self-
reinforcing optimism. Then, in that case, unexpected negative shock like a sudden drop of
durable goods orders would have smaller effect on the economy than in normal time. The
following statement in Bloomberg.com succinctly states the point:
“Against this background of heightened uncertainty, market participants focused on the de-
teriorating financial-market conditions while often ignoring positive macroeconomic news,”
the Basel, Switzerland-based BIS said in its quarterly report yesterday (Ross-Thomas
[2010]).
3.5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I studied the transition from the “Great Moderation” to the financial crisis
of 2007-9 while focusing on the interactive dynamics of short-term nominal interest rates of
the U.S. as a key currency country and international risk appetite as a main determinant of
interest spread. The simple model includes a nonlinear dynamics due to heterogenous agents
(= domestic investors and international investors) in financial markets and to international
capital flow.
The main findings in this papers are two: First, strong interaction between short-term
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Figure 25: Paths of it,$ and it,¿ with different sizes of random shock, t=0-49
nominal interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite can induce bifurcation of
dynamical system. In particular, the simple model can undergo the following bifurcation
route: stable fixed point → limit cycle → chaos. This finding provides a rationale for policy
intervention in order to reverse the bifurcation route by affecting relevant bifurcation pa-
rameters. The simple model also suggests that the strong interaction between short-term
nominal interest rates of the U.S. and international risk appetite is indispensable in under-
standing several economic phenomena such as the follower-leader relation between ECB and
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Fed and low interest rates in the U.S. for 2003-4. The model also reveals the possibility of
the vicious spiral of uncertainty insofar as a parameter of the model (risk attitude) depends
on endogenous uncertainty generated by chaotic dynamics.
Second, regarding empirical investigation with the variance ratio test, the model can gen-
erate variance ratios higher than unity. Regarding rising variance ratios, the numerical
experiment suggests two possible explanations: The reduction of random shock and the
bifurcation of a dynamical system. How can we confirm these explanations? Note that
there are several complexity measures which are sensitive on random shock.48 For exam-
ple, Hommes and Manzan [2006, Tabel 1] finds an evidence that Lyapunov exponent (LE)
estimated by so-called “Jacobian method” is negatively correlated with the size of random
shock. An experiment in Bandt and Pompe [2002, Figure 2, f)] displays the positive relation
between the size of exogenous random shock and “permutation entropy” (PE). Moreover,
taking into account the conjecture that more unstable endogenous dynamics might induce
smaller effect of random shock, we may expect that if financial markets become unstable,
the change may be detected by these measures (higher LEs and lower PEs). This reasoning
suggests the potential of complexity measures as early warning signals for financial crises. In
this regard, it is an interesting research topic to investigate the movements of LEs and PEs
of financial variables before the financial crisis of 2007-9. That is where this research is going.
The global imbalance literature highlights Asian countries’ strong demand for safe assets
as one of factors responsible for the housing bubble in the U.S. via the supply of credit.
This paper points out another possible effect of change of risk attitude of international
investors; leading to unstable dynamics of interest rates in international markets and hence
adding uncertainty in economies. Note that risk attitude of international investors is mainly
affected by the environment of international financial markets. So, this paper supports the
necessity of reforming current institutional setup in order to reduce the surge of demand for
reserve currency in the period of international financial distress.
48The complexity measures include dimensions, entropies, and Lyapunov exponents (see Eckmann and
Rulle [1985] for a classic discussion).
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2.2
Note that
J |s.s.s.=

aα 0 −a[βb1 − pi1b2] a[pi2b2]
0 aα a[pi1b2] −a[βb1 − pi2b2]
−1 0 b1 0
0 −1 0 b1

Then, the characteristic polynomial P (λ) of J |s.s.s. is as follows:
P (λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
aα− λ 0 −a[βb1 − pi1b2] a[pi2b2]
0 aα− λ a[pi1b2] −a[βb1 − pi2b2]
−1 0 b1 − λ 0
0 −1 0 b1 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (aα− λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
aα− λ a[pi1b2] −a[βb1 − pi2b2]
0 b1 − λ 0
−1 0 b1 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −a[βb1 − pi1b2] a[pi2b2]
aα− λ a[pi1b2] −a[βb1 − pi2b2]
−1 0 b1 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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= (aα− λ)(b1 − λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣aα− λ −a[βb1 − pi
2b2]
−1 b1 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
[
−(aα− λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣−a[βb1 − pi
1b2] a[pi
2b2]
0 b1 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣−a[βb1 − pi
1b2] a[pi
2b2]
a[pi1b2] −a[βb1 − pi2b2]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
]
= (aα− λ)(b1 − λ)
[
(aα− λ)(b1 − λ)− a(βb1 − pi2b2)
]
− (aα− λ)(b1 − λ)a(βb1 − pi1b2) + a(βb1 − pi1b2)a(βb1 − pi2b2)− a(pi2b2)a(pi1b2)
= (aα− λ)(b1 − λ)
[
(aα− λ)(b1 − λ)− a(2βb1 − b2)
]
+ aβb1(aβb1 − ab2)
=
[
(aα− λ)(b1 − λ)− aβb1
][
(aα− λ)(b1 − λ)− (aβb1 − ab2)
]
=
[
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β)
][
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β) + ab2)
]
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2.8
After substituting 1.45 and 1.46 into 1.43 and 1.44, I have
c˙i = −c
i
σ
{
α[pi1c1 + pi2c2]− β(A[pi1k1 + pi2k2]θ) + γ − θA[pi1k1 + pi2k2]θ−1}, i = 1, 2
k˙i = Aθ[pi1k1 + pi2k2]θ−1(ki − [pi1k1 + pi2k2]) + A[pi1k1 + pi2k2]θ − ci, i = 1, 2
(A.1)
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At the continuum of steady states,
∂c˙i
∂ci
= −αc
ipii
σ
∂c˙i
∂cj
= −αc
ipij
σ
∂c˙i
∂ki
= −c
i
σ
[−βθA(k∗)θ−1pii − θ(θ − 1)A(k∗)θ−2pii]
∂c˙i
∂kj
= −c
i
σ
[−βθA(k∗)θ−1pij − θ(θ − 1)A(k∗)θ−2pij ]
∂k˙i
∂ci
= −1
∂k˙i
∂cj
= 0
∂k˙i
∂ki
= Aθ(k∗)θ−1 +Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−1[1− k
i
k
]pii
∂k˙i
∂kj
= Aθ(1− θ)(k∗)θ−1[1− k
i
k
]pij
(A.2)
Recall that b1 = Aθ(k
∗)θ−1, b2 = Aθ(1 − θ)(k∗)θ−2. Let b3i = Aθ(1 − θ)(k∗)θ−1[1 − kik∗ ] (so,
b31pi
1 + b32pi
2 = 0).
J |c.s.s. =

−αc1
σ
pi1 −αc1
σ
pi2 c
1
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi1 c1σ [βb1 − b2]pi2
−αc2
σ
pi1 − c2
σ
pi2 c
2
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi1 c2σ [βb1 − b2]pi2
−1 0 b1 + b31pi1 b31pi2
0 −1 b32pi1 b1 + b32pi2

Note that if k1 = k2 = k∗, c1 = c2 = c∗, then b3i = 0, which is the case of the symmetric
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steady state.
|J |c.s.s. −λI| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−αc1
σ
pi1 − λ −αc1
σ
pi2 c
1
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi1 c1σ [βb1 − b2]pi2
−αc2
σ
pi1 − c2
σ
pi2 − λ c2
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi1 c2σ [βb1 − b2]pi2
−1 0 b1 + b31pi1 − λ b31pi2
0 −1 b32pi1 b1 + b32pi2 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−αc1
σ
pi1 − λ −αc1
σ
pi2 c
1
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi1 c1σ [βb1 − b2]pi2
c2
c1
λ −λ 0 0
−1 0 b1 + b31pi1 − λ b31pi2
0 −1 b32pi1 b1 + b32pi2 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−αc1
σ
pi1 − λ −αc1
σ
pi2 0 c
1
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi2
c2
c1
λ −λ 0 0
−1 0 b1 − λ b31pi2
0 −1 −b1 pi1pi2 + pi
1
pi2
λ b1 + b32pi
2 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (b1 − λ)
{
(−αc
1
σ
pi1 − λ)(−λ)(b1 + b32pi2 − λ)
− c
2
c1
λ[−αc
1
σ
pi2(b1 + b32pi
2 − λ) + c
1
σ
(βb1 − b2)pi2]
}
+ (b1
pi1
pi2
− λpi
1
pi2
)
{
−λc
1
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi2 + b31pi2[(−αc
1
σ
pi1 − λ)(−λ) + c
2
c1
λ
αc1
σ
pi2]
}
= λ(b1 − λ)
{
(
αc1
σ
pi1 + λ)(b1 + b32pi
2 − λ)
+ [
αc2
σ
pi2(b1 + b32pi
2 − λ)− c
2
σ
(βb1 − b2)pi2]
− c
1
σ
[βb1 − b2]pi1 + b31pi1[(αc
1
σ
pi1 + λ) +
αc2
σ
pi2]
}
= λ(b1 − λ)
{
(
αc∗
σ
+ λ)(b1 + b32pi
2 − λ)− c
∗
σ
(βb1 − b2) + b31pi1[(αc
∗
σ
+ λ)
}
= λ(b1 − λ)
{
(
αc∗
σ
+ λ)(b1 − λ)− c
∗
σ
(βb1 − b2)
}
, since b31pi
1 + b32pi
2 = 0
= λ(λ− b1)
{
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ aαb1 − a(βb1 − b2)
}
, a = −c
∗
σ
= λ(λ− b1)
{
λ2 − (aα + b1)λ+ ab1(α− β) + ab2
}
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APPENDIX B
SIMULATED PATHS
Figure 26: A divergent path (I): α > β
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Figure 27: A divergent path (II): α > β
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Figure 28: Three different paths: α > β
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Figure 29: Comparison of two paths: α < β
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Figure 30: A convergent path (I) in reverse time: ratios
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Figure 31: A convergent path (II) in reverse time
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Figure 32: A convergent path (II) in reverse time: ratios
Figure 33: A convergent path (II) in original time
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APPENDIX C
AN UNSTABLE LIMIT CYCLE AND THE NOTION OF “CORRIDOR
STABILITY”
Here, I study an model provided by [Meng, 2006, example 2.3]. My interest in this section
is whether I can find a limit cycle by employing bifurcation analysis. Ryder and Heal [1973]
is an early example in an optimal growth model exhibiting a limit cycle. Benhabib and
Nishimura [1979] is an early example of the application of the Hopf bifurcation theorem on
optimal growth. More recently, several models investigating the influence of social factors on
economic decision include limit cycles as equilibrium paths. For example, in continuous time
framework, Shi [1999] shows a limit cycle may occur in some range of parameter values when
fashion affects wealth accumulation decision. Drugeon [1998] finds an endogenous cycle in
an endogenous discounting model where average consumption is included in the discounting
function. Also, in discrete time framework, Artige et al. [2004] shows a limit cycle may occur
in a two countries model with consumption habits. Recently, Ryoo [2010] provides a model
of financial fragility where long waves and short cycles coexist.
The numerical investigation in this paper finds an unstable limit cycle.
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C.1 A MODEL
In Meng [2006, example 2.3], the Euler equation and law of motion of k is given by :
c˙ = − c
σ
[αc− βAkθ + γ − θAkθ−1] (C.1)
k˙ = Akθ − c (C.2)
For numerical investigation, following Meng [2006, 2679], I assume that α0 = 0.012, β0 =
1, γ0 = 0.6, σ0 = 0.8, A0 = 0.2. Then, I can rewrite Eqs. C.1 and C.2 as follows:
c˙ = − c
σ0
[α0c− β0A0kθ + γ0 − θA0kθ−1] ≡ T1(c, k; θ) (C.3)
k˙(t) = A0k
θ − c ≡ T2(c, k; θ) (C.4)
So, the model becomes a two-dimensional dynamic system with one parameter θ. I assume
θ ∈ [0.3, 0.37]1. As Meng [2006, 2679] notes, there exist two steady state values k∗1(θ) < k∗2(θ)
within this range. Let c∗2(θ) and k
∗
2(θ) be the larger steady state. For notational convenience,
from now on, I do not explicitly express the dependence of steady states on θ. By linearizing
Eqs. C.3 and C.4 around the steady state, I have the following Jacobian matrix J(θ):
J(θ) =
 −α0c∗2σ0 c∗2σ0 (β0θA0(k∗2)θ−1 + θ(θ − 1)A0(k∗2)θ−2)
−1 θA0(k∗2)θ−1
 (C.5)
Since c∗2 = A0(k
∗
2)
θ, I have as in [Meng, 2006, 2679]
tr(J ; θ) = A(k∗2)
θ−1(θ − α0
σ0
k∗2) (C.6)
det(J ; θ) =
θA0c
∗
2(k
∗
2)
θ−2
σ0
[(β0 − α0)k∗2 − (1− θ)] (C.7)
Let a = − c˜∗2
σ0
, b1 = A0θ(k
∗
2)
θ−1, b2 = A0θ(1− θ)(k∗2)θ−2. Then, the characteristic polynomial
P (λ) is
P (λ) = λ2 − (aα0 + b1)λ+ ab1(α0 − β0) + ab2 (C.8)
1In Meng [2006, 2679], θ = 0.3. Here I change the value of θ. For example, According to Shao and Silos
[2007], θ in the US was 0.36 on average in the post-war period. One reason of perturbing θ is that I think θ is
less structural parameter than other parameters in the model. Why does capital share matter for stability?
optimal growth model is about intertemporal decision of consumption. Today’s consumption affects future
consumption via capital accumulation. And the resulting impact also depends on capital share in the sense
that capital share can be viewed as the elasticity of per capita output with respect to per capita capital.
That is one reason capital share is related with stability issue.
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Proposition C.1.1. Given values of parameters, there exists unique θ0 ∈ [0.3, 0.37] such
that λ1,2(θ0) = ω0i with ω0 > 0
Proof. I show that given values of parameters, there exists θ0∈ [0.3, 0.37] such that tr(J ; θ0) =
0 and det(J ; θ0) > 0, which is equivalent to the proposition.
step 1. (k∗2)
′(θ) < 0.
By combining Eqs. C.3 and C.4 with the steady state condition c˙ = k˙ = 0, I obtain the
following equation for k and θ as in [Meng, 2006, 2679].
S(k, θ) = θ + (β − α)k − ( γ
A
)k1−θ = 0 (C.9)
Note that S(·, θ) is continuous and concave. Moreover, given values of parameters, S(1, θ) <
0, lim
k→0
S(k, θ) = θ > 0, and lim
k→∞
S(k, θ) = +∞. Hence, k∗1 < 1 and k∗2 > 1 for each
θ ∈ [0.3, 0.37].
Then, I have
(k∗2)
′(θ) = − 1 +
γ
A
ln(k¯2)k¯
1−θ
2
(β − α)− γ
A
(1− θ)k¯−θ2
by the implicit function theorem
= − 1 +
γ
A
ln(k¯2)k¯
1−θ
2
θ[ γ
A
(k∗2)−θ − (k∗2)−1]
< 0
under given values of parameters since k∗2 > 1 where the second equality follows from Eq.
C.9.
step 2. There exists unique θ0 ∈ [0.3, 0.37] such that tr(J ; θ0) = 0.
tr(J ; θ0) = 0 holds iff θ0 satisfies the following equation
θ
k∗2(θ)
=
α0
σ0
= 0.015 (C.10)
Let g(θ)= θ
k∗2(θ)
. Then, g′(θ) = k
∗
2(θ)−θ(k∗2)′(θ)
(k∗2(θ))2
> 0 for θ ∈ [0.3, 0.37] and g(0.3) ≈ 0.00759 < α0
σ0
,
g(0.37) ≈ 0.01937 > α0
σ0
. Since g(θ) is continuous and monotone, I can conclude that there
exists unique θ0 ∈ [0.3, 0.37] satisfying Eq. C.10.
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step 3. det(J ; θ0) > 0.
sign(det(J ; θ0)) = sign((β0 − α0)k∗2 − (1− θ0))
= sign(β0k
∗
2 − 1 + θ0(1− σ0)) (from Eq.C.10)
> 0
To approximate θ0, for given θ ∈ [0.3, 0.37] I solve Eq. C.9 numerically for k by using
simple bisect method and then evaluate matrix J(θ) at the approximated values. Note that
if θ = 0.3, as in Meng [2006, 2679], k∗1 is a saddle and k
∗
2 is a stable focus. But as θ becomes
larger, k∗2 becomes an unstable focus if θ > θ0 (see the Table 1.).
Table 16: Local stability for different θ′s.
θ k∗1 eigenvalues k
∗
2 eigenvalues
0.3 0.0455 -0.6402,1.1608 39.5185 -0.0022 ± 0.0578i
0.31 0.0453 -0.6236,1.1467 34.9538 -0.0018 ± 0.0623i
0.32 0.0451 -0.6077,1.1333 31.1420 -0.0014 ± 0.0669i
0.345 0.0441 -0.5703,1.1020 23.9863 -0.0001 ± 0.0805i
0.348 0.0440 -0.5661, 1.0984 23.3013 -1.9514e-005±8.0089e-002i
0.3484 0.0440 -0.5655,1.0980 23.2123 2.7768e-006± 8.0279e-002i
0.35 0.0439 -0.5633,1.0961 22.8614 0.0001 ± 0.0810i
0.37 0.0429 -0.5361,1.0735 19.0936 0.0013 ± 0.0906i
My analytic proof for the existence of a limit cycle is based on the following normal form
theorem for Hopf bifurcation.
Theorem C.1.2. (Topological normal form for the Hopf bifurcation, in [Kuznetsov, 1998,
Theorem 3.4], see also [Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983, Theorem 3.4.2]) Any generic two-
dimensional, one-parameter system
x˙ = f(x, η)
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having at η = 0 the equilibrium x=0 with eigenvalues λ1,2(0) = ±iω0, ω0 > 0,
is locally topologically equivalent near the origin to one of the following normal forms:
 y˙1
y˙2
 =
 κ −1
1 κ
 y1
y2
± (y21 + y22)
 y1
y2

The genericity conditions for theorem C.1.2 are the nondegeracy condition and the
transversality condition [Kuznetsov, 1998, 99].
Proposition C.1.3. There exists an unstable limit cycle.
Proof. By proposition C.1.1 there exists a unique θ0 ∈ [0.3, 0.37] which satisfies the con-
dition for the theorem C.1.2. The transversality condition requires that 1
2
∂tr(J ;θ)
∂θ
|θ=θ0 6= 0
[Kuznetsov, 1998, 98].
Note that
∂tr(J ; θ)
∂θ
|θ=θ0= A(k∗2(θ0))θ0−1(1−
α
σ
(k∗2)
′(θ0)) > 0
The stability of a limit cycle is related with the nondegeracy condition (particularly, the sign
of the first Lyapunov coefficient).2 Since the computation normally requires information
about the third derivative of the dynamic system, it is hard to interpret in economic terms.
Instead, I numerically demonstrate that the limit cycle is unstable (See Section C.2).
C.2 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
To verify my argument, I numerically approximate the orbit of the unstable limit cycle. Since
the limit cycle is unstable, that is not numerically observable. To overcome the problem, I
use the idea of time reversal. I change the direction of time by transforming t to (-t). Then,
by using a standard Matlab program (ode45 ), I approximate the orbit. In other words, I
approximate the following system
2For the definition of the first Lyapunov coefficient, I refer to Kuznetsov [1998, 3.5].
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c˙(t) = −T1(c(t), k(t); θ) (C.11)
k˙(t) = −T2(c(t), k(t); θ) (C.12)
If a limit cycle is unstable in the original model, now the limit cycle becomes stable. Similarly,
since the steady state is locally stable under the original system, now the steady state
becomes unstable.
I compare two trajectories which start at (c(0), k(0)) = (0.1, 15) and at (c(0), k(0)) =
Figure 34: Two trajectories I
(0.5, 15), respectively. The trajectory starting from (c(0), k(0)) = (0.1, 15) approaches to
the steady state but the trajectory starting from (c(0), k(0)) = (0.5, 15) diverges from the
steady state as time goes (see Figures 34-36).
By the uniqueness of solutions of ordinary differential equations, two trajectories cannot
cross. So, I can locate a limit cycle between two trajectories.
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Figure 35: Two trajectories II
Figure 36: Two trajectories III
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C.3 DISCUSSION
I found the model in [Meng, 2006, example 2.3] implies that the attracting region of the
locally stable steady state is bounded by an unstable limit cycle within some range of the
value of bifurcation parameter. According to Kind [1999, 147-148], an unstable limit cycle
can be interpreted as “corridor stability” proposed by Leijonhufvud [1973] and Howitt [1978].
The basic notion of the corridor is that although the economic system usually exhibits
desirable stability properties there are limits to size of shock that it is capable of handling.
Formally, the system is locally stable but globally unstable (Howitt [1978, 265]).
A famous model with corridor stability is Tobin [1975] regarding keynesian recession and
depression. The notion of corridor stability is discussed in Leijonhufvud [2009] in the context
of the financial crisis of 2007-9.3 From the perspective of corridor stability, the finding in
Appendix C implies that when consumption decisions are affected by social factors, the
economy may be more vulnerable to exogenous shock.
3Another way of modeling a sudden dynamical change is to employ the catastrophe theory. In a recent
paper, Rosser [2007] argues that abandoning catastrophe theory in economics was premature.
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APPENDIX D
PSID
D.1 DATA I: HEAD WAGE
 V11397: Wages and Salaries of Head-1984
 V17829: Wages and Salaries of Head-1989
 ER6962: Wages and Salaries of Head-1994
 ER16493:Wages and Salaries of Head-1998
 ER20425: Wages and Salaries of Head-2000
 ER24117: Wages and Salaries of Head-2002
 ER27913: Wages and Salaries of Head-2004
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics (Head Wage> 0)
V11397 V17829 ER6962(<9,999,999)
obs. 5,155 6,715 6,287
Mean $1.9684e+004 $2.3452e+004 $3.0101e+004
Maximum 600,000 800,000 775,029
coef. of variation 0.9736 1.0172 1.0357
Gini 0.3989 0.4016 0.4206
Gini (subsamples) [0.3437 0.0969 0.0794 0.1917] [0.3270 0.0971 0.0760 0.2062] [0.3629 0.0945 0.0783 0.2301]
1/5/20 0.0638/ 0.1735 /0.4410 0.0691 /0.1809/ 0.4485 0.0732/ 0.1965/ 0.4687
pareto exponent 3.0277/2.8947 2.787/2.659 2.6326/2.6118
(upper 20/upper 10)
ER16493 ER20425 ER24117
obs. 5,423 5,802 6,046
Mean $3.5597e+04 $3.9299e+004 $3.9880e+004
Maximum 850,000 885,467 3,500,000
coef. of variation 0.9370 1.1054 1.7121
Gini 0.4016 0.4104 0.4211
Gini (subsamples) [0.2934 0.0886 0.0726 0.2204] [0.2856 0.0851 0.0737 0.2617] [0.2984 0.0864 0.0774 0.2731]
1/5/20 0.0654/ 0.1867/ 0.4579 0.0842 /0.2108 /0.4731 0.0978 /0.2199 /0.4823
pareto exponent 2.8438/2.9502 2.3541/2.349 2.4092/2.3543
(upper 20/upper 10)
ER27913
obs. 6,313
Mean $4.1946e+004
Maximum 2,710,000
coef. of variation 1.5737
Gini 0.4327
Gini (subsamples) [0.3120 0.0932 0.0809 0.2742]
1/5/20 0.0985 /0.2236 /0.4895
pareto exponent 2.2822/2.2158
(upper 20/upper 10)
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D.2 DATA II: TOTAL HEAD LABOR INCOME
 V12372: Total Head Labor Y 84
 V18878: Total Head Labor Y 89
 ER6980: Labor Income of Head-1994
 ER16463: Labor Income-Head 1999
 ER20443 Labor Income of Head-2000
 ER24116: Head’s 2002 Labor Income
 ER27931: Labor Income of Head-2004
Table 18: Descriptive statistics (Total Head labor income> 0)
V12372 V18878 ER6980(<9,999,999)
obs. 5,504 7,151 6,352
Mean $ 1.9943e+004 $2.3772e+004 $3.0668e+004
Maximum 600,000 800,000 900,033
coef. of variation 0.9904 1.0612 1.0357
Gini 0.4071 0.4091 0.4286
Gini (subsamples) [0.3418 0.0982 0.0812 0.2037] [0.3263 0.0982 0.0773 0.2182] [0.3734 0.0959 0.0793 0.2394]
1/5/20 0.0670 /0.1814 /0.4501 0.0736 /0.1892 /0.4568 0.0797/ 0.2033/ 0.4757
pareto exponent 2.9156/2.854/2.717 2.6811/2.557/2.4021 2.5283/2.4739/2.3624
(upper 20/upper 10/upper 5)
ER16463 ER20443 ER24116
obs. 5,490 5,849 6,178
Mean $3.6431e+004 $4.0669e+004 $4.0974e+004
Maximum 950,000 1,156,700 3,500,000
coef. of variation 1.0800 1.2330 1.7285
Gini 0.4076 0.4229 0.4334
Gini (subsamples) [0.3204 0.0870 0.0730 0.2498] [0.2916 0.0841 0.0744 0.2814] [0.3002 0.0884 0.0783 0.2870]
1/5/20 0.0786/ 0.2029 /0.4683 0.0951/ 0.2245 /0.4851 0.1037 /0.2305 /0.4937
pareto exponent 2.4866/2.4817/2.4068 2.1828/2.1462/2.068 2.2817/2.2383/2.1276
(upper 20 / upper 10 / upper 5)
ER27931
obs. 6,358
Mean $4.3129e+004
Maximum 2,710,000
coef. of variation 1.5897
Gini 0.4394
Gini (subsamples) [0.3120 0.0929 0.0809 0.2852]
1/5/20 0.1038 /0.2317 /0.4963
pareto exponent 2.2034/2.1467/2.0087
(upper 20 / upper 10 / upper 5)
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D.3 DATA III: WEALTH
 S117: Wealth2 84 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 S217: Wealth2 89 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 S317: Wealth2 94 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 ER417: Wealth299 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 S517: Wealth201 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 S617: Wealth203 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 S717: Wealth205 ( Main Home Equity Included)
 V17609: 1984 Total Wealth
 V17389: 1989 Total Wealth
Table 19: Descriptive statistics (Wealth≥ 0)
S117 S217 S317
obs. 6,296 6,436 7,797
Mean $7.481e+04 $1.0120e+005 $28,984
Maximum 9560000 14609999 10584997
coef. of variation 4.7501 3.5746 3.0331
Gini 0.7379 0.7292 0.7219
Gini (subsamples) [0.6413 0.2959 0.1897 0.5158] [0.6447 0.2797 0.1913 0.4762] [0.6705 0.2687 0.1843 0.4659]
1/5/20 0.3105/ 0.5144 /0.7893 0.2486 /0.4749 /0.7824 0.2258/ 0.4615 /0.7732
pareto exponent 1.3699/1.4041 1.4505/1.5605 1.4683/1.5967
(upper 20/upper 10)
ER417 S517 S617
obs. 6,268 6,586 6,925
Mean $1.9108e+005 $2.0816e+005 $2.1473e+005
Maximum 27732000 43008000 36331000
coef. of variation 4.2037 4.2978 3.9110
Gini 0.7429 0.7372 0.7349
Gini (subsamples) [0.5583 0.2539 0.1902 0.5222] [0.5627 0.2518 0.2003 0.4999] [0.5671 0.2522 0.1956 0.4945]
1/5/20 0.2961 /0.5205 /0.8016 0.2717/ 0.5010/ 0.7943 0.2650/ 0.4934 /0.7913
pareto exponent 1.3258/1.4183 1.3954/1.4995 1.394/1.5112
(upper 20/upper 10)
S717 V17609(< 9, 999, 999), 84 V17389(< 99, 999, 999), 89
obs. 7,001 5,883 5,751
Mean $2.6453e+005 $8.1182e+004 $ 1.0869e+005
Maximum $24,2047,000 9,560,000 $14,610,000
coef. of variation 3.7139 3.1865 3.1690
Gini 0.7378 0.6793 0.6954
Gini (subsamples) [0.5677 0.2675 0.2030 0.4843] [0.4415 0.2220 0.1680 0.4447] [0.4235 0.2170 0.1760 0.4475]
1/5/20 0.2485 /0.4868 /0.7944 0.2184/ 0.4244 /0.7246 0.2189/ 0.4354/ 0.7473
pareto exponent 1.4108/1.5677 1.5244/1.647 1.5247/1.6614
(upper 20/upper 10)
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APPENDIX E
GENERAL FRAMEWORK
As Heathcote et al. [2009] points out, quantitative macroeconomics with heterogeneous agents
has been developed in the last two decades with the development of computers. And because
nice counting method is necessary to deal with rich heterogeneity, measure theory was chosen
as one of mathematical backgrounds of this approach, as Rı´os-Rull [1997] explained. General
framework in this paper closely follows Stokey and Lucas [1989] with a minor modification
due to endogenous shock.
 (X,X ) , a ∈ X: endogenous state space
 (Z,Z), l ∈ Z: shock
 (S,S) := (X × Z,X × Z), s := (a, l) ∈ S: state space.
DEFINITION E.0.1. ((probability) kernel from Kallenberg [2002, 20]).1 Given two
measurable spaces (W,W) and (Y,Y), a mapping K: W×Y → R¯+ is called a (probability)
kernel from W to Y if:
i) K(·, B) ∈ W , for all B ∈ Y
ii) K(w, ·) is a (probability) measure on (W,W).
 Q; true probability kernel on (S,Z).
Note that earning shock process depends on endogenous state variable as well. Normally,
the shock process is characterized by transition function on (Z,Z).2. Sometimes, the
1Probability kernel is the same as stochastic kernel in Stokey and Lucas [1989, 226].
2For example, please see Stokey and Lucas [1989, 241].
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shock process is generalized to take into account the possibility that the realization of
shock may depend on the state variables. If I assume that
Q((a1, l), B) = Q((a2, l), B),∀a1, a2 ∈ X, l ∈ Z,B ∈ Z (E.1)
then, the model comes back to the standard specification.
 Q˜; perceived probability kernel on (Z,Z). In this paper, Q˜ trivially satisfies the restriction
of Eq. E.1. Note that in standard set-up, Q˜ is just true transition function of shock.
It is viewed as misspecified in this paper just because now I assume shock depends on
endogenous state variable as well.
 Policy function gQ˜ : X ×Z → X where gQ˜ is S/X -measurable. I will use the notation of
gQ˜ whenever I need to emphasize the dependence of policy function only on Q˜(=perceived
probability kernel).
Finally, given Q and Q˜, we can derive the transition function:
 Transition function PQ,Q˜ : S × S → [0, 1] which is extended from3
PQ,Q˜[(a, l), A×B] :=
Q((a, l), B) if gQ˜(a, l) ∈ A,A ∈ X , B ∈ Z0 if gQ˜(a, l) /∈ A (E.2)
The following proposition says this extension is well-defined.
Proposition E.0.1. Let (X,X ) and (Z,Z) be measurable spaces. Assume probability kernel
Q from (X×Z) to Z and (X×Z)/X -measurable function g are given. Define SA := {A×B :
A ∈ X , B ∈ Z}. Then, a mapping PSA : (X × Z)× SA→ [0, 1] given by
PSA((a, l), (A×B)) :=
Q((a, l), B) if g(a, l) ∈ A ∈ X , B ∈ Z0 if g(a, l) /∈ A (E.3)
defines a transition function P on (X × Z,X × Z).
3Alternatively, we can have transition function from stochastic difference equations. Please see Stokey
and Lucas [1989, 8.4], Medio [2004, 162-4], and Santos and Peralta-Alva [2005, 1941-4].
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Proof. i) P ((a, l), ·) is a measure on ((X × Z),X × Z).
Note that SA is semi-algebra (Durret [2005, 438,466]. Hence, by Durret [2005, theorem
A.1.3,439] it suffices to show the followings:
- PSA((a, l), ∅) = 0. It is trivial.
- If A×B = ⋃
i∈I(Ai×Bi), I ⊂ N, A×B ∈ SA, (Ai×Bi) ∈ SA, ∀i ∈ I where
⋃
denotes
disjoint union, then,
PSA((a, l), A×B) =
∑
i∈I
PSA((a, l), (Ai ×Bi)) (E.4)
To show Eq. E.4, if g(a, 1) /∈ A, Eq. E.4 holds clearly. Let’s assume g(a, 1) ∈ A and
g(a, 1) ∈ Ai, i ∈ F ⊂ I. Then,
⋃
i∈F
(Bi) = B (E.5)
should hold, which implies Eq. E.4.
Therefore, by Durret [2005, theorem A.1.3,439], there exists a unique extension of
PSA to P.
ii) P (·, A) with A ∈ X × Z is X × Z-measurable.
Assume i). To show ii), let
D = {A ∈ X × Z | P (·, A) ∈ X × Z)} (E.6)
I will show D = X × Z by using pi − λ theorem (Durret [2005, 444]).
a) Let F := {C×D : C ∈ X , D ∈ Z}. So, X×Z = σ(F) where σ(F) denotes σ−algebra
generated by F . Note that P ((a, l), C ×D) = Q((a, l), D)1C(g(a, l)).
By basic properties of measurable functions, (Stokey and Lucas [1989, 284-5])
F ⊂ D (and clearly F is closed under intersection) (E.7)
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b) I will show that D is a Dynkin system (or λ system). (i) Clearly, X × Y ∈ D, (ii) if
A,B ∈ D and A ⊂ B, then, B \A ∈ D because P (·, B \A) = P (·, B)−P (·, A) from
i). (iii) if {An}n≥1 ⊂ D, An ↗ A, then, A ∈ X × Z and P ((a, l), An)↗ P ((a, l), A)
for each a ∈ X , l ∈ Z by the continuity of measure, which in turn implies that
P (·, A) ∈ X × Z because of limit function of measurable functions. By (i),(ii), and
(iii),
D is a Dynkin system (or λ− system). (E.8)
Hence, from a) and b), by pi − λ theorem, we have
σ(F) E.7,E.8⊂ D E.6⊂ σ(F) (E.9)
From Eq. E.9, we have the desired result.
 Transition operator TP and adjoint T
∗
P of TP .
(TPh)(s) :=
∫
h(s′)P (s, ds′), h ∈ B(S,S) (E.10)
where B(S,S) is the set of all bounded, S-measurable functions.
(T ∗Pλ)(E) :=
∫
P (s, E)λ(ds), ∀E ∈ S, λ ∈M(S,S) (E.11)
where M(S,S) is the space of probability measures on (S,S) as in Stokey and Lucas
[1989, 215].
 Stationary measure λ∗P on (S,S): fixed point of adjoint operator T ∗P .
(T ∗Pλ
∗
P )(E) = λ
∗
P (E),∀E ∈ S (E.12)
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APPENDIX F
RESULTS
Table 20: Transition Matrices with different wealth levels
( amax = 300,
ξ = 0.1, a˜∗ = 1) l¯1 l¯2 l¯3 l¯4 l¯5 l¯6 l¯7
at−1 = 0
l¯1 0.50811 0.44609 0.045403 0.00039848 2.5790×10−7 1.1390×10−11 0.00000
l¯2 0.094591 0.54361 0.34012 0.021561 0.00011341 4.3094×10−8 1.1067×10−12
l¯3 0.0040685 0.15956 0.59033 0.23675 0.0092656 2.9052×10−5 6.4645×10−9
l¯4 3.4506×10−5 0.010327 0.24867 0.58718 0.15018 0.0035982 6.6940×10−6
l¯5 5.3917×10−8 0.00013295 0.023737 0.35327 0.53494 0.086659 0.0012625
l¯6 1.5024×10−11 3.1845×10−7 0.00046119 0.049386 0.45826 0.44609 0.045802
l¯7 7.3364×10−16 1.3684×10−10 1.6893×10−6 0.0014411 0.093149 0.54361 0.36179
at−1 = 30
0.43382 0.49938 0.066036 0.00077031 6.7129×10−7 4.0160×10−11 1.1102×10−16
0.066807 0.49938 0.40044 0.033144 0.00023251 1.1915×10−7 4.1482×10−12
0.0023033 0.11937 0.56979 0.29341 0.015067 6.3190×10−5 1.8990×10−8
1.5454×10−5 0.0061942 0.19612 0.59534 0.19612 0.0061942 1.5454×10−5
1.8990×10−8 6.3190×10−5 0.015067 0.29341 0.56979 0.11937 0.0023033
4.1482×10−12 1.1915×10−7 0.00023251 0.033144 0.40044 0.49938 0.066807
1.5851×10−16 4.0160×10−11 6.7129×10−7 0.00077031 0.066036 0.49938 0.43382
at−1 = 300
0.30351 0.57190 0.12218 0.0024049 3.6337×10−6 3.8172×10−10 2.6645×10−15
0.032326 0.39586 0.50313 0.067872 0.00080909 7.2130×10−7 4.4166×10−11
0.00073387 0.064239 0.49557 0.40500 0.034209 0.00024531 1.2862×10−7
3.1760×10−6 0.0021990 0.11660 0.56760 0.29791 0.015618 6.6993×10−5
2.4928×10−9 1.4510×10−5 0.0059486 0.19235 0.59530 0.19992 0.0064652
3.4605×10−13 1.7506×10−8 5.9610×10−5 0.014533 0.28892 0.57190 0.12459
8.3786×10−18 3.7536×10−12 1.1035×10−7 0.00022033 0.032106 0.39586 0.57181
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Table 21: Endogenous shock with status-seeking: different ns
n = 100 n = 75
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0309 0.0303
amax/amean 47.7667 47.5139
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.6809 / 0.4196 0.6897 / 0.4213
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.6177 / 0.2537 / 0.1903 / 0.3917 0.6136 / 0.2539 / 0.1894 / 0.4141
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.1427 / 0.3826 / 0.7246 0.1594 / 0.4048 / 0.7340
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 1.9336 2.1143
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9393 0.9406
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3758 0.3612
n = 50 n = 40
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0297 0.0296
amax/amean 46.9689 47.1146
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.7003 / 0.4234 0.6996 / 0.4223
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.6137 / 0.2484 / 0.1845 / 0.4447 0.6094 / 0.2473 / 0.1853 / 0.4442
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.1995 / 0.4339 / 0.7472 0.2036 / 0.4339 / 0.7470
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 2.6089 2.6502
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9404 0.9399
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3146 0.3105
n = 30 n = 3
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0288 0.0281
amax/amean 46.5975 46.4533
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.7107 / 0.4251 0.7162 / 0.4255
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.6055 / 0.2477 / 0.1858 / 0.4759 0.6140 / 0.2493 / 0.1864 / 0.4900
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.2459 / 0.4635 / 0.7615 0.2773 / 0.4795 / 0.7675
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 3.0945 3.3865
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9393 0.9380
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.2845 0.2702
Table 22: Endogenous shock with the strongest status-seeking: different values of parameters
ξ = 0.11, ss = 0, 00015 ξ = 0.1, ss = 0.0002
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0282 0.0265
amax/amean 47.7848 45.3330
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.7389 / 0.4339 0.7333 / 0.4299
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.6535 / 0.2615 / 0.1943 / 0.5296 0.6286 / 0.2533 / 0.1889 / 0.5355
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.3067 / 0.5253 / 0.7965 0.3368 / 0.5269 / 0.7881
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 3.6148 3.8071
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9507 0.9386
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.2957 0.2641
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Table 23: Endogenous shock with status-seeking: different upper bounds
ξ = 0.11, ss = 0.000125,  = 175 ξ = 0.12, ss = 0.000125,  = 175
[amin, amax] [0,400] [0,400]
interest rate 0.0325 0.0322
amax/amean 69.2629 88.9648
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.7039 / 0.4204 0.7300 / 0.4280
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.6268 / 0.2539 / 0.1899 / 0.4497 0.6584 / 0.2656 / 0.2016 / 0.4989
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.2087 / 0.4417 / 0.7512 0.2512 / 0.4954 / 0.7835
Prob(amax) 4.0388e-005 8.9368e-005
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 2.6206 3.0604
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9327 0.9447
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3108 0.3239
ξ = 0.12, ss = 0.00009,  = 250 ξ = 0.12, ss = 0.00009,  = 200
[amin, amax] [0,500] [0,500]
interest rate 0.0332 0.0323
amax/amean 92.1421 91.1411
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.7282 / 0.4242 0.7370 / 0.4260
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.6589 / 0.2726 / 0.1875 / 0.5079 0.6712 / 0.2719 / 0.1942 / 0.5318
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.2931 / 0.5015 / 0.7807 0.3338 / 0.5255 / 0.7913
Prob(amax) 8.7230e-005 6.2528e-004
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 3.7030 4.3221
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.9308 0.9307
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.2696 0.2534
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Figure 37: Log-log plots with different ns
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Figure 38: Log-log plot: ξ = 0.12, ss = 0.00009,  = 250, and amax =500
Table 24: Five iteration of one-year mobility matrix
Benchmark model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.74020 0.21090 0.043750 0.0048998 0.00024258
2nd 0.21861 0.50228 0.23038 0.045333 0.0033836
3rd 0.042108 0.23967 0.47595 0.21288 0.029397
4th 0.0039688 0.047482 0.22413 0.55176 0.17266
5th 0.00011636 0.0029521 0.028780 0.17522 0.79293
Full model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.59122 0.31624 0.081258 0.010809 0.00047399
2nd 0.31476 0.40451 0.22315 0.053506 0.0040717
3rd 0.078360 0.23234 0.43955 0.21952 0.030236
4th 0.0087161 0.053636 0.22884 0.53277 0.17604
5th 0.00027709 0.0036006 0.030877 0.17567 0.78957
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APPENDIX G
WEALTH IN UTILITY: THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
In this Section, I study the effect of modifying preferences by introducing wealth in utility on
wealth distribution instead of changing the labor income process. The following specification
of the utility function initially is proposed by Carroll [2000] and recently investigated by
Francis [2009] and Luo and Young [2009].
Utility function with spirit of capitalism is specified as follows:
u(ct, at+1) =
c1−µt − 1
1− µ +
(at+1 + γ)
(1−s)
1− s (G.1)
γ determines the level of wealth where spirit of capitalism becomes an important factor.
And s affects the speed by which importance of spirit of capitalism decreases since ∂ u
∂ at+1
=
1
(at+1+γ)s
. In a finite horizon OLG model of Francis [2009, 402], s = 1.7 generates the closest
approximation to the data with µ = 2. Here I set s=1.385 (=
1.5+1.5∗ 1.7
2
2
). And I use four
different values of γ, {50, 150, 250, 500}. Table 25 shows the result. It turns out that the
effect of the spirit of capitalism is not large enough to match the data within the specification
of this paper as we can see from Table 25. So, the result is in line with Luo and Young [2009].
Luo and Young [2009] reports that the wealth concentration becomes less severe in an infinite
horizon model with leisure choice and spirit of capitalism. The result in Table 25 implies
that this specification generates too strong incentives for saving (note that interest rate is
lower than the interest rates reported in Table 4). Figure 39 displays the difference between
the policy function generated by the model with spirit of capitalism and the policy function
generated by the benchmark model. The figure also shows that there is a surge of saving in
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the case of the model with spirit of capitalism. But Table 25 shows that it does not generate
a fat-tailed distribution.
Table 25: Wealth in utility model
γ=50 γ=150
Number of grid points (wealth) 500 500
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0157 0.0211
amax/amean 28.0956 30.7276
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.5231 / 0.3868 0.5244 / 0.3847
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.4256 / 0.1765 / 0.1447 / 0.2284 0.4295 /0.1728 / 0.1433 / 0.2289
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.0607 / 0.2128 / 0.5457 0.0610 / 0.2160 / 0.5506
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 1.0695 1.0777
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.8735 0.8735
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3136 0.3186
γ=250 γ=500
Number of grid points (wealth) 500 500
[amin, amax] [0,300] [0,300]
interest rate 0.0223 0.0229
amax/amean 31.1595 31.5213
Gini coeff. (wealth/ income) 0.5206 / 0.3843 0.5176 / 0.3842
Gini coeff.( quartile in wealth) 0.4256 / 0.1684 / 0.1307 / 0.2296 0.4229 / 0.1616 / 0.1404 / 0.2259
Top. 1%/5%/20% 0.0607 / 0.2146 / 0.5458 0.0598 / 0.2149 / 0.5426
Coeff. of variation (wealth) 1.0667 1.0556
Coeff. of variation (labor income) 0.8735 0.8735
Corr(wealth,labor income) 0.3222 0.3260
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Figure 39: Policy function
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APPENDIX H
DHM TEST STATISTICS
To see how accurate the numerical method in this paper, I compute a DHM statistic de-
veloped in Den Haan and Marcet [1994]. The Euler equation for Eq. 2.9 with the utility
function specified in Eq. 2.33 is as follows:
c−µt−1 − 1{at≥(amax−n)}
samax
n
= β(1 + r)Et[c
−µ
t ] (H.1)
Multiplying both sides by cµt−1 and replacing the conditional expectation with a realized
value, we can derive the following definition of expectation error:
errort−1 = 1− 1{at≥(amax−n)}
samax
n
cµt−1 − β(1 + r)(
ct−1
ct
)µ, t ∈ N (H.2)
Then, DHMT in this paper is defined as follows:
DHMT = T
(
∑T
t=1 errort−1
T
)2∑T
t=1(errort−1)2
T
=
(
∑T
t=1 errort−1)
2∑T
t=1(errort−1)
2
(H.3)
According to Den Haan and Marcet [1994, 6], the DHMT in this case follows a chi-square
distribution with 1 degree of freedom:
DHMT
d→
T→∞
χ21 (H.4)
The detailed algorithm is similar to Den Haan and Marcet [1994, 9] and as follows:1
1The difference is that I choose the initial conditions randomly.
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Step 1. Randomly choose initial conditions for wealth and labor. Then, generate data up
to T=3,000 by simulating a Markov process. Compute DHMT from Eq. H.3.
Step 2. Repeat the process 500 times.
Step 3. Compute the fractions of data which belong to the upper 5 percent or the lower 5
percent of the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.
I perform the test twice. The results are reported in Table 26. Since we can expect similar
results for different ns, I only report the case with n = 100.
Table 26: Accuracy of numerical method, n = 100, T=3,000
Number of grid points (wealth) Lower 5% Upper 5%
500 6.6% / 7.2% 2.0% / 1.4%
1,000 4.8% / 6.4% 3.2% / 3.2%
1,500 4.4% / 5.6% 3.4% / 3.0%
2,000 4.2% / 5.4% 3.4% / 3.2%
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APPENDIX I
DATA
I.1 INTEREST RATES OF THE U.S.
Data about the interest rates of the U.S. all come from FRB’s home page (H15. Selected
Interest Rates).
 Aaa and Baa: Corporate bonds (Moody’s seasoned)
 CD: Certificates of deposit
 CP (financial): Financial papers
 ED (London): Eurodollar deposits (London)
 FF: Federal funds (effective)
 TB: Treasury bills
 TCMNOM: Treasury constant maturities
I.2 SHORT-TERM NOMINAL INTEREST RATES OF 10 COUNTRIES
All data except Japan come from each country’s central bank home page.
 Australia
– Variable & Period: Bank accepted Bills (90 days), 04/07/1976 - 08/31/2009 (8,456
obs.)
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– Source: http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/F01Dhist.xls
 Denmark
– Variable & Period: Inter-bank interest rates (uncollateralized, 3 months maturity),
01/02/1989 - 07/16/2009 (5,155 obs.)
– Source: http://nationalbanken.statistikbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/
Define.asp?MainTable=DNUDDAG&PLanguage=1&PXSId=0
 France
– Variable & Period: 3-month Treasury Bill reference rate (bid rate), 01/03/1989 -
04/24/2009 (5,019 obs.)
– Source: http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/poli mone/taux/html/page4.htm
 Germany
– Variable & Period: 3-month funds rate ( ST0107, Money market rates reported by
Frankfurt banks), 01/01/1970 - 04/26/2009 (9,855 obs.)
– Source: http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik zeitreihen.en.php?lang
=en&open=&func=row&tr=ST0107
 Japan
– Variable & Period: 3-month Euro-market interest rate, 11/02/1979 - 09/30/2009
(7,329 obs.)
– Source: Bank of Sweden home page, http://www.riksbank.com/
templates/stat.aspx?id=17206
 New Zealand
– Variable & Period: Bank Bill Yields (90 days), 01/04/1985 - 07/24/2009 (6,183 obs.)
– Source: http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/exandint/b2/hb2.xls
 Norway
– Variable & Period: Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate (nominal, 3-month),
01/02/1986 - 07/15/2009 (5,928 obs.)
– Source: http://www.norges-bank.no/webdav/stat/en/renter/renter dag e.csv
 Sweden
– Variable & Period: Treasury Bill (3-month), 01/03/1983 - 04/24/2009 (6,565 obs.)
– Source: http://www.riksbank.com/templates/stat.aspx?id=17187
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 Switzerland
– Variable & Period: Swiss franc Libor (3-month), 01/03/1989 - 10/31/2007 (4,759
obs.)
– Source: http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/stat/statpub/histz/id/statpub histz actual,
Interest rates and yields - Historical time series 4, internet.xls
 UK
– Variable & Period: Sterling interbank lending rate, mean (3-month), 01/03/1978 -
04/24/2009 (7,916 obs.)
– Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/Index.asp?first=
yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-1&ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIx
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APPENDIX J
SCATTER PLOTS
Figure 40: Scatter plots of 10 countries against TB(3m, U.S.), 1990 - 1998
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Figure 41: Scatter plots of 10 countries against TB(3m, U.S.), 1999 - 08/08/2007
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APPENDIX K
VARIANCE RATIO TESTS
Table 27: Variance ratio tests of nominal interest rates in U.S. (time lag = 30 days)
1984 - 1995 1996 - 08/08/2007
Interest spreads
Variance ratio obs. test stastistic (p-value) ratio obs. test stastistic (p-value) ratio
FF (overnight) - TB(3m) 100 -3.1498 (0.0016)∗∗∗ 0.4846 97 -1.8448 (0.0651)∗ 0.7630
CD (3m)-TB(3m) 100 -1.0276 (0.3041) 0.8649 97 -0.2788 (0.7804) 0.9619
CP (financial, 3m) - - - 89 -1.9604 (0.0499)∗∗ 0.6631
ED (3m) - TB(3m) 100 -0.9118 (0.3619) 0.8839 97 -0.4529 (0.6506) 0.9415
Aaa - TCMNOM (30y) 100 -1.7228 (0.0849)∗ 0.8281 64 0.8201 (0.4121) 1.0814
Baa - Aaa 85 -1.1028 (0.2701) 0.8472 97 0.2942 (0.7686) 1.0298
TCMNOM (10y) - TB(3m) 100 0.4565 (0.6481) 1.0499 45 1.5845 (0.1131) 1.2164
TCMNOM (30y) - TB(3m) 100 1.4256 (0.1540) 1.1495 64 0.7622 (0.4460) 1.0654
Interest rates
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
FF (overnight) 101 0.5360 (0.5920) 1.0766 98 -0.6705 (0.5026) 0.8478
CD (3m) 100 1.8566 (0.0634)∗ 1.2340 97 3.3832 (0.0007)∗∗∗ 1.4715
CP (financial, 3m) - - - 89 3.6530 (0.0003)∗∗∗ 1.5332
ED (3m) 104 1.2821 (0.1998) 1.1487 98 3.7953 (0.0001)∗∗∗ 1.5186
TB (3m) 100 1.4966 (0.1345) 1.2070 97 2.4324 (0.0150)∗∗ 1.3190
Aaa 102 0.3157 (0.7522) 1.0400 97 -1.0005 (0.3171) 0.8883
Baa 85 1.0016 (0.3166) 1.1107 97 -1.5152 (0.1297) 0.8259
10 y 100 0.3974 (0.6910) 1.0525 97 -0.4410 (0.6592) 0.9506
30 y 100 0.9041 (0.3659) 1.1172 64 -0.8069 (0.4197) 0.8874
145
Table 28: Variance ratio tests of nominal interest rates for 10 countries (time lag = 30 days)
1984 -1995 1996-08/08/2007
Interest spreads
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
Australia 99 0.6736 (0.5005) 1.0928 95 2.0469 (0.0407)∗∗ 1.2186
Denmark 57 -1.2165 (0.2238) 0.6769 95 0.0940 (0.9251) 1.0154
France 55 0.6380 (0.5235) 1.1136 94 2.3953 (0.0166)∗∗ 1.2270
Germany 78 2.4905 (0.0128) 1.2555 75 1.3638 (0.1726) 1.2443
Japan 66 2.5125(0.0120)∗∗∗ 1.3461 96 1.0705 (0.2844) 1.1388
New Zealand 90 1.2158 (0.2240) 1.1412 95 1.5895 (0.1120) 1.3036
Norway 82 0.0581 (0.9536) 1.0137 95 3.0168 (0.0026)∗∗∗ 1.3100
Sweden 97 0.7531 (0.4514) 1.0919 94 3.9525 (0.0001)∗∗∗ 1.6106
Switzerland 58 1.1005 (0.2711) 1.1269 95 0.2823 (0.7777) 1.0419
UK 99 0.9316 (0.3515) 1.1022 95 1.6185 (0.1056) 1.2415
Interest rates
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
Australia 102 2.8011 (0.0051)∗∗∗ 1.3124 98 2.7951 (0.0052)∗∗∗ 1.3430
Denmark 59 -1.3023 (0.1928) 0.5825 98 1.2835 (0.1993) 1.1932
EU - - - 74 3.4299 (0.0006)∗∗∗ 1.3737
France 58 0.0337 (0.9731) 1.0065 97 4.0855 (4.3988e-005)∗∗∗ 1.4818
Germany 101 0.7871 (0.4312) 1.0728 98 2.7495 (0.0060)∗∗∗ 1.2494
Japan 68 2.9852 (0.0028)∗∗∗ 1.3452 99 0.6023 (0.5470) 1.0582
New Zealand 93 0.9230 (0.3560) 1.1294 98 2.7561 (0.0058)∗∗∗ 1.4588
Norway 85 -0.8373 (0.4025) 0.6325 98 2.8436 (0.0045)∗∗∗ 1.4204
Sweden 100 -0.7070 (0.4796) 0.6889 97 3.5080 (0.0005)∗∗∗ 1.5481
Switzerland 59 -1.1493 (0.2504) 0.8344 98 0.1997 (0.8417) 1.0253
UK 102 1.1148 (0.2649) 1.1506 98 3.2923 (0.0010)∗∗∗ 1.4610
U.S. (3m, TB) 100 1.4966 (0.1345) 1.2070 97 2.4324 (0.0150)∗∗ 1.3190
U.S. (3m, Euro-dollar ) 104 1.2821 (0.1998) 1.1487 98 3.7953 (0.0001)∗∗∗ 1.5186
Table 29: Variance ratio tests (1999-08/2007)
1999-08/08/2007 1999-08/08/2007
Interest rates time lag = 65 days time lag = 30 days
Variance ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio obs. test statistic (p-value) ratio
Australia 34 1.3178 (0.1876) 1.2757 73 2.4363(0.0148)∗∗ 1.3844
Denmark 34 1.8684(0.0617)∗ 1.3577 73 2.1633(0.0305)∗∗ 1.3637
EU 34 3.0545(0.0023)∗∗∗ 1.5922 74 3.7423(1.8232e-004)∗∗∗ 1.4338
France 33 3.3018(9.6061e-004)∗∗∗ 1.6118 72 4.2086(2.5695e-005)∗∗∗ 1.5646
Germany 34 2.9495(0.0032)∗∗∗ 1.5744 73 3.2227( 0.0013)∗∗∗ 1.3594
Japan 34 1.9406(0.0523)∗ 1.2391 72 1.5620(0.1183) 1.2554
New Zealand 34 2.6292(0.0086)∗∗∗ 1.3180 72 2.3195(0.0204)∗∗ 1.3150
Norway 34 2.3200(0.0203)∗∗ 1.3850 73 3.2445(0.0012)∗∗∗ 1.5137
Sweden 34 2.4904(0.0128)∗∗ 1.3929 72 3.6982(2.1710e-004)∗∗∗ 1.3921
Switzerland 34 1.4263(0.1538) 1.3139 73 2.4909(0.0127)∗∗ 1.2720
UK 34 1.9174(0.0552)∗ 1.1906 73 2.1419 (0.0322)∗∗ 1.2486
U.S. 34 3.0544(0.0023)∗∗∗ 1.6436 72 3.4935( 4.7674e-004)∗∗∗ 1.5607
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APPENDIX L
AN EXAMPLE OF THE “BUTTERFLY EFFECT”
Figure 42: Example of sensitive dependence on initial conditions
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APPENDIX M
PATHS OF COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL
Figure 43: Paths of it,$, i
d
t,$, i
w
t,$, and αt
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APPENDIX N
BIFURCATION DIAGRAMS
Figure 44: Bifurcation diagrams
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